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Abstract 
Many factors have emerged for change towards cleaner and more efficient technologies and 
services: climate change, increasing oil demands, and rising living standards in many parts of 
the world are putting an ever-increasing strain on the environment. Recently, these drivers 
have fueled the formation of a clean energy venture capital market where both independent 
venture capitalists (VCs) and corporate venture capitalists (CVCs) have invested in clean 
energy start-ups. Financing of clean energy market creation is the focus of this dissertation. 
The dissertation contributes to several bodies of literature in the area of entrepreneurship, new 
industry creation, corporate venturing, and venture capital research. The dissertation uses a 
grounded theory approach. The study is guided by three data collection approaches with an 
emphasis on the first two. First, interviews with European and North American VC and CVC 
firms that have invested in the clean energy sector were carried out. Second, a clean energy 
venture financing survey that consisted of qualitative, essay-format questions and some 
quantitative questions was carried out. Third, interviews with clean energy stakeholders were 
carried out in order to gain a better understanding of the emerging sector.  
The research results consist of three main findings. First, the research results suggest that 
clean energy ventures face the following three main entrepreneurial challenges: financing, 
market education, and growth management. A further study of three clean energy industry 
categories revealed additional challenges that varied according to the industry development 
stage. Second, the results demonstrate that, from a venture capitalist perspective, clean energy 
venture risk characteristics can be divided into two groups: generally recognized risk 
characteristics and cognitive risk characteristics. The identified generally recognized risk 
characteristics were market demand and adaptation, incompatibility with the VC model, 
technology, regulatory control, and exits. The four cognitive risk factors were investment 
outcome history, VC risk preferences, investment domain familiarity, and venture framing. 
Third, the study developed a model showing that parent firm organizational culture affects the 
performance of a CVC fund. The effect of the organizational culture is moderated by risk-
taking practices in the parent firm’s decision-making process and the parent firm’s skills in 
managing, measuring, and compensating fund success.  
The main contribution of this dissertation is in identifying theoretical models that explain the 
clean energy venture entrepreneurial challenges, how VCs view clean energy ventures from a 
risk perspective, and how the organizational culture of a firm affects its CVC activity. The 
findings of the study suggest several managerial implications to policy makers, corporations 
planning to launch CVC fund activities, venture capitalists, and clean energy ventures. The 
findings and limitations of the study suggest several avenues for future research. First of all, 
the developed models and propositions should be quantitatively tested and further refined. 
Furthermore, the effect of the parent firm’s organizational culture on the CVC fund 
performance warrants further investigation, preferably in some other than clean energy 
context. In addition, future research could explore the two other clean energy venture 
entrepreneurial challenges, growth management and market education, in more detail. The 
role of institutions and energy policy in the formation of clean energy markets, especially 
from the perspective of clean energy ventures and investors, would also be worth exploring in 
future research. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Markkina-ajurit puhtaan teknologian kysynnälle ovat voimistumassa. Ilmastonmuutos, öljyn 
kysynnän kasvu sekä elinolojen koheneminen siirtymätalouksissa kuormittavat 
ympäristöämme yhä kiihtyvään tahtiin. Nämä markkina-ajurit on huomattu myös 
pääomasijoittajien keskuudessa. Sekä itsenäiset riskisijoitusyhtiöt että teollisuusyritysten 
riskisijoitusrahastot ovat viime vuosien aikana alkaneet sijoittaa puhtaan energiateknologian 
parissa työskenteleviin pienyrityksiin. Tämä väitöskirjatutkimus keskittyy puhtaan 
energiateknologian pienyritysten rahoitukseen erityisesti pääomasijoitusten näkökulmasta. 
Väitöskirjan luo uutta tietoa usealla alueella mukaanlukien yrittäjyys, uusien toimialojen 
synty, uuden liiketoiminnan luominen suuryrityksissä sekä pääomasijoittaminen. 
Väitöskirjatyö käyttää nk. grounded theory –tutkimusmenetelmää. Tutkimuksessa kerättiin 
tietoa käyttäen seuraavaa kolmea lähestymistapaa: Eurooppalaisten ja Pohjois-
Amerikkalaisten puhtaaseen energiateknologiaan sijoittaneiden pääomasijoittajien 
tutkimushaastattelut, globaali kyselytutkimus kohdistuen puhtaan energiateknologian 
yrityksiin sekä haastattelut puhtaan energiateknologian sidosryhmien parissa.  
Tutkimuksen tulokset koostuvat kolmesta päätuloksesta. Ensiksi, tutkimustulokset osoittavat, 
että alkuvaiheessa olevien puhtaan energiateknologian yritysten haasteet koostuvat pääasiassa 
seuraavasta kolmesta aihealueesta: yrityksen toiminnan rahoitus, kohdemarkkinan 
kouluttaminen sekä yrityksen kasvun hallinta. Lähempi tarkastelu osoitti, että yritysten 
haasteet eroavat kyseessä olevan energiateknologian kehitysvaiheesta riippuen. Toiseksi, 
tutkimusten tulosten perusteella voidaan osoittaa, että pääomasijoittajien riskikartta puhtaan 
energiateknologian yritysten suhteen voidaan jakaa kahteen osaan: yleisesti tiedossa oleviin ja 
tunnustettaviin riskitekijöihin sekä kognitiivisiin riskitekijöihin. Yleisesti tunnustettavia 
riskitekijöitä olivat markkinan synty ja sopeutuminen, yrityksen yhteensopimattomuus 
risksijoitusmallin kanssa, teknologia, lainsäädäntö sekä sijoituksista irtautuminen. 
Kognitiivisia riskitekijöitä olivat aiemmin tehtyjen sijoitusten menestys, riskisijoittajan 
riskihakuisuus, sijoituskohteen toimialan tuntemus sekä yrityksen liikeidean esitystapa. 
Kolmanneksi, tutkimusten tulosten perusteella kehitettiin malli joka kuvaa emoyrityksen 
organisaatiokulttuurin vaikutusta yrityksen hallinnoiman pääomasijoitusrahaston 
toimintakykyyn. Mallin mukaan organisaatiokulttuurin vaikutusta voi vähentää emoyrityksen 
käyttämä päätöksentekomalli sekä emoyrityksen kyky johtaa, mitata ja palkita 
pääomasijoitusrahaston menestystä. 
Väitöskirjatutkimus loi uutta teoreettisesta tietoa puhtaan energiateknologian yritysten 
haasteista, pääomasijoittajien riskikartasta kyseisten yritysten suhteen sekä 
organisaatiokulttuurin vaikutuksesta yrityksen pääomasijoitusrahaston menestykseen. 
Väitöskirjan tuloksia voidaan soveltaa sekä yhteiskunnallisessa päätöksenteossa 
ympäristöhallinnon alalla sekä elinkeinoelämässä pääomasijoittajien ja puhtaan teknologian 
yritysen keskuudessa. Jatkotutkimusaiheiksi ehdotetetaan kehitettyjen teoreettisten mallien 
kvantitatiivista testausta sekä kehitetyn organisaatiokulttuurimallin testausta muilla 
toimialoilla. Tämän lisäksi kohdemarkkinan kouluttamisen ja yrityksen kasvun hallinnan 
haasteita aloittelevissa puhtaan energiateknologian yrityksissä tulisi tutkia. 
  iii 
Acknowledgements 
One of the great sides of working on a PhD is that one meets a lot of interesting and talented 
people. My PhD journey has brought me new colleagues and friends in Finland, other Nordic 
countries, Switzerland and the United States. This manuscript would not exist if not for the 
support of many people. I want to thank them all for sharing their time and expertise with me. 
First of all I express my warmest thanks to my supervisor Professor Tuula Pohjola. She made 
sure that I had enough time from other research duties to work on my PhD thesis, was very 
flexible with my several month long research visits abroad, approved all the PhD coursework 
I carried out in other Nordic universities and provided invaluable assistance in finishing up 
the PhD project. I also want to thank my instructor Professor Raimo Lovio from Helsinki 
School of Economics for providing many intelligent perspectives and recommendations to 
consider. I am also thankful to Professor Lassi Linnanen who encouraged me to pursue post-
graduate studies and who helped me to get started with my topic. Finally, my thanks go to Dr. 
Rolf Wuestenhagen from University of St.Gallen in Switzerland with whom I have 
collaborated throughout the research process. I have learned a great deal from Rolf by co-
authoring papers and conducting research interviews together.  I want to thank Rolf also for 
the many discussions we have had over a cup of coffee or email during the past three years, 
and for sharing his contacts to VCs and energy entrepreneurs. Rolf has managed to create the 
IWÖ into a hub that brings together researchers and students that share an interest in 
sustainable entrepreneurship and venture capital. I also want to express a special thanks to one 
of the hub members, Bill Moore, for his insightful comments and for being a great research 
colleague. I also want to thank the whole IWÖ for hosting me and making me feel right at 
home during my research visit to IWÖ in the spring of 2004.  
I wish to thank Professor Staffan Jacobsson from Chalmers University in Sweden for acting 
as my opponent. I also got many valuable comments and recommendations from my pre-
examiners, Professor Michel Bernasconi from CERAM Sophia Antipolis and Docent, Dr. 
Minna Halme from Helsinki School of Economics. Their comments had a crucial impact on 
many issues and helped me in clarifying the main message of the thesis. I appreciate them for 
sharing their time and expertise in this field with me. 
The Environmental and Quality Management unit, or better known as the “EMU-team”, has 
provided me with a fun and supportive working environment. Against all odds, the EMU-
team has managed to stay alive and thrived through several re-organizations and focus 
changes, and has attracted exceptionally warm-hearted and talented researchers into the team. 
My warmest thanks go for all the former and current members of the EMU-team. I especially 
want to thank Hanne, Timo and Adeline for the research work we carried out together in 
various projects during the past years. I also want to thank Professor Janne Hukkinen and his 
PhD students for all the valuable feedback I received in Janne’s PhD seminars over the past 
four years. I am also grateful for all the colleagues, PhD students and department personnel at 
the Industrial Engineering and Management Department for all the help I have received over 
the years and the interesting discussions we have had. I especially want to thank Satu 
Teerikangas for all the PhD related discussions we had. 
I also give special acknowledgements to all the survey respondents and the interviewees I 
have worked with. A lot of very busy people found time from their calendars to meet up with 
me for an interview. The interview part was the most enriching and interesting phase of the 
research process that I greatly enjoyed. Without them I would not have had the interesting 
empirical data which formed the core of my research. This manuscript also owes to the 
  iv 
questions raised in conferences, seminars and doctoral consortiums when earlier versions of 
the research findings have been presented.  
The research for this dissertation has been funded by Technology Development Agency of 
Finland (Tekes), Fortum foundation, Foundation for Economic Education 
(Liikesivistysrahasto), the Finnish Cultural Foundation (Suomen Kulttuurirahasto) and the 
Finland-Iceland Culture Foundation, which is gratefully acknowledged. The funding has 
enabled me to focus full-time on research and has made international interview, research visit 
and PhD course work related travel possible. I especially want to thank Raija Pikku-Pyhältö 
and Pekka Pesonen from Tekes and Mervi Salminen from Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(KTM) for their support of the YmpReg project. Big thanks go also for Torsti Loikkanen and 
Jukka Hyvönen from VTT without whom YmpReg project would not have succeeded. Big 
thanks go out also for people at Sitra for showing interest and support in my research. 
In the spring of 2005 I had the pleasure of carrying out research in the United States. I 
especially want to thank Professor Dan Kammen from the University of California at 
Berkeley who hosted my visit to Renewable and Appropriate Energy Lab (RAEL). I cannot 
think of a more inspiring environment than UC Berkeley and RAEL lab to pay a research visit 
to, and I am truly grateful to Dan for hosting me for three months. I also want to thank Greg 
Nemet for the discussions we had and all the help he provided, and Annette Loveless for 
helping out with all the practicalities in the lab and making everyday life fun! Big thanks go 
out also for all the RAELies that I met during the lunch seminars and the ERG PhD seminars. 
I hope we will meet again. 
I want to also express my sincere gratitude to my parents, who have always emphasized the 
value of education and have invested so much time and effort in their children. Through the 
time spent at the Loppi farm they have taught me an appreciative attitude towards work and 
have also supported me in all of my endeavors. Big thanks go also for all my siblings and 
their families that have been supportive during my PhD studies although it has puzzled them 
why someone would like to spend so much time doing academic research. I also want to 
thank all my friends who have shared the ups and downs and contributed significantly by their 
support, understanding and encouragement. Special thanks to my business partner Timo who 
has been very understanding in the finishing stage of the thesis, which took away precious 
time that could have been used to work on Cleantech Invest. Finally, my deepest gratitude and 
love goes to Tim and little Olav. Tim has made sure I have done also other things than just 
research and has been a very understanding companion in our common journey. Olav has 
already shown great patience and understanding in his mother’s overly optimistic time 
management habits. Olav arrived 9 days over the expected date and thus let his mother to 
submit the thesis for external review before he was born.  
 
Helsinki, May 18th 2006 
 
Tarja Teppo 
  v 
 
Abstract...................................................................................................................................................... i 
Tiivistelmä ................................................................................................................................................ ii 
Acknowledgements.................................................................................................................................. iii 
1. Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Background............................................................................................................................ 1 
1.2. Research Questions and Contributions .............................................................................. 2 
1.3. Scope and Limitations .......................................................................................................... 4 
1.4. Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 5 
1.5. Structure of the Dissertation................................................................................................ 5 
2. Definitions ....................................................................................................................................... 8 
2.1. Cleantech................................................................................................................................ 8 
2.2. Clean Energy ......................................................................................................................... 9 
2.3. Entrepreneurial Challenge................................................................................................... 9 
2.4. Venture Capital ..................................................................................................................... 9 
2.5. Corporate Venture Capital Fund Performance............................................................... 10 
2.6. Organizational Culture....................................................................................................... 10 
2.7. Venture Risk Characteristics............................................................................................. 11 
2.8. Industry Development Stage .............................................................................................. 11 
3. Review of Existing Knowledge ..................................................................................................... 12 
3.1. Industry Emergence and Evolution .................................................................................. 12 
3.1.1. Emergence of New Firms............................................................................................. 14 
3.1.2. Cleantech and Clean Energy Industry Emergence....................................................... 16 
3.1.3. Barriers, Opportunities, and Characteristics ................................................................ 17 
3.2. Entrepreneurs and Industry Creation.............................................................................. 20 
3.2.1. Entrepreneurs and Legitimacy ..................................................................................... 22 
3.2.2. Entrepreneurial Strategies ............................................................................................ 23 
3.3. Industry Incumbents and New Market Creation ............................................................ 27 
3.3.1. Organizational Culture and Incumbent Firms.............................................................. 28 
3.3.2. Innovation and Incumbent Firms ................................................................................. 29 
3.3.3. Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) ............................................................................... 30 
3.3.4. CVC Challenges and Success Factors.......................................................................... 32 
3.4. Financing Industry Creation ............................................................................................. 33 
3.4.1. Venture Capital (VC) ................................................................................................... 34 
3.4.2. VC and Entrepreneurs .................................................................................................. 36 
3.4.3. VC and Cleantech Ventures ......................................................................................... 37 
  vi 
3.4.4. VC Investment Decision-Making ................................................................................ 38 
4. Methodology and Research Process............................................................................................. 44 
4.1. Methodological Choices...................................................................................................... 44 
4.2. Research Setting .................................................................................................................. 47 
4.2.1. VC and CVC Funds...................................................................................................... 47 
4.2.2. Clean Energy Ventures................................................................................................. 50 
4.2.3. Other Clean Energy Market Stakeholders ................................................................... 51 
4.3. Research Process ................................................................................................................. 52 
4.3.1. Data Sources and Data Collection................................................................................ 53 
4.3.2. Data Analysis ............................................................................................................... 56 
5. Cleantech and Clean Energy Market........................................................................................... 60 
5.1. Cleantech VC Market......................................................................................................... 60 
5.2. Clean Energy VC Market................................................................................................... 62 
5.2.1. CVC Funds and Other Investors .................................................................................. 64 
5.3. Clean Energy Market Drivers ........................................................................................... 65 
5.3.1. Climate Change and Governmental Commitment ....................................................... 65 
5.3.2. Energy Uncertainty and Security ................................................................................. 67 
5.3.3. Technological Advances and Solutions to Climate Problem....................................... 68 
6. Clean Energy Venture Entrepreneurial Challenges................................................................... 70 
6.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 70 
6.2. Methodological Notes.......................................................................................................... 71 
6.3. Entrepreneurial Challenges ............................................................................................... 71 
6.3.1. Financing ...................................................................................................................... 72 
6.3.2. Market Education ......................................................................................................... 75 
6.3.3. Growth Management.................................................................................................... 78 
6.4. Entrepreneurial Challenges in Development Stages ....................................................... 82 
6.4.1. Early-Stage Ventures: Technology and Cost Challenge.............................................. 84 
6.4.2. Rapid Growth Ventures: Production and Cost Challenge ........................................... 86 
6.4.3. Slow Growth Ventures: Marketing Challenge............................................................. 89 
6.5. Discussion............................................................................................................................. 92 
7. Clean Energy Venture Risk Characteristics................................................................................ 95 
7.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 95 
7.2. Methodological Notes.......................................................................................................... 96 
7.3. Clean Energy Venture Risk Characteristics .................................................................... 96 
7.4. Clean Energy Venture Generally Recognized Risk Characteristics ............................. 97 
7.4.1. Market Demand and Adaptation .................................................................................. 97 
7.4.2. Incompatibility with VC Model ................................................................................. 101 
  vii 
7.4.3. Technology................................................................................................................. 103 
7.4.4. Regulatory Control ..................................................................................................... 105 
7.4.5. Exits ............................................................................................................................ 107 
7.5. Clean Energy Venture Cognitive Risk Characteristics................................................. 108 
7.5.1. Investment Outcome History ..................................................................................... 108 
7.5.2. Venture Capitalist Risk Preferences........................................................................... 110 
7.5.3. Clean Energy Venture Investment Domain Familiarity ............................................ 113 
7.5.4. Venture Framing......................................................................................................... 118 
7.6. Discussion........................................................................................................................... 119 
8. Parent Firm’s Organizational Culture and CVC Fund Performance ..................................... 120 
8.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 120 
8.2. Methodological Notes........................................................................................................ 121 
8.3. CVC Fund Motivation for Investing in Clean Energy .................................................. 121 
8.4. Clean Energy Venture Experience with CVC Funds.................................................... 124 
8.5. Developed Model ............................................................................................................... 126 
8.6. Industry Context ............................................................................................................... 128 
8.7. Parent Firm’s Organizational Culture ........................................................................... 129 
8.7.1. Parent Firm’s View of Innovation.............................................................................. 130 
8.7.2. Parent Firm’s View of Industry Development........................................................... 132 
8.7.3. Parent Firm’s Entrepreneurial Spirit .......................................................................... 134 
8.8. Risk and Organizational Decision-Making .................................................................... 136 
8.9. Measuring and Managing Success .................................................................................. 139 
8.10. CVC Fund Performance................................................................................................... 142 
8.11. Discussion........................................................................................................................... 145 
9. Discussion and Conclusions....................................................................................................... 146 
9.1. Discussion of Results ......................................................................................................... 146 
9.1.1. Clean Energy Venture Entrepreneurial Challenges ................................................... 147 
9.1.2. Clean Energy Venture Risk Characteristics............................................................... 149 
9.1.3. Parent Firm’s Organizational Culture and CVC Fund Performance ......................... 150 
9.2. Theoretical Contributions of the Dissertation................................................................ 151 
9.3. Managerial Implications................................................................................................... 152 
9.4. Limitations and Directions for Further Research ......................................................... 154 
References ............................................................................................................................................ 156 
Appendix 1............................................................................................................................................ 177 
  viii 
List of Figures 
Figure 1 Structure of the dissertation ....................................................................................................... 6 
Figure 2 Source: Nth Power, CleanEdge, PricewaterhouseCoopers / Venture Economics / NVCA 
money tree survey .......................................................................................................................... 63 
Figure 3 Van de Ven et al.  (1989 and 1993) model for industry development .................................... 92 
Figure 4 Van de Ven et al. (1989 and 1993) model for clean energy ventures ..................................... 93 
Figure 5 Clean energy venture risk characteristics ................................................................................ 97 
Figure 6 Effect of parent firm’s organizational culture on CVC fund performance ........................... 127 
Figure 7 Summary of the study results................................................................................................. 146 
 
  ix 
List of Lists 
List 1 Cleantech Industry Categories ....................................................................................................... 8 
List 2 Profile of Ideal Entrepreneur from VC Perspective..................................................................... 37 
List 3 Framework of Clean Energy Entrepreneurial Challenges ........................................................... 72 
List 4 Early-Stage Clean Energy Venture Entrepreneurial Challenges ................................................. 84 
List 5 Rapid Growth Clean Energy Venture Entrepreneurial Challenges ............................................. 87 
List 6 Slow-Growth Clean Energy Venture Entrepreneurial Challenges .............................................. 89 
List 7 Risk characteristic: Market Demand and Adaptation .................................................................. 98 
List 8 Example Venture Responses Regarding Speed of Market Adoption ........................................ 100 
List 9 Risk characteristic: Incompatibility with the VC Model ........................................................... 101 
List 10 Example Venture Responses Regarding Long Investment Lead Times.................................. 103 
List 11 Risk characteristic: Technology ............................................................................................... 104 
List 12 VC and Venture Responses Regarding Technological Uncertainty of Clean Energy Ventures
...................................................................................................................................................... 105 
List 13 Risk characteristic: Regulatory Control ................................................................................... 105 
List 14 VC and Venture Responses Regarding Regulatory Risk of Clean Energy Ventures.............. 106 
List 15 Risk characteristic: Exits .......................................................................................................... 107 
List 16 VC and Venture Responses Regarding Scarcity of Exit Opportunities................................... 108 
List 17 Risk characteristic: Investment Outcome History ................................................................... 109 
List 18 VC and Venture Responses Regarding Clean Energy Venture Outcome History .................. 109 
List 19 Risk characteristic: VC Risk Preferences ................................................................................ 111 
List 20 VC and Venture Responses Regarding VC Risk Aversion ..................................................... 111 
List 21 VC and Venture Responses Regarding Reluctance to Enter Early-Stage Deals in Clean Energy 
Sector ........................................................................................................................................... 112 
List 22 VC and Venture Responses Regarding Reluctance to be First Movers .................................. 113 
List 23 Risk characteristic: Investment Domain Familiarity ............................................................... 115 
List 24 VC and Venture Responses Regarding VC Ability to Identify Clean Energy Business 
Opportunities................................................................................................................................ 115 
List 25 VC and Venture Example Responses Regarding VC Hesitancy to Enter Unfamiliar Investment 
Areas ............................................................................................................................................ 117 
List 26 Risk characteristic: Venture Framing....................................................................................... 118 
List 27 Entrepreneurs' Tendency to Solve Problems Beyond Traditional Economic Scope............... 118 
List 28 Factors related to Parent Firm’s Organizational Culture ......................................................... 129 
List 29 Factors related to Decision-Making in Organizations ............................................................. 137 
List 30 Factors related to Managing and Measuring Success .............................................................. 140 
 
  x 
List of Tables 
Table 1 Eight Barriers to Technological Regime Shift .......................................................................... 18 
Table 2 Entrepreneurial Strategies to Promote New Industry Development......................................... 24 
Table 3 Impact of Commercialization Environment on Start-Up Strategies ......................................... 26 
Table 4 Characteristics Used by VCs in Deal Assessment .................................................................... 35 
Table 5 Review of Behavioral Finance .................................................................................................. 38 
Table 6 Venture Capital Industry Strategies to Manage Risk................................................................ 40 
Table 7 Interviewed VC and CVC Funds............................................................................................... 48 
Table 8 Interviewed Clean Energy Market Stakeholders....................................................................... 51 
Table 9 Clean Energy Venture Financing Survey Overview................................................................. 55 
Table 10 Elements Used in Axial Coding and Examples ...................................................................... 58 
Table 11 Strategies Available to Reduce Carbon Emissions ................................................................. 68 
Table 12 Survey Data Examples Regarding Financing Challenge ........................................................ 74 
Table 13 Survey Data Examples Regarding Market Education Challenge ........................................... 77 
Table 14 Survey Data Examples Regarding Growth Management Challenge...................................... 80 
Table 15 Industry Development Stages and Clean Energy Industry Categories Used in Study ........... 83 
Table 16 Survey Data Examples Regarding Technology and Cost Challenge of Early-Stage Clean 
Energy Ventures............................................................................................................................. 86 
Table 17 Survey Data Examples Regarding Production and Cost Challenge of Rapid-Growth Clean 
Energy Ventures............................................................................................................................. 88 
Table 18 Demand-Side Interventions..................................................................................................... 91 
Table 19 Survey Data Examples Regarding Marketing Challenge of Slow-Growth Clean Energy 
Ventures ......................................................................................................................................... 91 
Table 20 Venture Responses Regarding Challenges with CVC Funds ............................................... 125 
Table 21 Status of Interviewed CVC Funds, October 2005................................................................. 143 
  1 
1. Introduction 
We are investing in environmentally cleaner technology because we believe 
it will increase our revenue, our value and our profits… Not because it is 
trendy or moral, but because it will accelerate our growth and make us 
more competitive. 
-- Jeff Immelt, CEO of General Electric 
 
For far-sighted companies, the environment may turn out to be the biggest 
opportunity for enterprise and invention the industrial world has ever seen. 
-- The Economist 
1.1. Background 
Many factors are emerging for change towards cleaner and more efficient technologies and 
services: climate change, increasing oil demands, and rising living standards in many parts of 
the world that are putting an ever-increasing strain on the environment. Russo (2003) argues 
that there are strong social and institutional elements to the push towards greening. These 
elements create opportunities for innovative entrepreneurial firms and require existing firms 
to adapt to a changing business environment. Recently, these factors have led to the formation 
of a clean technology (“cleantech”) venture capital market where both independent venture 
capitalists (VCs) and corporate venture capitalists (CVCs) have invested in cleantech start-
ups. The most prominent area of investment has been the energy sector, as approximately 
40% of all cleantech VC investments have gone to clean energy technologies (Parker 2005). 
Financing of clean energy market creation is the focus of this dissertation. 
New venture creation, entrepreneurship, venture capital, and external corporate venturing in 
the form of corporate venture capital have received significant attention from academic 
researchers during the past decade. This dissertation is motivated by three reasons. First, most 
of the studies have concentrated on industries that have experienced a “venture capital glut,” 
such as Internet and communications technologies. Venturing in the area of clean energy has 
received scant attention from academic researchers, although other press, such as business 
periodicals, has noted the emerging cleantech and clean energy market on several occasions 
(Henig 2003, De Callejon 2005, Parker 2005, Prudencio 2005, Cauchi 2004, Liebreich 2005, 
Sheahan 2004, Copeland 2005, Higginbotham 2005, LaRuffa 2004, Weeks 2004, Wilson 
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2003, Gunderson et al. 2003, Abrams 2004, Landry 2002, Frankel 2000, Stone 2003, Harvey 
2005, and Rivlin 2005). Second, technological change and industry creation literature has 
largely ignored new business creation or adaptation to environmental and social 
sustainability-induced changes in the business environment. Recently, it has been noted that, 
for example, climate change poses strategic dilemmas for companies across a range of 
industries, affecting those that produce fossil fuels, depend on fossil fuels directly or 
indirectly, and those interested in developing new opportunities (Kolk et al. 2004). 
Third, most existing literature regarding market creation for environmental technologies, 
referred to in this study as the cleantech sector, has focused on the policy perspective and 
effectiveness of governmental regulation. However, Kolk et al. (2005) argue that dramatic 
change has taken place in the policy and strategy debate on climate change. Instead of 
focusing solely on political and non-market strategies, a range of market responses is 
emerging to address global warming and reduction of emissions through product and process 
innovations. Only a small body of literature exists that analyzes business creation in the 
emerging market of clean energy. One can argue that our knowledge of clean energy venture 
entrepreneurial challenges, the role of private equity fueling the clean energy industry 
formation, and the entrepreneurial activities of industry incumbents is very limited. This 
dissertation aims to expand the knowledge base of clean energy venture entrepreneurial 
challenges and financing. The dissertation is a theory-building study, which utilizes previous 
research and empirical data to build models and propositions that can be used in further 
research of the clean energy market and the cleantech market in general. 
1.2. Research Questions and Contributions 
We have limited knowledge on clean energy industry emergence and how investors view the 
market. Also, we have little coherent theory that would explain clean energy entrepreneurial 
challenges, especially in the area of venture financing. This dissertation addresses the gap in 
our understanding by developing a venture financing perspective of clean energy industry 
emergence. Venture financing is the key element for clean energy entrepreneurial ventures, as 
in all industrial areas where acquiring funding may either “make or break” the venture. By 
studying the relationship between investors and clean energy entrepreneurial firms, the 
dissertation illuminates the entrepreneurial challenges that clean energy firms and the 
emerging clean energy market are facing. The dissertation addresses the following research 
question: 
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In the clean energy market, what entrepreneurial challenges do clean energy 
ventures face, and what role do venture capitalists and large firms play in 
the development of the clean energy market? 
To contribute to answering the wider research question presented above, three more precise 
sub-questions are developed that are directly addressed in this dissertation. The first question 
aims at describing the entrepreneurial challenges clean energy ventures face in order to 
provide a comprehensive description. The first question to be addressed is: 
1. What entrepreneurial challenges do clean energy ventures face and how 
do these challenges vary between the development stages of different clean 
energy industry categories? 
To answer this first question, this dissertation develops a framework of clean energy venture 
entrepreneurial challenges. The framework is extended by analyzing entrepreneurial 
challenges specific to clean energy ventures operating in three different clean energy industry 
categories, where each category is in a different development stage. 
The second question concerns the role of VCs in creation of the clean energy market. Venture 
capitalists have been shown to be indicative for innovation and emergence of a new sector for 
two reasons. First, in the past decades, several of the new emerging technological sectors, 
such as biotechnology and Internet and telecommunications sector, have been financed, in 
large part, by venture capital investment in the early stages of the sector development. 
Second, venture capital has been shown to have a strong positive impact on innovation 
(Gompers et al. 2001, and Kortum et al. 2000). For example, Gompers et al. estimate that, on 
average, a dollar of venture capital appears to have three to four times more potential in 
stimulating patenting, and thus spurring innovative new activity, than a dollar of corporate 
R&D. The dissertation is guided by the second question: 
2. How do the decision-making behavior and possible cognitive biases of a 
VC contribute to a clean energy venture’s chances of raising capital? 
The third sub-question studies the role of large firms in creation of the clean energy market, 
concentrating on a special vehicle of external corporate venturing, namely corporate venture 
capital. This dissertation argues that analyzing the parent firm’s organizational culture brings 
new perspectives to understanding the performance of a corporate venture capital fund. 
Corporate venture capital literature has shown corporate venture capital funds to be volatile 
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(Gompers et al. 2001) and varying in success (Sykes 1986, Siegel et al. 1988, Gompers et al. 
1998, and Chesbrough 2000). Learning capability (Keil 2000) has been referred to as one of 
the factors determining CVC fund performance differences. However, the role of the parent 
firm’s organizational culture on CVC fund performance has remained unexplored. The third 
question addressed is: 
3. How does the parent firm’s organizational culture affect the performance 
of a corporate venture capital fund and what are the implications to clean 
energy market creation? 
By answering to these three research questions, the dissertation contributes to several bodies 
of literature. First, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of clean energy 
entrepreneurship and the entrepreneurial challenges clean energy ventures face. Second, 
providing a model of clean energy venture risk characteristics by taking into account the 
venture capitalist cognitive biases contributes to the venture capital literature by linking 
behavioral economics literature with the venture capitalist decision-making process. Finally, 
the dissertation advances our understanding of the role of large corporations in creating the 
clean energy market and highlights how the parent firm’s organizational culture affects CVC 
fund performance. 
1.3. Scope and Limitations 
This dissertation focuses on entrepreneurial challenges of clean energy ventures and the role 
investors and large firms play in the development of the clean energy market. The scope of 
the dissertation is limited along both theoretical and empirical dimensions. 
The theoretical scope is limited to clean energy market development. From the investor’s 
side, the scope is venture capital firms making equity or equity-linked investments in 
privately held clean energy ventures. The venture capital firms may be independently 
managed, government-backed, or backed by a corporation. The investment scope excludes 
buyouts, consolidations, mezzanines, or other forms of private equity.  
The empirical data of venture capital firms is limited to Europe and North America. On clean 
energy ventures, the data are dominated by European and North American ventures, although 
some Asian and South American ventures are included in the empirical data set.  
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1.4. Methodology 
The dissertation uses a grounded theory approach (Strauss et al. 1998, Corbin et al. 1990, 
Creswell 1998 and 2003, and Ryan et al. 2000). The study is guided by three data collection 
approaches with an emphasis on the first two. First, interviews with European and North 
American VC and CVC firms that have invested in the clean energy sector were carried out. 
Second, a clean energy venture financing survey that consisted of qualitative, essay-format 
questions and some quantitative questions was carried out. The survey collected data from 
clean energy ventures less than 10 years of age. Third, interviews with clean energy 
stakeholders, media search, and attendance of conferences in the clean energy and cleantech 
area were carried out in order to gain a better understanding of the emerging sector.  
The use of multiple data collection approaches seems justified, as the goal of the study is 
theory building rather than testing or expanding existing theory. Grounded theory approach 
was chosen for the following reasons. First, cleantech and clean energy market emergence and 
the financing of clean energy ventures has received scant attention in the literature. Second, 
little coherent theory exists that would explain the biggest entrepreneurial challenges clean 
energy ventures face and the risk characteristics of clean energy ventures from the VC 
perspective, and especially the characteristics due to possible cognitive biases. Third, the 
cognitive side of VC decision-making has received insufficient attention in the literature and 
little theory building exists on this matter. Departing from the tradition of the early-grounded 
theory methods (Glaser et al. 1967), this dissertation also utilizes links to existing theory. 
First, an extensive literature review of theories that have guided the thinking and 
argumentation of the researcher is provided. In the theory building chapters, literature is 
consulted to refine findings from the empirical data.  
1.5. Structure of the Dissertation 
The structure of the dissertation is shown in Figure 1. Chapter 2 provides the central 
definitions. Chapter 3 presents a literature review of previous research relevant to the research 
questions the dissertation addresses: industry emergence, entrepreneurial challenges, 
incumbents and technological change, financing of industry creation, and decision-making 
behavior in risky situations. The theory review highlights the findings of previous research 
and points out issues that have previously been ignored and that are addressed in the empirical 
part of the dissertation. Chapter 4 introduces the research methodology and process. Chapter 5 
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provides an introduction to the research context of the dissertation, the clean energy market, 
including discussion of the industry drivers and overview of venture capital investment 
activity in the sector.  
Introduction 
Chapter 1
Definitions
Chapter 2
Review of Existing Knowledge
Chapter 3
Methodology and Research Process
Chapter 4
Cleantech and Clean Energy Market
Chapter 5
Clean Energy Venture
Entrepreneurial Challenges
Chapter 6
Clean Energy Venture Risk
Characteristics
Chapter 7
Parent Firm Organizational
Culture and CVC Fund
Performance
Chapter 8
Discussion and Conclusions
Chapter 9
Theory Building
 
Figure 1 Structure of the dissertation 
Theory building of the dissertation takes place in three steps. First, chapter 6 develops a 
framework of clean energy venture entrepreneurial challenges based on the empirical data 
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gathered from the clean energy venture financing survey. Chapter 7 introduces a model of 
clean energy venture risk characteristics by taking into account the venture capitalist cognitive 
biases on clean energy entrepreneurial ventures. Chapter 8 develops a model that aims to 
explain the effect of the parent firm’s organizational culture on the performance of a corporate 
venture capital fund. The empirical data presented in chapters 7 and 8 are based on VC and 
CVC interviews and data from the clean energy venture financing survey.  
In chapter 9, conclusions from the dissertation are presented. The theoretical contributions 
and managerial implications are outlined. Finally, limitations of the study and avenues of 
further research are presented. 
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2. Definitions 
Several terms used in this dissertation require a clear definition to ensure that the theory 
building is not only grounded in empirical data but can be used to extend existing knowledge. 
Eight definitions will be introduced in this chapter: cleantech, clean energy, entrepreneurial 
challenge, venture capital, corporate venture capital fund performance, organizational culture, 
venture risk characteristic, and industry development stage.  
2.1. Cleantech 
In this dissertation, cleantech is used to refer to technologies that optimize the use of natural 
resources while reducing ecological impacts and increasing economic value. Cleantech, as a 
term, is not specific to any particular industry, but it is a broader concept that can be applied 
to various industries (Parker 2005). According to Cleantech Venture Network (CVN), these 
industries can include agriculture, building materials, energy, household appliances, 
pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, transportation, and water treatment (Parker). Burtis et al. 
(2004) have defined eleven cleantech industry categories, as shown in List 1.  
List 1 Cleantech Industry Categories 
Advanced materials and nanotechnology 
Agriculture and nutrition 
Air quality 
Consumer products 
Enabling technologies and services 
Energy generation, storage, and infrastructure 
Environmental information technology 
Manufacturing / Industrial technologies 
Materials recovery and recycling 
Transportation and logistics 
Waste and water purification and management 
 
According to Russo (2003), the common characteristic of firms operating in a sustainable 
industry, such as cleantech industry, is that they represent a transformational form of 
entrepreneurial activity that has a trajectory towards sustainability. 
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2.2. Clean Energy 
In this dissertation, clean energy ventures are defined as providing energy technologies and 
services that reduce environmental impacts, are socially acceptable, and can be economically 
competitive (Moore 2004). Clean energy technologies and services can be divided into four 
main clusters: renewable energy, distributed energy systems, natural gas, and demand-side 
energy efficiency (Pfeuti 2002). Clean energy ventures contain environmental, social, and 
economic factors. Economic factors consist of cost savings by limiting consumer costs of 
energy and by providing energy services for economic growth. Environmental factors in clean 
energy ventures are related to the energy supply source used that may contribute to air 
pollution, greenhouse gases, or other impacts on ecosystems. Social factors in clean energy 
ventures consist of the security of supply aspects.  
2.3. Entrepreneurial Challenge 
Entrepreneurship studies focus on start-up and growth activities, recognizing the importance 
of such resources as money, people, and information that must be acquired to launch a 
venture (Brush et al. 2001). In this dissertation, the term entrepreneurial challenge refers to a 
particular management task that emerges during the venture development. Entrepreneurial 
challenges are confronted in identifying, attracting, combining, and transforming 
technological, financial, informational, human, and other resources during the venture 
development process. Brush et al. have suggested some example prescriptions for meeting 
entrepreneurial challenges: seeking advice from a network of contacts, assessing decision 
characteristics of equity providers, delegating responsibilities, developing controls, and 
setting policies. 
2.4. Venture Capital 
Venture capital refers, in this study, to as professional equity co-invested with the 
entrepreneur to fund an early-stage (seed and start-up) or expansion venture (EVCA 2005). A 
venture capitalist is the manager of a private equity fund who has responsibility for the 
management of the fund’s investment in a particular portfolio company. The venture capitalist 
brings in capital, domain knowledge, business contacts, brand equity, and strategic advice 
(EVCA). Private equity provides equity capital to enterprises not quoted on a stock market 
and can be used to develop new products and technologies, to expand working capital, to 
make acquisitions, or to strengthen a company’s balance sheet (EVCA). Venture capital is a 
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subset of private equity and refers to equity investments made for the launch, early 
development, or expansion of a business. 
2.5. Corporate Venture Capital Fund Performance 
In this dissertation, corporate venture capital (CVC) is defined as investment of corporate 
funds directly in external start-up companies (Chesbrough 2002). The definition excludes 
investments made through an external fund managed by a third party, even if the investment 
vehicle is funded by and specifically designed to meet the objectives of a single investing 
company. It also excludes investments that fall under the more general rubric of corporate 
venturing: the funding of new internal ventures that remain legally part of the company 
(Chesbrough).  
In this study, the performance of CVC funds is defined as the degree to which the strategic 
and financial goals the firm, as set for its corporate venture capital fund, are met, measured by 
the level of activity and the survival of the fund. 
2.6. Organizational Culture 
Several definitions for organizational culture exist. Schein (1985) has defined three levels of 
phenomena in organizational culture: (1) artifacts and creations, (2) values, and (3) basic 
assumptions. Gordon (1991) describes organizational culture as having been founded on 
similar “assumptions about customers, competitors and society.” According to Davis (1984), 
organizational culture is defined as being “based upon internally oriented beliefs regarding 
how to manage, and externally oriented beliefs regarding how to compete.” Deal et al (1982) 
define organizational culture as “the way things get done around here.” Deal et al. measure 
organizations in regard to feedback and risk. Using these two parameters, Deal et al. suggest 
four classifications of organizational culture: tough-guy macho culture, work hard/play hard 
culture, bet your company culture, and the process culture. Handy (1985) provide definitions 
for four different organizational culture types that are closely connected with organizational 
structure of the firm: power culture, role culture, task culture, and person culture. Detert et al. 
(2000) reviewed previous research on organizational culture and identified eight dimensions 
of organizational culture that underlie the majority of existing organizational culture concepts. 
These eight dimensions were: the basis of truth and rationality in the organization; the nature 
of time and time horizon; motivation; stability versus change / innovation / personal growth; 
orientation to work, task, and coworkers; isolation versus collaboration / cooperation; control, 
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coordination, and responsibility; and orientation and focus. In this dissertation, the Davis 
(1984) definition of organization culture is used. 
2.7. Venture Risk Characteristics 
Venture capital investing is concerned with balancing risk and return of the investment 
portfolios (Wuestenhagen et al. 2006, and Ruhnka et al. 1991). Venture capital portfolio 
managers tend to refer to their venture investments as “winners,” “living dead,” and “losers” 
(Ruhnka et al. 1992). Ruhnka et al. note that venture capital risk is “a function of the 
probability of losing and the amount, which, when taken together, are referred to as the 
prospect of loss.” In addition to prospect of loss, Ruhnka et al. address the exit or liquidity 
risk. They refer to the exit risk as the so-called “living dead” phenomenon, where firms that 
were once expected to equal or exceed portfolio target levels of return have stalled in their 
sales growth or profitability. In this dissertation, venture risk characteristics are the product of 
investor perception of risk related to a particular venture (Ruhnka et al. 1991).  
2.8. Industry Development Stage 
In this dissertation, the term industry development stage is used to indicate one of the 
following stages: early stage, rapid growth, and slow growth stage. The terms have commonly 
been used in previous literature referring to the so-called S-curve of technology adaptation, 
innovation diffusion, or industry development. S-curve has been described as a process where 
the innovation is “communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a 
social system” (Rogers 1983). The definitions of each of the three developmental stages used 
in this study are described briefly. In the early stage, the industry development is in its infancy 
and large-scale commercialization plans are far in the distance. In the rapid growth stage, 
there are several technology generations and many the firms are struggling to ramp up their 
production and acquire financing for growth. For firms in the slow growth stage, the rapid 
growth phase has been delayed.  
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3. Review of Existing Knowledge 
The goal of this chapter is to review existing knowledge that is closely related to industry 
emergence and the role of investors, entrepreneurs, and large firms in new market creation. 
The theory building of the dissertation takes place in chapters 6 through 8. As was argued in 
the introduction chapter, little previous research or existing theory on clean energy market 
evolution exists. However, literature that discusses aspects related to industry emergence and 
the role of entrepreneurs, industry incumbents, and financiers in industry creation is available. 
The chapter consists of four separate sections. The first section provides an overview of the 
industry emergence and evolution literature and emergence of new firms. A brief overview of 
previous clean energy and cleantech industry emergence literature is also presented. Review 
of previous entrepreneurship and industry creation literature is presented in the second 
section. The third section reviews industry incumbents and market creation. In particular, 
corporate venture capital literature is reviewed. The fourth section provides an overview of 
venture financing literature. Literature on venture capital and venture capitalist decision-
making are discussed. 
3.1. Industry Emergence and Evolution 
Industry emergence and evolution has interested researchers for decades. As far back as 1978, 
Abernathy and Utterback presented their models of product and process innovation 
(Abernathy et al. 1978, and Utterback 1994). The models hypothesized that the rate of major 
innovation for both products and processes follows a general pattern over time. The pattern 
they discovered was that, in the early years of an industry, experimentation with product 
design and high rate of innovation takes place, with less emphasis on the processes by which 
products are made. In the transitional phase, innovation slows down and process innovations 
increase, introducing dominant designs. Finally, the industry enters what Abernathy et al. 
called specific space, where the firms in the industry focus on cost and volume, and product 
and process innovation are scarce.  
The transition from emerging technologies to new industries is a complex process where new 
firms enter and either grow and survive or exit from the new industry (Audretsch 1995). The 
development of a new industry may happen rapidly or it may take several decades. Klepper et 
al. (1990) finds that the time it takes for an industry to stabilize might vary from 2 to 50 years. 
Evolution of a new industrial sector is often demonstrated in the form of an S-curve, which 
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consists of three stages: emergence, growth, and eventual plateau. However, the S-curve may 
not hold for all industries (Low et al. 1997). Low et al. note that the S-curve is not inviolate, 
as some industries never take off and others experience sudden rises and falls. For example, in 
the clean energy sector, the solar energy industry experienced its first boom-and-bust cycle in 
the early 1980s, only to return to the clean energy cycle almost 20 years later as an interesting 
investment area. Industry evolution has also been studied from a network perspective. Human 
et al. (2000) divide the industry evolution into five stages: “pre-network organizational field,” 
“network formation,” “early growth,” “emerging legitimacy,” and “sustainment or demise.” 
It has been argued that technological development, industry emergence, and entrepreneurship 
have similarities with social movements (Van de Ven et al. 2004, and Dacin et al. 2002). 
Rosenberg (1983) notes “what is really involved is a process of cumulative accretion of useful 
knowledge, to which many people make essential contributions, even though the prizes and 
recognition are usually accorded to the one actor who happens to have been on the stage at a 
critical moment.” A model that attempts to explain the emergence of a new industry has been 
developed by Van de Ven et al. (1989 and 1993). Van de Ven et al. model what is called “an 
augmented view of an industry” thas been applied in various studies to explain the emergence 
of new industries in various sectors from film industry to health-care (Garud et al. 1994 and 
2002, Aldrich et al. 1994, Mezias et al. 2000, and Murtha et al. 2001). The Van de Ven et al. 
model is used to reflect the findings of this study in chapter 6.5.  
According to Bettis et al. (1995), the 21st century faces new aspects of competition and 
strategy due to the broad nature of technological changes that are taking place: the increasing 
rate of technological change and diffusion, the information age, increasing knowledge 
intensity, and the emergence of positive feedback industry. To respond to the change in 
competitive landscape, Bettis et al. suggest four themes as important. First, the increasing rate 
of technological change and diffusion will decrease forecastability and thus an increase in risk 
and uncertainty is expected. Second, the concept of industry will become more ambiguous, 
causing the traditional boundaries to blur as substitute products are developed in other 
industries. It thus becomes more difficult to identify the competitors, including their 
strategies, resources, and future actions. Third, managers must develop a mindset that allows 
cooperation with competitors. Firms cannot remain static even in mature industries, forcing 
managers to adopt an entrepreneurial mindset, “emphasizing innovation in most industry 
settings.” Fourth, there will be three new imperatives that drive organizational design: 
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decreased transaction costs, increased penalties for mistakes and hesitancy, and competition 
based on knowledge accumulation and deployment. The impact of these imperatives implies a 
redefinition of organizations and increases the emphasis on learning and strategic response 
capability. 
3.1.1. Emergence of New Firms 
According to Chesbrough (1999), a technical change in an industry may result in a rich 
variety of organizational phenomena. Chesbrough argues that, in some industries, firms 
struggle to adapt to new possibilities and threats in their environment and, in others, 
incumbents are able to adapt to or pre-empt competitive challenges from new entrants. 
Klepper et al. (1990) identify important differences across industries in the factors that 
condition the evolutionary process of industries. According to Klepper et al., exogenous 
factors that differ across industries affect the pace and severity of evolutionary process. 
Aldrich et al. (1994) argue that established industries may attempt to slow down the 
development of a new industry and the entrance of new players. According to Aldrich et al., 
the established industries may change the terms on which resources are available to emerging 
industries by questioning their efficacy or their conformity to the established order. Other 
industries may withhold recognition or acceptance of the new industry, even after it has 
developed into a recognized entity. 
Small firms have traditionally been associated with the commercialization of disruptive 
technologies (Bower et al. 1995) or radical innovations. Radical innovations are ones that 
“transfer the relationship between customers and suppliers, restructure marketplace 
economies, displace current products and create entirely new product categories” (Leifer et al. 
2001). According to Henderson (1993), neoclassical theory suggests that entrants will replace 
incumbent firms during periods of radical technological change because they have greater 
strategic incentives to invest in radical innovation, while organizational theory suggest that 
established firms often fail in the face of radical innovation because their research efforts are 
significantly less productive than those of entrants. Henderson synthesizes these contradictory 
findings and shows that, without examining both under-investment and incompetence as 
responses to radical innovation, the failure of many established firms to deal with radical 
innovation cannot be understood. Henderson notes that “the results highlight the danger of 
assuming that there is any simple relationship between market power, size and experience, 
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and innovative success, and they open up a number of important issues concerning the role of 
organizational capabilities in strategic competition.”  
According to Sine et al. (2003), the biggest impact in terms of entrepreneurship, or as Sine et 
al. refer to “mobilization of search processes,” is on industries that are dominated by a single 
institutionalized structural and technological logic and are thus closed to alternative ideas. 
However, the process of commercializing emerging technologies is quite risky and costly 
(Hung et al. 2004), with a high potential for failure. Kassicieh et al. (2002) show that also the 
nature of technology is a significant factor in determining whether a large or smaller firm is 
successful in commercializing the technology. Sanders et al. (2004) demonstrate that, during 
the emergence of new industries, investors and analysts lack a codified body of knowledge 
and industry-specific experience. This may lead to difficulties for firms with yet unproven 
business models to raise financing for their activity, increasing the risk of failure. However, 
Day et al. (2000) argue that emerging technologies signal their arrival long before they bloom 
into full-fledged commercial success. Furthermore, according to Day et al., correctly 
identifying the early signs requires knowledge and a “prepared mind” that is able to see 
beyond “the disappointing results, limited functionality, and modest initial applications.” 
Chesbrough (1999) has approached the battle between new entrants and incumbent firms from 
an innovation constraint perspective. According to Chesbrough, innovating firms face two 
constraints: incentive constraint and appropriability constraint. Incumbent firms may face an 
incentive constraint when they try to promote risk-taking in the firm. According to 
Chesbrough, entrant firms are able to better align incentives within their organizations and 
elicit greater entrepreneurial efforts from their staff relative to incumbent firms. On the other 
hand, entrant firms may suffer from appropriability constraint where, due to lack of 
complimentary assets, the innovation’s full value cannot be realized. According to 
Chesbrough, these two organizational constraints can offset one another, as incentive 
constraints favor entrant firms and appropriability constraints favor incumbent players. In 
addition to the relative strength and weakness of entrants and incumbents, the technical 
advance of industries and technological paths has been studied from a national perspective. 
These national perspective studies consist mainly of two research streams, namely studies of 
national innovation systems (Mowery 1992, Nelson 1993 and 1994) and studies of 
technological regimes (Kemp et al. 1998, Berkhout 2002, and Malerba et al. 1997). 
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Chesbrough (1999) criticized the innovation literature from the lack of industry-specific 
studies that span multiple countries. According to Chesbrough, the majority of innovation 
studies consider many industries within multiple countries. This approach mainly emphasis 
the differences between countries, but not between individual industries. On the other hand, 
Chesbrough notes that individual industry studies take little or no account of the external 
environment. The next chapter takes a look at the previous research findings of cleantech and 
clean energy industry emergence.  
3.1.2. Cleantech and Clean Energy Industry Emergence 
The drivers for clean energy industry growth are strong: rise in energy prices due to the finite 
reserves of oil and gas, lower costs for clean energy technology due to innovation and 
learning effect, climate change and other environmental concerns, changes in energy industry 
structure due to electricity deregulation, and security of supply concerns. Russo (2003) argues 
that there are strong social and institutional elements to the push towards greening. 
Rothenberg et al. (1999) state that corporations are critical players in the worldwide effort to 
address greenhouse gases and other emissions. According to Rothenburg et al., “although 
there has been some growing recognition of the role of private actors in international 
environmental regimes, little attention has been paid to the role of private sector at the 
science-policy interface.” Shrivastava (1995) notes that, regardless of whether environmental 
regulations hurt or help industry, they influence competitive behavior of firms and the 
competitive dynamics of industries by imposing new costs, investment demands, and 
opportunities for improving production and energy efficiency. 
According to Diefendorf (2000), regulatory action is key in creating a capital market for 
sustainable industry creation, as has been the case in other sectors where tax incentives and 
government support mechanisms have helped the development of the VC industry (Manigart 
et al. 2000). O’Rourke (2004) suggests that regulatory reform could remove subsidies for 
unsustainable ventures and provide tax incentives for sustainable venture investments. 
Shrivastava et al. (1995) has emphasized the adaptation skills of industry incumbents. 
Shrivastava et al. argue that, for the global economy to become ecologically sustainable, it 
will be necessary to organize business and industry along ecologically sound principles. The 
change will transform the corporations, their products, production systems, and management 
practices. 
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Sine et al. (2003) studied the oil crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s. According to Sine et al., 
the energy crisis did not force the abandonment of the then-current industrial structure, but it 
degraded the prominence of the accompanying power generation strategies, changing their 
status as the only or natural way of power generation to one of many available methods. The 
shift created fertile ground for entrepreneurship and a new set of organizational forms and 
practices. When studying the institutional change in the power generation sector in the U.S., 
Sine et al. found that most electric utilities did not pursue alternative technologies, since the 
organizational strategies were strongly influenced by the institutional industrial structure that 
existed for more than 40 years. However, during the oil crisis, many myths about the electric 
power industry were dispelled and “it was no longer taken for granted that the generating 
industry was promoting the best interest of the public” (Sine et al. 2003). In addition to 
delegitimizing the existing institutional logics, the oil crisis increased awareness of pre-
existing technological solutions, such as alternative energy and cogeneration. According to 
Sine et al., the policy makers missed the earlier opportunities for industrial reform and 
change, since they were not recognized due to information-gathering processes influenced by 
taken-for-granted assumptions. The oil crisis disrupted the information gathering processes 
and mobilized advocates of alternative structures and technologies. Sine et al. conclude that 
technological advances do not always result in immediate entrepreneurial activity but are 
instead mediated by institutional logistics (i.e., whether or not the institutional conditions are 
ripe for change).  
3.1.3. Barriers, Opportunities, and Characteristics  
According to Russo (2003), the common characteristic of firms operating in a sustainable 
industry, such as the clean energy industry, is that they represent a transformational form of 
entrepreneurial activity that has a trajectory towards sustainability. Russo argues that 
“organizations within sustainable industries are mission-driven.” Hart et al. (2002) suggest 
that the four billion people at the “bottom of the economic pyramid” could be the first 
adopters of profitable, sustainable innovative products. Hart (1997 and 2005) identifies 
opportunities in sustainable industry creation and markets for sustainable products that both 
create growth and solve social problems. Hawken (1993) and Hawken et al. (1999) argue that 
profitable opportunities exist for firms in the area of sustainable resource use. According to 
Shrivastava (1995), ecological issues regarding energy, natural resources, pollution, and waste 
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offer competitive opportunities and constraints and are changing the competitive landscape in 
many industries. 
Tsoutsos et al. (2005) introduce a framework of eight barriers to technological regime shift 
towards renewable energy technologies. The framework is an extension of research work 
carried out by Kemp et al. (1998) for transportation technologies. The eight barriers identified 
by Tsoutsos et al. (2005) are presented in Table 1 in more detail, since the Tsoutsos et al. 
model is used in chapter 6 to reflect the findings of this dissertation on clean energy venture 
entrepreneurial challenges. 
Table 1 Eight Barriers to Technological Regime Shift 
Factor Description 
Technological 
factors 
Technological immaturity: need for optimization with respect to user needs 
and large-scale deployment: 
? Complexity: often, renewables need to be embedded within another 
system (e.g., a building) or to interact with other elements (e.g., a 
battery system or the grid) 
? The variety of installation sites raises the need for robust modular 
designs: interfaces between various subsystems have to be 
established 
? Skills: the management of the new technology requires the 
“unlearning” of established wisdom on what is right and the 
establishment of a new rationale 
Government 
policy or 
regulatory 
framework 
Unclear messages about the need for the new technologies and their role in 
the energy system result in uncertainty about the future of market 
development: 
? Regulatory barriers to the deployment of new technologies (e.g., 
there is no provision for small domestic wind-power installations in 
many EU countries) 
? Risk aversion: governments do not risk change in the face of the 
political cost of vested interests 
Cultural and 
psychological 
factors 
Social acceptance is low, as they have not been established as a reliable 
alternative: 
? Our electricity- and oil-based civilization is identified with a 
comfort and ease that people may be afraid to abolish with 
renewables 
? Unfamiliarity with the new technologies and possible failures or 
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Factor Description 
bad examples (e.g., broken or run-down wind turbines, poorly 
designed bioclimatic building, etc.) lead to skepticism 
? Uncertainty that arises from the temporally variable nature of some 
renewable sources (e.g., sun, wind) put people off when comparing 
these alternatives with the perceived safety of electricity or oil 
Demand 
factors 
Risk aversion: consumers and users cannot form specific expectations of 
the use and value of renewables: 
? User preferences: in many cases, users are required to adjust their 
demands and preferences to patterns that fit the new technologies 
? Willingness to pay: the share of users willing to trade comfort, 
perceived security, and low cost for reduced environmental impact is 
limited, especially as the benefits are not evident 
Production 
factors 
Investment in new technology would signal the sharp devaluation of 
existing facilities: from centralized mass production in oil- and large 
hydro-based facilities, production should transfer to decentralized, 
distributed renewable sources: 
? Competencies in existing technologies would become obsolete, 
engineers and specialized workers would invest in adopting the new 
technologies 
Infrastructure 
and 
maintenance 
Network incompatibility: the distribution infrastructure does not fit the 
topology of renewable energy, (e.g., wind, solar or small hydro-based): 
? Maintenance needs change in conjunction with the geography of 
the new system and the new technologies involved 
? New agents, such as suppliers of maintenance services, may need 
to enter the system for a variety of new technologies that may be 
deployed across various regions 
? Sunk costs may be high with regard to the existing infrastructure 
and related competencies 
Undesirable 
societal and 
environmental 
effects 
Conflicts may arise out of aesthetic or environmental concerns over the 
deployment of new installations (e.g., wind turbines, geothermal 
installations) or the production facilities of components (e.g., toxic waste 
from solar cells) 
Economic 
factors 
The economic rationale shifts from the growth of consumption to the 
minimization of environmental impact: 
? “Sailing ship” effect: short-term improvements in incumbent 
technologies put off investments in new technology 
? High initial investment puts off potential adopters, in the absence 
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Factor Description 
of corresponding financing mechanisms, such as third-party 
financing, leasing, etc. 
? Slow take-off of new technologies reduces the impact of economies 
of scale and accelerated learning on the unit cost; as a result, high 
prices, even of relatively simple technologies, slows down diffusion 
3.2. Entrepreneurs and Industry Creation 
Entrepreneurs in the form of new start-ups have been argued to be essential for new industry 
growth. Chesbrough (1999) suggests that the absence of aggressive new start-up entrants 
indicates that prospective new technologies may not be commercialized as rapidly as they 
might be when start-up entrants are present. The reason why entrepreneurial firms are 
important for industry growth is that entrepreneurial firms can serve as incubators and carriers 
of the innovation and attract other followers to further develop the infrastructure for 
widespread diffusion of the innovation (Hung et al. 2004). Hung et al. suggest three 
mechanisms as being critical to stimulating new technology-based industries, namely 
encouraging partnerships in the commercialization process, fostering entrepreneurship and 
venture initiatives in the innovation system, and sustaining the commercialization and the 
creation of new firms. 
According to Venkataram (1997), entrepreneurship research seeks to understand how 
opportunities to bring new goods and services are “discovered, created, and exploited, by 
whom, and with what consequences.” Amit et al. (1990) argue that an entrepreneurial firm 
centers on its ability, consisting of talent, skill, experience, ingenuity, and leadership, to 
combine tangible and intangible assets in new ways and to deploy them to meet customers’ 
needs in a manner that can not easily be imitated. In the context of emerging industry, a more 
specific definition of an entrepreneur, namely the institutional entrepreneur, has been adopted. 
An institutional entrepreneur is an entrepreneurial firm that, with its business activity, 
manages to affect cultural norms and public perception and gain legitimacy to the emerging 
industry (DiMaggio 1988 and Suchman 1995). Jones-Evans (1997) extends the inventor-
entrepreneur typology introduced by Smith (1967) and Miner et al. (1992) by classifying four 
categories of technical entrepreneurs: research, producer, user, and opportunist technical 
entrepreneur. Garud et al. (2003) define technology entrepreneurship as a distributed process 
that creates opportunities through a process of creative synthesis. Van de Ven (2005) 
emphasizes the importance of the cooperative, distributed process in entrepreneurship. 
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According to Van de Ven, an individual firm seldom commands “the resources, power, or 
legitimacy to go it alone.” Van de Ven argued that entrepreneurial firms must simultaneously 
cooperate and compete (i.e., “run in packs with other firms”). According to Van de Ven, 
entrepreneurs that operate in an emerging industry form an interconnected group that is linked 
by similar challenges, some of which are unique to the industry and others that are universal 
to all entrepreneurial firms. 
A research stream within entrepreneurship studies the characteristics and risk-taking of 
entrepreneurs. Simon et al. (2000) find that individuals start ventures because they do not 
perceive the risks involved and not because they knowingly accept high levels of risk. Simon 
et al. also argue that individuals starting ventures might not acknowledge that certain tasks 
important to the venture’s success are beyond their control, leading to decreased risk 
perception. According to Busenitz et al. (1997), entrepreneurs display greater overconfidence 
than managers in large organizations do in considering whether to start a venture. Busenitz et 
al. (1997) argue that “the window of opportunity would often be gone by the time all the 
necessary information became available for more rational decision-making.” Mullins et al. 
(2005) study new venture decision-making and find that most entrepreneurs would rather risk 
“missing than sinking the boat.” Mullins et al. also find that the source of new venture 
funding (i.e., the entrepreneur’s own money versus that of investors) influences the choices 
between ventures whose chances for loss or gain differed. Palich et al. (1995) argue that 
entrepreneurs may not necessarily prefer to engage in more risky behavior but their behavior 
may be the result of framing a given situation more positively than negatively, thereby 
focusing on the high probability for favorable outcomes and responding according to these 
perceptions. Palich et al. further note that non-entrepreneurs may not share this “rose garden” 
view, leading them to react more cautiously. Decreased risk perception is related to over-
optimism, which, according to Cooper et al. (1988), is a known feature of entrepreneurs. 
Krueger et al. (1994) argue that entrepreneurs have a tendency to overlook very real obstacles. 
Cooper et al. find that entrepreneurs can be overly optimistic in their assessment of business 
opportunities. Cooper et al. surveyed almost 3,000 entrepreneurs and found that 81% believed 
their chances of success to be at least 70% and 33% believed their success to be certain. 
However, half of all new ventures fail within five years, and 34% to 50% of new businesses 
discontinue within two years (Cooper et al.). As Timmons (1990) notes, “building a better 
mousetrap” does not mean that customers want to buy the new mousetrap. 
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3.2.1. Entrepreneurs and Legitimacy 
One of the common themes in research on entrepreneurial challenges is legitimacy of the new 
firm and its area of business. Organizational ecology theories have been applied to study the 
“liability of newness” and growth of organizational populations (Baum et al. 1995 and 
Hannan et al. 1995). In the area of strategic management, legitimacy issues have a long 
research history (Powell et al. 1991 and Suchman 1995). However, according to Zimmerman 
et al. (2002), research on new venture legitimacy “is in its infancy.”  
Independent of the industrial sector, entrepreneurial firms face common challenges such as 
raising capital from skeptical sources and recruiting untrained employees (Aldrich et al. 
1994). Aldrich et al. find that, in the process of industry formation, the constraints that 
entrepreneurs face emerge from two sources: lack of cognitive legitimacy and lack of 
sociopolitical legitimacy. By cognitive legitimation, Aldrich et al. mean the spread of 
knowledge about a new venture. For example, this can be measured as the level of public 
knowledge of an activity. Sociopolitical legitimization is a process by which key stakeholders 
and the general public accept a venture as appropriate and right, given existing norms and 
laws. Aldrich et al. suggest that legitimization processes take place at four levels: 
organizational, intraindustry, interindustry, and institutional. Industry level legitimacy 
(Hannan et al. 1989 and Scott 1995) is a measure of the degree to which the solutions offered 
by organizations in a given industry are accepted as appropriate and right. The lack of 
external validation (Stone et al. 1996), which can be regarded as part of sociopolitical 
legitimization, has also been discovered to be a challenge of new ventures.  
Suchman (1995) divides legitimacy into three main components: pragmatic, moral, and 
cognitive. Pragmatic and moral legitimacy concern mostly the firm’s stakeholders; cognitive 
legitimacy is more general and refers to society at large. Schoonhoven et al. (2001) emphasize 
the importance of legitimacy in entrepreneurship. Schoonhoven et al. argue that 
“entrepreneurial activity arises from the collective activity of entrepreneurs and others, such 
as venture capitalists, lawyers, and industry professionals, who together actively create and 
sustain legitimate market space for new products, services, and technologies.” In other words, 
legitimacy-building is a cooperative process. According to Meznar et al. (1993), gaining 
legitimacy among the firm’s stakeholders is of a great importance. Meznar et al. argue that the 
ultimate survival of the firm may hinge on adequately managing the relationship between the 
organization and its social and political stakeholders. Human et al. (2000) carried out a study 
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on two multilateral networks of small- and medium- sized firms in the U.S. wood products 
manufacturing industry and found that three forms of network structure had to be legitimized 
in order to succeed: network as a form, network as entity, and network as interaction. 
According to Human et al., building the legitimacy of the basic network form must happen 
early in the evolutionary process of the firm. 
3.2.2. Entrepreneurial Strategies 
Even though entrepreneurship and new venture creation have been studied widely, factors that 
consistently lead to entrepreneurial success have not been identified (Low et al. 1997). Low et 
al. note that the surrounding environmental context has usually been a strong determinant of 
success or failure. To address this problem, Low et al. identified factors related to industry 
evolution and showed that emerging, growing, and mature industries present a different set of 
entrepreneurial challenges.  
In order to overcome legitimacy challenges, Aldrich et al. (1994) suggest that the firm 
founders must build a reputation of the new industry as a reality, “as something that naturally 
should be taken for granted by others.” One approach to reputation-building is framing 
(Aldrich et al., Nelson et al. 1999, and Elsbach et al. 2000) or impression management 
(Elsbach et al. 1992). However, firms must be careful in their legitimization-building. 
Otherwise, their efforts will backfire and “produce the opposite effect of that desired” 
(Ashforth et al. 1990). Singh et al. (1986) has proposed third-party endorsement as a strategy 
to avoid legitimization-building looking like self-promotion. Development of entrepreneurial 
strategies is especially challenging when the number of firms in an industry is small and no 
role models exist, leading to a lower chance of survival (Aldrich et al.).  
To gain sociopolitical legitimacy, Aldrich et al. (1994) suggest that entrepreneurs create 
stories that explain events. Lounsbury et al. (2001) suggest that stories play a critical role in 
the process that enables new businesses to emerge. According to Lounsbury et al., stories may 
enable resource flows to the new enterprise, as the stories that are told by or about 
entrepreneurs define a new venture in ways that can lead to favorable interpretations of the 
venture’s wealth-creating possibilities. Entrepreneurial stories may also help potential 
entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and other institutional actors who need to direct their 
attention to only the highest potential opportunities in complex environments to make future 
venture decisions (Lounsbury et al. 2001). According to Lounsbury et al., since many 
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entrepreneurial ventures are unknown to external audiences, the creation of an appealing and 
coherent story may be one of the most crucial assets for a nascent enterprise, as the key aspect 
of stories is their ability to reduce uncertainty. In addition to stories, Lounsbury et al. 
recommend seeking of formal credentials awarded by recognized accreditation bodies or other 
third parties.  
According to Suchman (1995), legitimacy-building strategies fall into three clusters: efforts to 
conform, efforts to select, and efforts to manipulate. Conforming means positioning the firm 
within a preexisting institutional regime and selecting an environment that will grant the 
organization legitimacy “as is” without demanding many changes in return. Manipulation 
strategy is intended for firms and innovators who depart substantially from prior practice. 
According to Lounsbury et al. (2001), positive media coverage of an industry provides 
generalized institutional capital that individual entrepreneurs can draw on to facilitate their 
efforts to create new organizations. Lounsbury et al. point to Internet entrepreneurs as an 
example and note that they “do not expend energy on creating stories to legitimize the 
Internet itself, since society and financial gatekeepers have already bought in.” However, 
firms should be careful to not “overdo” their story. Lounsbury et al. point out that “it is 
important to balance the need for legitimacy by abiding by societal norms about what it 
appropriate with efforts to create unique identities that may differentiate and lend competitive 
advantage.” 
As mentioned earlier, Aldrich et al. (1994) suggest there are four levels where legitimation 
processes take place: organizational, intraindustry, interindustry, and institutional. For each 
level, Aldrich et al. suggest entrepreneurial strategies that promote new industry development. 
Table 2 demonstrates these suggested different strategies.  
Table 2 Entrepreneurial Strategies to Promote New Industry Development 
Level of 
Analysis 
Cognitive Legitimacy Sociopolitical Legitimacy 
Organizational Develop knowledge base via 
symbolic language and behaviors 
Develop trust by maintaining internally 
consistent stories 
Intraindustry Develop knowledge base by 
encouraging convergence around 
a dominant design 
Develop perceptions of reliability by 
mobilizing to take effective action 
Interindustry Develop knowledge base by Develop reputation of new activity as 
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promoting activity through third-
party actors 
reality by negotiating and 
compromising with other industries 
Institutional Develop knowledge base by 
creating linkages with established 
educational curricula 
Develop legitimacy by organizing 
collective marketing and lobbying 
efforts 
 
Several other studies have been carried out at the intraindustry level. Van de Ven et al. (1989) 
study the intraindustry legitimacy challenges and conclude that dominant design is important 
for technology-based industries, since a multiplicity of standards and designs may create 
confusion in the market and undermine legitimacy. However, endorsing a dominant design 
may not always be beneficial. Garud et al. (2002) find, in the study of Sun Microsystems and 
its sponsorship of Java technology, examples of the challenges that arise when a firm attempts 
to function as an institutional entrepreneur and tries to push a common industry standard, 
effectively a dominant design. According the Garud et al., “standards in the making generate 
seeds of self-destruction.”  
Although cooperation between the industry players may be beneficial in order to overcome 
legitimacy challenges, it also contains risks for small firms. Alvarez et al. (2001) find that, 
although large firms are usually able to gain access to an entrepreneurial firm’s new 
technology through an alliance, the long-term success of entrepreneurial firms can actually 
suffer from their alliances with large firms since it is often very difficult for the 
entrepreneurial firm to learn about and imitate the large firm’s organizational resources and 
capabilities. 
As mentioned earlier, Human et al. (2000) argue that three forms of network structure need to 
be legitimized in order for the firm to succeed. According to Human et al., successful 
evolution of an industry “depends on legitimizing the network as form, both to members and 
to external groups, such as funders.” The second form of network structure that needs to 
legitimized is “network as entity,” meaning that the network has to develop a recognizable 
identity that would allow both members and outsiders to perceive the network as a legitimate 
entity. According to Human et al., a lead organization may take a critical role in developing 
an identity for the network. In the networks they studied, the lead organization was the 
network administrative organization. The third and final dimensions, network as interaction 
and the interaction process, need to be legitimized so that network members would be willing 
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to work together to build and maintain the levels of involvement and norms of cooperation 
(Human et al.). 
Gans et al. (2003) introduce commercialization strategy environments for technology 
entrepreneurs. They divide the strategy environments into four areas: the attacker’s advantage, 
greenfields competition, reputation-based ideas training, and idea factories. Table 3 
demonstrates the strategies available to start-ups in each of the four strategy environments and 
briefly describes each of the four strategy environments.  
Table 3 Impact of Commercialization Environment on Start-Up Strategies 
Commercialization 
Environment Type 
Description of the 
Environment 
Available Start-Up Strategy 
Attacker’s 
advantage 
? Non-excludable 
technology 
? Overturns 
incumbent asset 
value 
? Few opportunities for effective 
contracting 
? Opportunity to exploit technical 
leadership to capture market 
leadership 
? Performance depends on “stealth” 
product market entry 
Reputation-based 
ideas trading 
? Non-excludable 
technology 
? Reinforces 
incumbent 
complementary 
assets 
 
? May be few opportunities for 
contracting 
? Product market entry risk due to 
high costs and imitation risk 
? Performance depends on existence 
of incumbent commitment to ideas 
trading 
Greenfields 
competition 
? Excludable 
technology 
? Overturns 
incumbent asset 
value 
? Ideal opportunity to choose 
between contracting and product 
market entry 
? Opportunity to use temporary 
monopoly power to build future 
positioning 
? Performance depends on strength 
of technological competition 
Idea factories ? Excludable 
technology 
? Reinforces 
? Contracting with established firms 
? Product market entry is very costly 
and perhaps impossible 
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Commercialization 
Environment Type 
Description of the 
Environment 
Available Start-Up Strategy 
incumbent 
complementary 
assets 
? Performance depends on securing 
bargaining power 
3.3. Industry Incumbents and New Market Creation 
According to Day et al. (2000), there are four common pitfalls for incumbents in dealing with 
emerging technology: delayed participation, sticking with the familiar, reluctance to fully 
commit, and lack of persistence. Delayed participation is due to mental models that cause 
managers to see only what they are prepared to see, framing the emerging technologies as 
suitable only for narrow applications not demanded by existing customers and the tendency of 
managers to compare the first imperfect and costly versions of the emerging technology 
against the refined versions of the established technology. The second pitfall, sticking with 
the familiar, is caused by past success that reinforces certain ways of problem-solving, lack of 
in-house capability to fully appraise the emerging technology, and a proprietary mind-set that 
gets in the way. According to Day et al. (2000), the first and second pitfalls are rooted in two 
decision-making biases, namely aversion to ambiguity and risk, and a deep-seated preference 
for the status quo. The third pitfall, reluctance to commit fully, consists of five causes: the 
fear of cannibalizing existing profitable products; managerial tendency towards bold forecasts 
on the one hand and timid choices on the other; usage of customary decision processes that 
tend to be biased against risky and long-term investments; managerial focus on the current 
customers; and the tendency of successful organizations to have closely aligned strategy, 
capability, structure and culture, which makes it difficult to respond to a discontinuous 
change. The fourth pitfall, lack of persistence, is especially common for firms that are very 
committed to their core business. What matters more than the financial commitment is the 
emotional and strategic commitment on behalf of the senior management. 
Levinthal (1997) studied the ability of existing organizations to respond to changing 
environments. According to Levinthal, incumbents in general may have difficulty in adapting 
to changing environments because the changes negate the value of some of the organization’s 
existing assets. Levinthal argues that tightly coupled organizations are worst off, since efforts 
at search and experimentation tend to negate the advantages and wisdom associated with 
established policies and thereby place the organization at risk of failure. According to 
  28 
Henderson et al. (1990), incumbent firms often fail to recognize destruction brought about by 
“architectural innovations” that change the architecture of the product without changing its 
components. Henderson et al. describe that “the essence of an architectural innovation is the 
reconfiguration of an established system to link together existing components in a new way.” 
Sharma (1999) notes that it is not that incumbents’ lack creativity and ability to invent new 
things, but it is “the inertia of past actions, the stifling effects of bureaucracy, and the 
inflexibility of collective mind-sets that inhabit large firms.” According to Miller et al. (1975), 
people are more likely to attribute their success to ability and failures to luck than their 
successes to luck and failures to ability. This leads to a situation where persistent failure leads 
to a tendency to overestimate the risks and persistent success leads to a tendency to 
underestimate those risks (Levinthal et al. 1993 and Kahneman et al. 1993).  
3.3.1. Organizational Culture and Incumbent Firms 
The industry in which the incumbent firm operates is of importance when considering the 
right strategy to respond to a changing environment. According to Gordon (1991), industries 
cause cultures to develop within defined parameters. Thus, certain cultural characteristics will 
be widespread among organizations in the same industry, and these are most likely different 
from characteristics found in other industries. Because of this relationship, the potential for 
changing a company’s culture is limited to actions that are neutral to, or directionally 
consistent with, industry demands. Gordon identifies three dimensions: the competitive 
environment, customer requirements and societal expectations, as elements around which 
industry-driven assumptions are developed. 
Companies are said to carry industry mindsets (Pablo 1999) and follow industry recipes 
(Spender 1989) or mental models that are “deeply held internal images of how the world 
works, images that limit us to familiar ways of thinking and acting” (Senge 1990). Chatman et 
al. (1994) studied similarities in the culture of firms in the same industry. They found that 
stable organizational culture dimensions existed and varied more across industries than within 
groups of firms in a particular industry. According to Chatman et al., innovation, stability, an 
orientation toward people, an orientation towards outcomes or results, and emphasis on being 
easygoing, attention to detail, and a collaborative or team orientation are pervasive 
organizational culture themes. Similar findings have been reported by Johnson et al. (1987) in 
their study on the brewing industry: “The findings of the study [...] highlight the need for the 
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study of strategies and performance to be carried out in the context of the industry to which 
the strategies are relevant.”  
3.3.2. Innovation and Incumbent Firms 
Liabilities of bureaucracy, inertia that accompanies organizational size, and aging have 
contributed to a common perception that new company start-ups are more innovative than 
established large firms (Chandy et al. 2000). In addition, radical changes in the business 
environment can render the skills of the incumbent firms obsolete (Tushman et al. 1986). 
Ahuja et al. (2001) identify three traps that inhibit breakthrough inventions in established 
firms: favoring the familiar (familiarity trap), favoring the mature (maturity trap), and 
favoring the search for solutions near to existing solutions (propinquity trap). According to 
Ahuja et al., organizations can overcome these traps and create breakthrough inventions by 
experimenting with novel, emerging, and pioneering technologies. 
Christensen et al. (1996) studied the disk drive industry and show that established firms “led 
the industry in developing technologies of every sort whenever the technologies addressed 
existing customers’ needs.” However, the same firms were unable to develop simpler 
technologies that were initially useful in emerging markets. According to Christensen et al. 
(1996), “projects targeted at technologies for which no customers yet exist languish for lack 
of impetus and resources.” Christensen (1997) introduced a model of disruptive innovation 
that attempts to explain why current industry leaders do well with sustaining innovations but 
why disruptive innovations are usually launched by entrant firms. Christensen defines 
sustaining innovation as one which offers existing customers products that have better 
performance than what was previously available. Disruptive innovations do not bring better 
products to the market but redefine the development trajectory by introducing less advanced 
products that have other merits, such as simplicity or lower costs, targeting new or less 
demanding customers. The disruptive innovation gains a foothold in the marketplace and 
starts a cycle of innovation improvement. Once the disruptive innovation improves to the 
level of more demanding customers, the downfall of incumbent firms begins. Day et al. 
(2000) emphasize the use of “early indicators” in order to spot emerging technologies. Day et 
al. encourage firms to look past disappointing results and limited functionality and argue 
“many signals are available to those who look.” 
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Chesbrough (2001) reviewed 16 empirical studies of the impact of technological change upon 
incumbent firms and proposed a framework consisting of three dimensions that synthesize the 
findings of the literature: challenge of managing technical complexity, importance of external 
linkages, and the institutional environment. According to Chesbrough, the technical 
complexity dimension suggests that problems of internal coordination may be partly to blame. 
External linkages are important in managing linkages between firms in the value chain, and to 
access and absorb knowledge from the external environment. According to Chesbrough, 
institutional differences between countries may partly explain the differences in the frequency 
and impact of start-up firms that arise from technological change. 
3.3.3. Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) 
Big companies want to control the technologies that affect their businesses, 
but they’re disenchanted with the idea of sinking huge amounts into 
research and development that may never see the light of day. It’s far better, 
they seem to be saying, to turn the R&D effort into a profit center. 
-- Business Week (1999) 
Chesbrough (2003) has introduced a concept of open innovation which states that “in a world 
of widely distributed knowledge, a company must access external technologies for use in its 
business and allow its technologies to be accessed by other firms’ businesses” (Chesbrough et 
al. 1996). Stopford et al. (1994) argue that “troubled firms in hostile environments can shed 
past behaviors, adopt policies fostering entrepreneurship, and accumulate innovative resource 
bundles that provide a platform on which industry leadership can be built.” Corporate 
entrepreneurship offers the firm a possibility to learn about new technologies and markets and 
acquire new operational skills (Ahuja et al. 2001 and Dess et al. 2003). One available strategy 
to access external technologies and foster entrepreneurial activities is the operation of a 
corporate venture capital (CVC) fund. Corporate venture capital can be described as equity 
investment into entrepreneurial ventures by established corporations. The investment into 
start-up companies by incumbents “serve[s] as a bridge that connects incumbents to start-ups 
that are exploring diverse and oftentimes competing new technologies that could evolve into 
technological discontinuities” (Maula et al. 2003). According to Schildt et al. (2005), 
companies are likely to select a less integrated governance mode, such as corporate venture 
capital, when they conduct risky explorative ventures. Schildt et al. argue that corporate 
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venture capital and alliances are the least expensive way for a company to conduct external 
corporate venturing activities, and may also allow the company to limit its risks. 
Most firms create CVC funds with a dual mission in mind, as their goal is to reach financial 
objectives (Block et al. 1993, Chesbrough 2002, and Siegel et al. 1988) and create strategic 
benefits for the parent firm (Rind 1981, Siegel et al. 1988, Sykes 1990, Block et al. 1993, 
Maula 2001, and Chesbrough 2000 and 2002). The financial objective is to reach rates of 
return similar to independent VC funds. However, for many firms, gaining strategic benefits 
is more important than reaching the financial goals (Block et al. 1993, Rind 1981, and Sykes 
1986). Some examples of strategic benefits are identifying future products or technologies, 
understanding management strengths or weaknesses in acquisitions, designing products faster 
and at lower cost, gaining a window on technology, and offering a way of studying new 
markets (Rind 1981).  
Most corporations set up a dedicated organization to operate as an intermediary between the 
venture and the corporation, or alternatively manage the investments through a traditional 
venture capital firm (Keil 2000, Miles et al. 2002). According to Maula et al. (2003), CVC 
investments allow incumbents to develop deep relationships with multiple start-ups, making it 
possible for them to observe their technological skills and understand their goals, resources, 
and business models. Gompers (2002) shows that CVC investments have been at least as 
successful as independent VC investments in financial terms and the probability of success is 
substantially higher for funds operating in industries related to the parent company business. 
Maula et al.  argue that corporate venture capital activity supports the ability of a firm to early 
recognize technological discontinuities that may threaten the firm. The recognition of threats 
and learning takes place as incumbents gain access to social networks of venture capitalists by 
participating in syndication networks. According to Maula et al., the technology recognition 
effects of CVC investments are best understood by analyzing the structure of incumbents’ 
investment portfolios and how they position incumbents in emerging social networks. Maula 
et al. argue that incumbents’ CVC investments should be use to complement their internal 
R&D spending that enhances organizational learning and keeps incumbents’ knowledge 
current. 
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3.3.4. CVC Challenges and Success Factors 
A corporate venture capital program that has lasted more than 10 years is 
hard to find. 
-- Business Week (1999) 
The financial outcome of CVC funds has been found to vary greatly (Sykes 1986, Siegel et al. 
1988, Gompers et al. 1998, and Chesbrough 2000). This naturally depends both on the 
original goals of the fund, (i.e., whether strategic benefits were allowed to override financial 
objectives) and the way the fund was managed. According to Siegel et al. (1988), CVC funds 
that enjoyed greater autonomy in investment decision-making and longer-term financial 
commitment to the venturing activity reached higher financial return on investment and at 
least as good strategic benefits as the funds with less autonomy and corporate commitment. 
Gompers et al. (1999) report similar findings on the importance of a high degree of autonomy. 
They conclude that greater autonomy, combined with long-term commitment, prevents the 
current corporate management from viewing the CVC fund as the pet project of its 
predecessors. However, CVC funds have also their benefits. For example, Maula (2001) 
found that ventures backed by CVCs fared better in initial public offerings than those backed 
by independent VCs. Gompers et al. (1998) have reported that ventures backed by corporate 
VCs were as successful as those backed by independent VCs when the lines of business of the 
venture and the investing corporation were similar. This indicates that some firms have been 
able to use their complementary capabilities to advance the ventures in the CVC fund 
portfolio (Gompers et al. 1998) and thus gain a competitive edge over independent VCs. 
The high failure rate of CVC funds reveals that such an activity has its operational challenges. 
Challenges faced by the funds may be one reason for the cyclical nature of CVC funds. In 
general, CVC funds have been found to be more volatile than independent VC funds 
(Gompers et al. 1998). According to Chesbrough (2000), “the general pattern is a cycle that 
starts with enthusiasm, continues into implementation, then encounters significant difficulties, 
and ends with eventual termination of the initiative.” Sykes et al. (1995) argue that the root of 
the CVC management problem in corporations is a preconceived mental model about how 
new ventures should be managed and how performance should be measured. Examples of 
challenges are problems with venture manager incentives (Block et al. 1987 and Chesbrough 
2000), internal politics (Sykes 1986), or inadequate financial commitment (Siegel et al. 1988). 
One of the most often cited obstacles is a low level of fund autonomy (Siegel et al. 1988) that 
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often accompanies the execution of strategic goals. Insufficient autonomy of the fund was a 
direct cause of the following four obstacles in CVC fund management: lack of clear mission, 
lack of patience, lack of flexibility, and inability to relinquish control to the CVC fund (Siegel 
et al. 1988). Furthermore, those CVCs that enjoyed organizational independence were 
generally more effective, as they could respond more aggressively to investment 
opportunities. Greater autonomy in investment decision-making may also enable the fund to 
pursue alternative business models in the invested ventures, which is one of the advantages of 
independent VCs over CVCs (Chesbrough 2000).  
Forlani et al. (2000) suggest that new venture investments should be entrusted to individuals 
whose risk propensities and other individual characteristics best match the needs of the 
market opportunity and a prospective investor’s objectives. According to Winters et al. 
(1988), the most important factors for the strategic success of an external corporate venturing 
program are the creation of a high-quality deal stream and the use of outstanding people to 
interface between the corporation and the venture capital world. Winters et al. also note that 
there needs to be a long-term commitment, active involvement, and a carefully devised 
internal communications strategy to promote and protect the program. According to 
Chesbrough et al. (2003), most of the corporate investment programs that endured through the 
downturn in venture capital in the early 2000s are ones that were managed by outside 
professional investors.  
3.4. Financing Industry Creation 
According to Cassar (2004), how business start-ups are financed is one of the most 
fundamental questions of enterprise research. Cassar argues that capital decisions and use of 
debt and equity at start-up have been shown to have important implications for the operations 
of business, risk of failure, firm performance, and the potential of the business to expand. The 
main financing sources available for entrepreneurial ventures are venture capital, so-called 
angel money, corporations, banks, government grant programs, and self-financing by family 
and friends. Business angels or angel investors are often referred to as providers of informal 
venture capital (Mason et al. 1999), consisting of wealthy individuals with an interest in 
investing in young companies. According to Mason et al. (1999), informal venture capital is 
the main source of risk finance for early growth, start-up, and seed stage firms. Venture 
capitalists provide early-stage and expansion-stage financing and will typically look at exiting 
their investment two to eight years after investing, typically through initial public offerings 
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(IPOs) or trade sales. Between expansion stage and IPO, there may be additional financing 
rounds by private equity funds. For a healthy venture capital market, it is essential that there is 
sufficient capital and know-how on all stages of the VC cycle, as well as exit opportunities. 
Corporations invest in entrepreneurial ventures either directly or through an intermediary 
organization, such as a corporate venture capital fund, as described earlier. Banks provide 
loans or engage in a venture capital investment through a bank subsidiary, but they tend to be 
generally more conservative investors (Hellman et al. 2000). Hellman et al. provide a short 
review of entrepreneurial financing options and conclude, “It seems reasonable to conjecture 
that venture capitalists are a somewhat distinct type of investor who specialize in the 
financing of entrepreneurial companies.” According to Cassar (2004), the larger the start-up 
is, the greater is the proportion of debt, long-term debt, outside financing, and bank financing 
the start-up holds. Cassar also finds that firms with a relative lack of tangible assets appear to 
be financed through less formal means, where non-bank financing, such as loans from 
individuals unrelated to the business, plays a more important role in the capital structure of 
the start-ups.  
3.4.1. Venture Capital (VC) 
Venture capital (VC) can be defined as investment of long-term, risk equity finance by 
professional investors in new firms where the primary reward is eventual capital gain (Wright 
et al. 1998). The typical venture capital firm is organized as a limited partnership, with the 
VCs serving as general partners and the investors as limited partners (Gifford 1997). General 
partner venture capitalists act as agents for the limited partners investing in their funds. 
Venture capitalists do not only provide financial capital, but also take an active role in firm 
decision-making. This is due to the specific situation of new ventures, which are characterised 
by high levels of uncertainty and information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders. 
Therefore, VCs are typically highly specialized in identifying, investing in, and monitoring 
new firms in a specific sector and at a specific stage of development of a company. As Wright 
et al. (1998) note, “venture capital is particularly appropriate in a specific subset of firms 
which have non-redeployable or highly specialized assets.” Amit et al. (1998) show that VC 
funding concentrates on industries where the importance of monitoring and due diligence is 
particularly great due to informational asymmetry. 
Mason et al. (1999) refer to an industry folklore of the 2:6:2 rule on venture capital investing, 
when it comes to VC investment risk: an average portfolio contains two losses (the lemons), 
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six moderately performing investments (the living dead), and two very successful investments 
(the plums). Fiet (1995) divides venture capital investment-related risk into two parts: agency 
risk and market risk. Market risk is associated with unforeseen competitive conditions 
affecting the size, growth, and accessability of the market, and factors affecting the market 
demand, which may be influenced by changes in a venture’s industry environment. Divergent 
interests of principals (VCs) and agents (entrepreneurs) are the cause of agency risk. 
According to Fiet (1995), venture capitalists enjoy a much more efficient flow of information 
when compared to business angels, and trust mainly other venture capital firms in information 
gathering. According to Fiet, “presenting a request for funding to one of [venture capital 
firms] will quickly result in sharing of it among their informant associates.” Tyebjee et al. 
(1984) argue that VCs use five characteristics when they assess a deal. The characteristics are 
highlighted in Table 4. 
Table 4 Characteristics Used by VCs in Deal Assessment 
Characteristic Description 
Market attractiveness 
 
? Size of market 
? Market need 
? Market growth potential 
? Access to market 
Product differentiation 
 
? Uniqueness of product 
? Technical skills 
? Profit margins 
? Patentability of product 
Managerial capabilities 
 
? Management skills 
? Marketing skills 
? Financial skills 
? References of entrepreneurs 
Resistance to 
environmental threats 
 
? Protection from competitive entry 
? Protection from obsolescence 
? Protection against downside risk 
? Resistance to economic cycles 
Cash-out potential ? Future opportunities to realize capital gains 
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3.4.2. VC and Entrepreneurs 
According to Chesbrough (1999), venture capital allows new firms to enter the industry by 
creating high risk / high reward positions for talented managers and engineers. Incumbent 
firms are the main available pool of experienced engineering and management talent on which 
the VC community depends (Chesbrough 1999). On the other hand, Gompers et al. (2005) 
suggest that the ultimate success of VC-backed firms is bounded because employees of the 
firm are likely to leave to start their own ventures when the firm growth slows. Chesbrough 
observes that, when there is relatively little external capital available for new venture 
formation, incumbent firms do not confront the prospect of losing people or customers to new 
start-up competitors. Gompers et al. shows that existing public companies are an important 
source of entrepreneurs for venture-capital backed start-ups, especially those corporations 
with patents in areas that venture capitalists are interested in. 
Hellmann et al. (2000) study the factors that determine whether entrepreneurs are able to raise 
venture capital. Their study of high-tech start-ups in Silicon Valley shows that innovator firms 
are more likely to obtain venture capital than imitator firms. In addition, Hellman et al. shows 
that venture capital shortens the time to market for new innovative products. Also, the 
presence of a venture capitalist is associated with a significant reduction in the time required 
to bring a product to market. According to Hellmann et al. (2000), firms also list obtaining 
venture capital as a significant milestone in the lifecycle of the company as compared to other 
financing events. According to Amit et al. (1990), failure rates among venture capital-backed 
firms is higher than in the population of new firms because the most promising 
entrepreneurial firms will not seek venture capital financing. Carpenter et al. (2003) find that, 
although venture capitalists are risk specialists, technology-based IPO firms are less likely to 
have extensive global sales when they are backed by a VC. Carpenter et al. also find that VCs 
are risk-seeking when VC backing is complemented by the international experience of their 
board appointees, top management team members, or both. To understand what venture 
capitalists are looking for in an entrepreneurial firm, a profile of “the ideal entrepreneur” 
(Zider 1998) is presented in List 2. 
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List 2 Profile of Ideal Entrepreneur from VC Perspective 
Ideal Entrepreneur, from a Venture Capitalist’s Perspective 
? Qualified in a “hot” area of interest 
? Delivers sales or technical advances, such as FDA approval, with reasonable 
probability 
? Tells a compelling story and is presentable to outside investors 
? Recognizes the need for speed to IPO for liquidity 
? Has a good reputation and can provide references that show competencies and skills 
? Understands the need for a team with a variety of skills and therefore sees why 
equity has to be allocated to other people 
? Works diligently toward a goal but maintains flexibility 
? Gets along with the investor group 
? Understands the cost of capital and typical deal structures and is not offended by 
them 
? Is sought after by many VCs 
? Has realistic expectations about process and outcome 
3.4.3. VC and Cleantech Ventures 
Lack of capital is cited by many entrepreneurs as a barrier to growth, or sometimes even for 
the failure of the start-up (Amit et al. 2000). According to O’Rourke (2004), ventures that are 
environmentally oriented face the same financing barrier as other ventures, but also have an 
additional hurdle to overcome: investors who do not recognize or understand the 
environmental sector. Other than O’Rourke (2004), there are only a few other studies that 
have explored VC and investing in green technology, cleantech, or environmental technology 
(Diefendorf 2000, Wuestenhagen et al. 2006, and Randjelovic et al. 2003). Randjelovic et al. 
noted that defining a venture capital category for “green venture capital,” “ecological,” or 
“environmental” venture capital is difficult. During the past few years, the terms “clean 
energy” and “cleantech” have become more commonly used in the investment circles.  
O’Rourke (2004) introduced four strategic levels of sustainable VC: (1) VC investments that 
target enterprises and technologies that deliver socially, financially, and environmentally 
sustainable returns and avoid investing in clearly unsustainable practices; (2) VC practices 
that guide companies in adding value but prevent the potential negative environmental and 
social impacts of new ventures; (3) VC work that aims to develop market and stakeholder 
support for sustainable products and services; and (4) VC activity that generates financially, 
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socially, and environmentally sustainable rates of return on investment. According to 
O’Rourke, the apparent blindness of VCs to the sustainability or environmental sector often 
results in under-investment in such ventures and makes it even harder for new 
environmentally oriented business ventures to be launched. O’Rourke accuses VCs of 
“waiting for some spectacular success stories to emerge” and argues that treating sustainable 
or green VCs as a niche market actively marginalizes the concept of sustainable development 
within the finance sector and reduces the many different ways that VCs could develop more 
sustainable ventures across their whole portfolios. Regarding clean energy sector, Sonntag-
O’Brien (2003) argued that there is a general lack of understanding of the clean energy 
industry among mainstream financial institutions. Information, experience, and tools are 
needed to anticipate and quantify product and project risks in the clean energy sector and 
develop strategies to mitigate and hedge them. According to Sonntag-O’Brien, experience 
from the wind energy sector has shown that, when investors are able to understand and judge 
the risks, the money starts to flow.  
3.4.4. VC Investment Decision-Making 
It is not so much that people hate uncertainty – but rather they hate losing. 
-- Amos Tversky (1990)  
Behavioral finance aims to explain what drives investment decision-making behavior and 
tries to find explanations for it from psychology. A short review of the theories and 
psychological phenomena that behavioral finance uses to explain investor behavior is 
demonstrated in Table 5.  
Table 5 Review of Behavioral Finance 
Phenomenon Description 
Anchoring Anchoring effect takes place when decision is made adjusting from an 
existing position (Tversky et al. 1974, Northcraft et al. 1987, and 
Shiller et al. 1996). 
Information 
constraints 
Information constraints include problems of attention, memory, 
comprehension, and communication (March 1994). 
Problem framing Problem framing occurs when decision makers adopt paradigms to tell 
themselves what perspective to take on a problem, what questions 
should be asked, and what technologies should be used to ask 
questions (Thaler et al. 1990, and March 1994). 
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Phenomenon Description 
Prospect theory Prospect theory states that people are risk-averse when facing gains 
but become risk-seeking when facing losses (Kahneman et al. 1979, 
Feigenbaum et al. 1988, and Feigenbaum 1990). 
Loss aversion Loss aversion refers to the tendency of people to strongly prefer 
avoiding losses to acquiring gains ((Tversky et al. 1991, and 
Kahneman et al. 1991). 
Overconfidence; 
hindsight and 
success-induced 
bias  
Examples of overconfidence (Odean 1998) are hindsight bias and 
success-induced bias. Hindsight bias occurs when events that happen 
are thought of as having been predictable prior to the event, in 
comparison to events that do not happen that are thought of as having 
been unlikely prior to the event (Goitein 1984 and Bukszar et al. 
1988). Because of success-induced bias, people are more likely to 
attribute success to ability and failure to luck (March 1994). 
Ignorance of 
probability 
distributions 
Ignorance of probability distributions leads people to consider those 
events more probable which they find easier to imagine (Tversky et al. 
1974 and Camerer et al. 1992). 
Mental 
accounting 
Mental accounting refers to a process of coding, categorizing, and 
evaluating outcomes (Thaler 1985 and Thaler et al. 1990), which in 
turn affects decision-making. 
Status quo bias Status quo bias states that people have a marked preference to keep 
things the way they are (Kahneman et al. 1991). 
 
Sitkin et al. (1992) review previous research on decision-making behaviour in risky 
organizational situations and find several contradictory results. Sitkin et al. argue that the 
conflicting results are due to two main factors: (1) issue-oriented focus that leads to 
oversimplified models of individual risk behavior and (2) studies that identify characteristics 
that are claimed to influence risk behavior directly, instead of mediating, indirect effect. 
Sitkin et al. further argue that once the findings of previous studies are reformulated, 
contradictory findings are reconcilable. They propose a new model on risky decision-making 
behavior that is based on the results of previous studies but reconciles the contradictions 
present in the results.  
The Sitkin et al. (1992) model is briefly discussed in more detail, as the model is used in 
chapter 7 to reflect and refine the findings of this dissertation. The Sitkin et al. model was 
chosen since the model has been successfully applied to previous research on 
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entrepreneurship and venture capital (Mullins et al. 2002, Carpenter et al. 2003, Manigart et 
al. 2002, and Simon et al. 2000). The Sitkin et al. model of the determinants of risk behavior 
is based on two mediating mechanisms: risk propensity and risk perception. Risk propensity 
acts to shift decision-makers’ attention regarding risk-related information, influencing what 
information is used and what is discarded. In the Sitkin et al. model, decision-maker risk 
propensity has three determinants: risk preferences, inertia, and history of risk-related success 
and failure. Risk perception is an individual’s assessment of risk in a particular situation. In 
the Sitkin et al. model, decision-maker risk perception has six determinants: risk propensity, 
problem framing, top management team homogeneity, social influence, problem domain 
familiarity, and organizational control systems. Sitkin et al. (1995) tested the model further 
using only one determinant of risk propensity (i.e., outcome history) and two determinants of 
risk perception (i.e., problem framing and risk propensity). The results of Sitkin et al (1995) 
support the inclusion of risk perception and risk propensity as mediators of effects on risky 
decision-making behavior. They also lend support for direct effect of problem-framing on 
risky decision-making behavior. 
The goal of venture capitalist decision-making is to assess the possibility for success and the 
risk of failure by evaluating the information surrounding a particular venture and the industry 
in which it operates. Venture capitalists have developed several financial risk management 
tools, some of them exhibited in Table 6, to minimize their downside exposure in case the 
venture does not perform. In making the decision to participate in the new venture, the 
venture capitalist has few hard facts to rely on, making the venture capitalist rely heavily on 
his assessment of the entrepreneur’s ability to develop the new venture (Amit et al. 1990). 
Uncertainties regarding business models, lack of codified operating and industry data, and 
investor inexperience with similar firms all present market participants with the potential of 
investing in “virtual lemons” (Sanders et al. 2004). 
Table 6 Venture Capital Industry Strategies to Manage Risk 
Way to Manage 
Financial Risk 
Result 
Staging of 
investments 
Reduced financial risk, as not all of the money is invested up front. 
This gives a possibility for the venture capitalist to either back out 
from investing more or “re-value” the company at each stage. 
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Way to Manage 
Financial Risk 
Result 
Syndicating deals 
with other investors 
The total investment burden is shared with two or three other 
venture capitalists, diminishing the exposure to risk. This also 
creates a possibility to participate in several deals and offers a 
possibility to diversify the investment portfolio.  
Use of preferred 
shares by venture 
capitalists 
Guarantees a senior position in the case of liquidation of the 
venture. 
Anti-dilution 
provisions 
Right to purchase securities in subsequent rounds of financing on 
the same terms offered to outside investors. 
Use of debt instead 
of equity 
Portion of the risk may be placed in the form of subordinated debt, 
which may even accrue interest. 
 
According to Gifford (1997), venture capital contracts have three main characteristics: (1) 
staging the commitment of capital and preserving the option to abandon, (2) using 
compensation systems directly linked to value creation, and (3) preserving ways to force 
management to distribute investment proceeds. Chesbrough (2003b) argues that the staging of 
venture capital investments, combined with the strong incentive alignment between the 
venture managers and their investors, creates an ability to adjust the direction of the venture 
rapidly as market and technical uncertainties are resolved. Chesbrough contrasts the venture 
capital practice to internal capital market of a firm and notes that the process that allocates 
capital through an annual capital budgeting process is “much less suitable for early-stage 
ventures experimenting in areas of high uncertainty that lie far from the primary business of 
the firm.” 
Previous research on decision-making in venture capital includes descriptions of decision-
making stages, followed by expressions of doubt on the logical behavior of venture 
capitalists, and recently some studies on the cognitive elements in venture capitalist decision-
making. In addition, some research has been carried out on perceived risks and differences in 
risk-taking propensity among entrepreneurs’ new venture decisions (Forlani et al. 2000 and 
Simon et al. 2000). Tyebjee et al. (1984) presents the venture capitalist decision-making as a 
process consisting of five steps. The steps are: (1) deal origination, (2) deal screening (3) deal 
structuring (4) deal evaluation, and (5) post-investment activities. Fried et al. (1994) present a 
similar task-oriented and rational description of the venture capital decision-making process 
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consisting of six stages. Other studies on the venture capitalist decision-making process 
include Silver (1985) and Hall et al. (1993). MacMillan et al. (1985) studies the decision-
making process from evaluation criteria perspective. 
Various researchers have expressed their doubt on the accuracy of describing the venture 
capitalist decision-making process as a flow of logical steps. Roberts (1991) states, “venture 
capitalists are as different from each other as are individuals” and noted that finding 
consistent and learnable criteria for venture capital investment decisions is difficult. Sandberg 
et al. (1988), who studied venture capital decision processes, states, “Human decision-making 
cannot be understood by simply studying final decisions.” Shepherd (1999) warns venture 
capital researchers of potential biases and errors with venture capitalist self-reported data. 
Shepherd notes further that “venture capitalists have a tendency to overstate the least 
important criteria and understate the most important criteria.”  
Studies that research the cognitive side of venture capitalist decision-making process are quite 
recent. Shepherd (1999) studies “espoused” and “in-use” decision-making policies of venture 
capitalists. In Shepherd’s study, the term “espoused” is used to mean decision-making 
policies venture capitalists report and “in use” to mean those that they actually use. The study 
shows that several decision-making factors, such as industry-related competence, lead-time, 
and scope differed in importance when “in use” decision-making policies were compared to 
“espoused” decision-making policies. Shepherd notes that the results also show that venture 
capitalists have only limited introspection into their decision-making when assessing the 
likely profitability of a new venture proposal. A later study Shepherd carried out together with 
Zacharakis (Zacharakis et al. 2001) shows that venture capitalists are overconfident and have 
cognitive bias in their decision-making. Zacharakis et al. (1998) suggests that venture 
capitalists are not good at introspecting their own decision-making process. Zacharakis et al. 
(1998) argues that VCs may suffer from a systematic bias, caused by a lack of understanding 
of their intuitive decision-making process because of information overflow, that impedes the 
performance of their investment portfolio. Zacharakis et al. (1998) also finds that VCs are 
very consistent in their decision-making process, even though they do not necessarily 
understand how they make their decisions. 
Although the elements of risk, risk propensities, and risk perceptions of venture capitalists 
have not explicitly been studied, Forlani et al. (2000) examine how risk propensities and risk 
perceptions affect entrepreneurs’ new venture decisions. Forlani et al. state, “our results 
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suggest that investors should entrust their new venture investments to entrepreneurs whose 
risk propensities best match the needs of both the opportunity at hand and the investor’s 
objectives.” Simon et al. (2000) study new venture formation and conclude, “Our findings 
suggest that risk perceptions may differ because certain types of cognitive biases lead 
individuals to perceive less risk.” Their study examines three types of biases: overconfidence, 
illusion of control, and belief in the law of small numbers, which occurs when the sample of 
information is too small to draw firm conclusions. 
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4. Methodology and Research Process 
Chapters 1 through 3 present the study research questions and findings of previous research 
on industry emergence and evolution and the role of entrepreneurs and financiers in industry 
creation. Chapters 4 through 8 discuss the empirical study that was carried out and is used in 
theory building of this dissertation. This chapter presents methodology, research setting, and 
the research process. First, the methodological choices are discussed and justified. Second, the 
research setting is introduced, including the selection criteria for the interviewed investors and 
selection criteria for entrepreneurs that were included in the clean energy venture financing 
survey. A description of the wider research context, concentrating on clean energy market 
drivers and the clean energy and cleantech VC market development, will follow in chapter 5. 
Third, the research process is discussed, including a description of the data collection and 
analysis. 
4.1. Methodological Choices 
The empirical part of this study was collected from the clean energy technology sector. This 
sector was chosen because of its prominence among cleantech investment categories. Clean 
energy technologies have attracted the largest share, over 40%, of all cleantech VC 
investments (Parker 2005). The study consisted of three subsequent data collection phases, 
with emphasis on the first two: 
VC and CVC funds: twenty-nine semi-structured, in-depth interviews were carried out with 
venture capitalists and corporate venture capitalists who have invested in the cleantech sector, 
and specifically to clean energy ventures. Face-to-face interviews were conducted in Europe 
and North America. 
Clean energy ventures: A clean energy venture financing survey that consisted both of 
qualitative, essay-format questions and some quantitative questions was carried out. The 
survey results contain data from 164 clean energy ventures less than 10 years of age. 
Other clean energy sector stakeholders: Data collection was conducted in the form of 
stakeholder interviews, media search, and attendance of conferences in the clean energy and 
cleantech area in order to gain a better understanding of the emerging clean energy and 
cleantech sector. Interviews with trade organizations, research park technology transfer 
officials, entrepreneurs, and other related actors were carried out. In addition, newspaper and 
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magazine articles and press releases concerning clean energy as an investment area were 
collected and analyzed. Clean energy conferences and other related events were attended.  
The choice of qualitative approach and the usage of a variety of data collection methods are 
justified by the following arguments. This dissertation is concerned with the clean energy 
venture entrepreneurial challenges and the role VCs and large companies play in the 
development of the clean energy market. In order to capture the richness of the clean energy 
market emergence phenomenon, emphasis on the qualitative approach was found suitable, 
since the goal of qualitative studies is to gain an understanding of a complex problem area 
(Creswell 2003). Denzin et al. (2000) describe the qualitative researcher as a bricoleur who 
learns to borrow from many different disciplines. Denzin et al. describes the qualitative 
research approach as follows:  
Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a 
set of interpretative, material practices that make the world visible. These practices transform 
the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, 
interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. This means that 
qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to 
interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. 
The following arguments exist for the use of the grounded theory approach, the use of 
empirical materials among them, interviews, and survey data. First, clean energy market 
emergence and the financing of clean energy ventures have received very limited attention in 
literature. Second, little coherent theory exists that would explain the biggest entrepreneurial 
challenges clean energy ventures face and the risk characteristics of clean energy ventures 
from VC perspective, especially the cognitive risk characteristics. Third, the cognitive side of 
VC decision-making has received insufficient attention in literature and little theory building 
exists on this matter. Also, no previous theory building exists regarding the link between 
clean energy market development and the role of VCs or corporate VCs. Therefore further 
explorative, theory-generating research is needed in order to establish such a body of theory. 
Qualitative research is multi-method in focus (Flick 1998). Flick argues that combining 
multiple methodological practices, such as empirical materials, perspectives, and observers in 
a single study is a strategy to add rigor, breadth, complexity, richness, and depth to the 
research inquiry. According to Denzin et al. (2000), the use of multiple methods, also referred 
to as triangulation, reflects the attempt to secure an in-depth understanding of the 
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phenomenon in question. In grounded theory, one develops a theory, which is an abstract 
analytical schema of a phenomenon related to a particular situation (Creswell 1998). This 
situation is one in which individuals interact, take actions, or engage in a process in response 
to a phenomenon. To present the results, the researcher writes theoretical propositions or 
hypotheses or presents a visual picture of the theory (Creswell). According to Creswell, the 
grounded theory data collection methods involve primarily interviewing, but other methods 
can also be used. Grounded theory researchers use systemic procedures for analyzing and 
developing theory, with the overall tone of rigor and scientific credibility (Creswell).  
Theory is a plausible relationship among concepts and sets of concepts (Strauss et al. 1998). 
According to Creswell (1998), in grounded theory study, the researcher typically conducts 20 
to 30 interviews based on several visits “to the field” to collect data to saturate the categories 
of information. While the researcher collects the data, she or he begins analysis (Creswell). 
Creswell calls the analysis process a “zigzag,” where the researcher ventures “out to the field 
to gather information, analyze the data, back to the field to gather more information, analyze 
the data, and so forth.” Corbin et al (1990) propose the following three procedures for 
grounded theory analysis: open, axial, and selective coding. Open coding develops categories 
of information, axial coding interconnects the categories, and selective coding “builds the 
story.” The process ends with the development of theoretical propositions (Strauss et al.).  
In addition to empirical data, this dissertation uses existing literature in theory building. The 
proponents of traditional grounded theory methods advise that the researcher should allow the 
theory to emerge from the data only and ignore the findings of previous literature (Glaser et al 
1967). However, later grounded theory proponents have taken a more permissive approach to 
the use of previous literature findings in theory building (Strauss et al. 1998). The purist’s 
approach to grounded theory proposed by Glaser et al. (1967) received criticism as early as 
the 1960s. A review by Loubser (1968), published in the American Journal of Sociology, 
stated “Sociologists are urged to shed all the pre-conceived notions, received theories, and 
propensities to logical deduction, and to expose themselves to the data. Hence the problem of 
the relation between induction and deduction in scientific activity is solved by taking either-or 
position, declaring that induction is the best, if not the only, method.” This dissertation uses 
previous literature to focus research issues, set criteria for the study, and refine the research 
findings.  
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4.2. Research Setting 
The empirical focus of the dissertation is clean energy venture entrepreneurial challenges, VC 
and clean energy venture interaction, and performance of CVC funds that invest in clean 
energy ventures. In the area of clean energy, both VC and CVC funds have, during the last 
five years, showed rapidly increasing investment activity. The wider research context, clean 
energy market, will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5. The names of the 29 interviewed 
VC and CVC firms are disclosed, as is the time of the fund interview. However, for reasons of 
confidentiality, the names of the informants are not disclosed, neither are the quotes used in 
chapters 6 through 8 attributable to the interviewed firm name. The names of the 164 clean 
energy ventures whose survey responses are used in the study are not disclosed for reasons of 
confidentiality. A brief discussion of the three data collection phases and the logic behind the 
selection of the studied VCs, CVCs, ventures, and other clean energy sector stakeholders 
follows.  
4.2.1. VC and CVC Funds 
All together, 29 interviews were carried out among independent, corporate, and government-
backed VCs, both in Europe and in North America during 2003-2005. The researcher 
personally carried out all except for three interviews. However, these three interviews 
followed the same format as the interviews conducted by the researcher herself. A written 
transcript was received from the three interviews. Table 7 shows the interviewed VC, CVC, 
and government-backed funds. Due to practical limitations, most of the interviews were 
carried out among European VCs and CVCs. The funds were identified through energy sector 
VC conferences, such as Cleantech Venture Forum1 and European Energy Venture Fair2, and 
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by crosschecking with the already interviewed funds. Almost all of the European VC and 
CVC funds that were actively investing in clean energy ventures in 2003-2004 were 
interviewed. In Spring 2005, additional interviews were carried out among North American 
VCs investing in clean energy ventures in order to lessen possible geographical bias.  
All of the interviewed VC funds had made at least one investment into clean energy 
technologies. Most of the interviewed funds publicly promoted the clean energy sector as one 
of the fund’s focus areas. It was essential to concentrate in one cleantech category only in 
order to acquire solid understanding of the research context, the clean energy sector. The 
clean energy sector was chosen as the source of cleantech empirical data for three reasons. 
First, the energy industry, which is one of the largest sectors of the economy, is currently 
under pressure to change. Second, the energy sector is attracting a growing amount of 
attention from VCs (Parker 2005). Third, since European CVC funds have been active 
investors in the clean energy market, it was expected that interesting and rich research data 
would be available if clean energy focus was chosen.  
Table 7 Interviewed VC and CVC Funds 
Fund Name  Fund Type  
Parent 
Company Type 
Fund 
Location 
Interview 
Date 
Interview 
Type 
Norsk Hydro 
Technology Ventures 
Corporate 
VC Oil & gas Norway 6.11 2003 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
RWE Dynamics 
Corporate 
VC Utility Germany 17.2 2004 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
MVV/Accera 
Corporate 
VC Utility Germany 18.2 2004 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
Eon Venture Partners 
Corporate 
VC Utility Germany 19.2 2004 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
Vattenfall Europe 
venture 
Corporate 
VC Utility Germany 5.2 2004 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
Suez NovInvest 
Corporate 
VC Utility France 24.3 2004 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
Edf Business 
Innovation 
Corporate 
VC Utility France 25.3 2004 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
EdF Capital 
investissement 
Corporate 
VC Utility France 24.3 2004 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
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Fund Name  Fund Type  
Parent 
Company Type 
Fund 
Location 
Interview 
Date 
Interview 
Type 
Schneider Electric 
Ventures 
Corporate 
VC 
Technology 
Manufacturer France 23.3 2004 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
BASF Venture Capital 
GmbH 
Corporate 
VC 
Technology 
Manufacturer Germany 18.2 2004 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
Easenergy 
Corporate 
VC Utility USA 17.2 2005 
Face-to-face 
(notes) 
Nth Power 
Independent 
VC None USA 9.10 2003 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
SAM Group 
Independent 
VC 
None 
Switzerland 20.8 2003 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
MSBI Capital 
Independent 
VC 
None 
Canada 
20.10 
2003 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
Innofinance 
Independent 
VC 
None 
Finland 
21.11 
2003 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
Glastad Invest 
Independent 
VC 
None 
Norway 5.11 2003 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
PEM-fund 
Independent 
VC 
None 
Finland 7.11 2003 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
Proventia Group 
Independent 
VC 
None 
Finland 
20.10 
2003 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
Capman 
Independent 
VC 
None 
Denmark 
14.11 
2003 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
Apax 
Independent 
VC 
None 
Germany 11.3 2004 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
Nordstjernan Ventures 
Independent 
VC 
None 
Sweden 
29.10 
2003 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
Draper Fisher Jurvetson 
Independent 
VC 
None 
USA 1.2 2005 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
Rustic Canyon Partners 
Independent 
VC 
None 
USA 26.1 2005 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
Good Energies Inc 
Independent 
VC 
None 
USA 26.1 2005 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
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Fund Name  Fund Type  
Parent 
Company Type 
Fund 
Location 
Interview 
Date 
Interview 
Type 
Pacific Corporate 
Group 
Independent 
VC 
None 
USA 29.3 2005 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
California Clean 
Energy Fund 
Independent 
VC 
None 
USA 21.3 2005 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
Chrysalix 
Independent 
VC 
None 
Canada 24.1 2005 
Phone 
interview 
(notes) 
Finnish Industrial 
Investment 
Government 
VC 
None 
Finland 7.11 2003 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
Start-Fondet 
Government 
VC 
None 
Norway 4.11 2003 
Face-to-face 
(taped) 
4.2.2. Clean Energy Ventures 
Collecting data on clean energy ventures, and specifically the challenges the firms face when 
trying to raise venture capital for their firms, is difficult. No readily available databases or 
previous studies exist or, if they do exist, they could not be identified. Therefore, a decision 
was made to carry out a survey among clean energy ventures. A Web-based survey method 
was chosen for practical implementation of the survey. The first step was to assemble a 
contact database of clean energy ventures worldwide. The goal was to identify clean energy 
ventures less than 10 years of age that have tried to raise venture capital funding for the firm. 
The database was built using publicly available data on energy venture fair participants, 
national registries of renewable energy firms, portfolios of venture capitalists, and other 
databases such as GreenTie3. Publicly available lists of Energy venture fair4, European energy 
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 www.greentie.org 
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venture fair5 and National Renewable Energy Lab (NREL) Industry growth Forum6 
participants provided a starting point for building the contact database. Using the firm Web 
sites and the above-mentioned sources, contact information for each firm was added to the 
database. The clean energy venture contact information included the email addresses of either 
the CEO, CFO, or investor relations representative of the firm. The contact database was 
gradually built between June 2004 and February 2005 and consisted of 916 clean energy 
ventures worldwide. The survey was sent out in February 2005. Prior to sending the request to 
participate in the survey, the survey questionnaire was tested by two North American clean 
energy ventures. The survey questionnaire is shown in Appendix 1. 
4.2.3. Other Clean Energy Market Stakeholders 
In order to acquire background information on the clean energy market, clean energy market 
drivers, and to design the survey format, additional stakeholder interviews were carried out. 
These interviews have guided the research direction and provided additional viewpoints into 
the research area. For reasons of confidentiality, the informant names are not disclosed. Only 
the informants’ organizations are shown in Table 8. 
Table 8 Interviewed Clean Energy Market Stakeholders 
Organization Name  Organization Type Location Interview 
Type 
Interview 
Date 
Lawrence Berkeley Labs, 
Technology transfer unit 
Energy research and 
technology development 
USA Face-to-face 
(taped) 
2.3 2005 
Lawrence Berkeley Labs, 
Energy efficiency research 
Energy research and 
technology development 
USA Face-to-face 
(taped) 
2.3 2005 
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 www.europeanenergyfair.com 
6
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Organization Name  Organization Type Location Interview 
Type 
Interview 
Date 
WestStart/CalStart Non-profit organization 
working with 
transportation issues  
USA Face-to-face 
(taped) 
26.1 2005 
Hydrogen Ventures LLC Firm providing research, 
financial and 
technological advisory 
services on alternative 
energy technologies 
USA Face-to-face 
(taped) 
25.1 2005 
Quantum Insight Emerging technology 
and assessment service 
firm 
USA Face-to-face 
(notes) 
10.2 2005 
UC Berkeley, Open 
Innovation Center 
University research 
organization 
USA Face-to-face 
(videotaped) 
22.3 2005 
Ecosa Capital Environmental debt fund USA Face-to-face 
(notes) 
Feb-March 
2005 
CleanEdge Cleantech advisory firm USA Telephone 
(notes) 
22.2 2005 
Enginion Clean energy venture Germany Face-to-face 
(taped) 
6.2 2004 
Sulfurcell Clean energy venture Germany Face-to-face 
(taped) 
6.2 2004 
 
In addition, a large number of conferences, workshops, and trade fairs in the area of cleantech 
and clean energy were attended in order to gain further understanding of clean energy as an 
emerging investment area. Newspaper and magazine articles and press releases concerning 
clean energy as an investment area were collected and analyzed. 
4.3. Research Process 
Empirical data were collected over a period of two years. The majority of the VC and CVC 
interviews were carried out in 2003 and 2004 (Table 7), concentrating on the European 
investors. Additional interviews were carried out in the spring of 2005 in North America 
(Table 7). Although Table 7 shows the funds’ physical locations, many of the interviewed VC 
and CVC funds have made investments in ventures that operate in other countries or 
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continents. For example, Germany-based BASF Venture Capital and Norway-based Norsk 
Hydro Technology Ventures have made several investments in North American ventures. The 
same is true for European independent VC funds, such as SAM Group. These cross-border 
VC investments are argued to lessen the possible Europe-centric bias of the VC and CVC 
interviews. Stakeholders other than VC and CVC interviews (Table 8) were carried out in 
2004 and 2005. The survey contact database was built during the latter half of 2004 and the 
survey was carried out in February 2005. Conferences, workshops, venture fairs, and trade 
fairs in the area of cleantech and clean energy were regularly attended during the period from 
2002 through 2005. Newspaper and magazine articles and press releases concerning clean 
energy as an investment area were collected and analyzed during this same time period. 
4.3.1. Data Sources and Data Collection 
The research process varied for all of the three data collection phases (chapter 4.1). Data 
sources, collection, and analysis are next discussed for each of the three approaches. 
(1) VC and CVC Funds 
The average duration of the informant interviews was 1.5 hours. For each of the interviewed 
funds, at least one of the fund partners was interviewed. In some cases, all of the fund 
personnel attended the interview session. All interviews except for one were face-to-face 
interviews that were carried out in the fund premises (Table 7). All interviews except for two 
were taped and later transcribed. Those interviews that were not taped were transcribed during 
the interview.  
The goal of the interview was to cover clean energy activities of the fund. Every interview 
was guided by open-ended questions that were, in most cases, sent to the informants prior to 
the interview. In the interview, a brief description of the study was first presented and the 
confidentiality of all responses was assured. Second, the informant was asked about his or her 
responsibilities in the fund, the informant background, and personal experience on clean 
energy ventures. The interviewee was also asked to describe the fund history, objectives, and 
reasons for investing in the clean energy sector. The informant was then asked about the clean 
energy sector investments his or her fund had made and the involvement of the interviewee in 
these investments. The informant was also asked about his or her views on clean energy 
market drivers and the challenges he or she had experienced with clean energy technology 
investments. Informants in independent VC funds were also asked about their views on CVC 
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funds active in the sector. CVC fund informants were asked about the involvement of the 
CVC fund’s parent firm in the fund’s daily operation, and the financial and strategic goals of 
the fund that had been set by the parent firm. At the end of the interview, the interviewee was 
asked to name additional clean energy funds and contact people for the use of the researcher. 
These contact leads were used to cross-check that the leading clean energy VC funds were 
covered during the data collection process. In addition to the fund interview data, documents 
and other secondary sources were consulted whenever available. This included World Wide 
Web documents, press releases, and fund annual reports. These documents were used to 
triangulate the findings from the interviews. In the case of corporate venture capital funds, 
secondary data from news services and trade journals were important in understanding the 
CVC fund parent firm’s technology and market situation. Understanding the industry and 
market context surrounding the CVC fund parent firm was needed in analyzing the CVC 
interview data.  
(2) Clean Energy Ventures  
A Web-based survey, using the contact database described earlier, was carried out in February 
2005. A brief description of the survey respondents is presented in Table 9. The survey 
invitation was sent via email to 916 clean energy ventures. Of these invitations, 161 emails 
did not reach their destination. It was discovered that, during the eight months it had taken to 
collect the contact information database, some of the clean energy ventures had ceased to 
exist, some had merged with other firms, and thus some had changed their contact 
information. In several cases, the contact person that had been added to the database no longer 
worked for the firm and the email account had become inactive. When these losses were taken 
into account, 755 emails reached their destination. The survey questionnaire is shown in 
Appendix 1. The survey started with questions on the venture background, in order to make 
sure that the firm was part of the target group. The eligibility criteria were that the firm was 
less than 10 years of age and it operated in the area of clean energy technology. The survey 
received 164 eligible responses.  
Of the respondents, 68% were in leadership or senior management positions and 64% of the 
respondents were one of the firm founders. Of those respondents that were one of the firm 
founders, 69% had previous start-up experience. Roughly half, 54%, of the ventures had 
participated in an energy venture fair or other similar event in order to make contact with 
investors.  
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The goal of the survey was to study the experience of clean energy ventures with venture 
capitalists and the challenges the ventures were facing. Of the survey data, the open-ended 
questions provided the researcher with the most useful data. Since the contact database was 
constructed using participant information of various clean energy and other cleantech sector 
venture fairs (chapter 4.2.2), the database and the survey respondents exhibit a certain bias. 
For example, the ventures included in the contact database were actively looking for 
additional financing for their firms or had already secured VC funding. The success rate in 
raising VC financing (Table 9) was also exceptionally high among the respondent firms. 
Although no quantitative measures on the ease or difficulty in raising funding for a clean 
energy venture can be given based on this study, the open-ended essays regarding venture 
challenges and experience with venture capitalists provided the researcher with rich data on 
the interaction between the stakeholders. The clean energy venture financing survey data 
provided a view to the “other side of the financing table” and complement the data acquired 
through VC and CVC interviews.  
Table 9 Clean Energy Venture Financing Survey Overview 
Topic Details 
Peak year of  
venture founding 
2001; 16% of the respondent firms were founded in 2001 
Company size 41% of the respondent firms employed five people or less, 32% 
employed 6-25 people. In other words, companies in the area of clean 
energy that participated in the survey were fairly small, as 73% 
employed fewer that 25 people. 
Location 57% of the respondent firms were located in the US, of which roughly 
one-third were located in California. 27% of the respondent firms 
were located in Europe and 9% in Canada. The US bias is partly due 
to the better visibility of energy start-ups. The survey contact database 
was built using venture fair participant lists and other forums where 
clean energy ventures promote their businesses.  
Energy technology 
area 
The survey respondents were asked to identify their main business 
area. The largest groups were fuel cells and other hydrogen–related 
technologies (23%), solar PV technology (16%), wind (8%), energy 
efficiency (15%), and energy management solutions (10%).  
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Venture capital 
funding 
72% of all respondent firms had sought venture capital funding either 
from independent, corporate, or government-backed VC funds. 44% 
of the firms that had sought VC funding had managed to raise it. The 
high rate of success in raising venture capital is due to the bias in firm 
selection, since VC portfolios and energy venture fair participant lists 
were used when building the contact database. 
  
(3) Other Clean Energy Stakeholders 
The data collection procedure for clean energy stakeholders was the same as described earlier 
for VC and CVC funds. The informants in each of the interviewed organizations were in a 
leading position within the organization. The open-ended questions included questions on 
clean energy market drivers and challenges for the clean energy market growth, as observed 
by the informant. The stakeholder interview data, newspaper and magazine articles and press 
releases concerning clean energy as an investment area were used in gaining general 
understanding of the research area, but they were not used in the theory building of the study. 
References to the collected and analyzed stakeholder interview data and newspaper and 
magazine articles are made in the theory building chapters when it is judged necessary in 
order to help the reader to understand the energy industry context and the emerging clean 
energy market in more detail. 
4.3.2. Data Analysis 
According to Ryan et al (2000), grounded theory is an iterative process by which the analyst 
becomes more and more “grounded” in the data and develops increasingly richer concepts and 
models of how the phenomenon being studied really works. The data on clean energy venture 
challenges and the role of financiers and large firms in the clean energy market development 
was collected in three different data collection phases, as described earlier. Data from phases 
1 and 2 were used in the data analysis. Data from phase 3 served as background material for 
the researcher. Data collection of this study was a challenging task, carried out over two 
years’ time. The long data collection period resulted in having copious amounts of data to be 
analyzed, mostly in text format. Grounded theory data analysis principles (Creswell 2003 and 
Strauss et al. 1998) were followed in the manner described in this chapter. An iterative 
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process between data, emerging theory, and literature was used to make sure that reliability 
and validity concerns were addressed during the data analysis. 
The typical way of carrying out grounded theory research is collecting verbatim transcripts of 
interviews and reading through a small sample of text, usually line by line (Ryan et al. 2000). 
The data analysis of this study followed the typical way described by Ryan et al. The coding 
part of the data analysis process that led to the theoretical models presented in the theory 
chapters (chapters 6 through 8) consisted of three stages. These stages are discussed next in 
more detail, including a description of theoretical memos that were kept during the data 
analysis. 
(1) Open coding 
The VC and CVC interviews were taped and transcribed as described in chapter 4.3.1. The 
interview data was coded using open coding (Strauss et al. 1998). In practice, the coding 
meant re-reading the transcribed interviews with questions such as “What is the fund manager 
discussing here?”, “What caused the described situation?”, “How did the VC fund manager 
react to the situation?”, “How does the fund manager’s previous professional experience 
influence his view of the situation?” and “What was the outcome of the situation?” in mind. 
With the help of questions data categories and properties (Creswell 2003) were identified. 
Since the interviewed VCs and CVCs tended to use very similar terminology in the interviews 
such as “exit strategy”, “capital intensity” and “due diligence”, in-vivo labels i.e. terms used 
by the informants themselves were used for category names in most cases.  
The VC and CVC interview transcript coding started while additional interviews were carried 
out. More categories were added when new data came along. To keep track of the data 
categories, and to note down the emerging relations between the categories and their 
properties, the researcher started to write working paper versions in an early stage of the VC 
and CVC interview process. Literature was consulted to refine these early empirical findings. 
These working paper versions served also as code books (Creswell 2003) for the researcher. 
The early working paper versions gradually developed into theoretical memos and helped in 
axial coding of the data. Both axial coding and theoretical memos are discussed in more detail 
later in the chapter. 
Ryan et al. (2000) noted, “as grounded theorists develop their concepts and categories, they 
often decide they need more data from informants.” After the initial coding of European VC 
and CVC interviews (Table 7), it became apparent that “other side of the financing coin,” the 
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clean energy entrepreneurs trying to raise funding for their venture, needed to be studied. The 
categories and properties that had been identified from the European VC and CVC interview 
data were used to construct the survey questionnaire (Appendix 1). Since many of the survey 
respondent ventures were located in North America and had thus interacted with North 
American VCs instead of European VCs, additional interview data from North American 
clean energy VCs were collected in the Spring 2005 to compensate for the possible 
geographical bias of the VC and CVC interviews carried out earlier. After the survey had 
been carried out in February 2005, the open-question essay responses from the survey data 
were coded in a similar manner as the European VC and CVC interviews. The same was done 
for the North American VC and CVC interview transcripts. Initial codes that emerged from 
the European VC and CVC interview transcript data were supplemented by codes that 
emerged from the survey data and North American VC and CVC data open coding process.  
 (2) Axial coding 
The goal of axial coding is to relate the separate codes (categories and their properties) to 
each other and to fit the data into a frame of generic relationships. The process proceeds in an 
inductive manner mainly concentrating on causal relationships. The axial coding and open 
coding process proceeded in a parallel manner during the data analysis, mainly due to the 
usage of early working paper versions mentioned earlier. During axial coding categories and 
their properties were divided into separate elements. These elements were phenomena, causal 
conditions, context, intervening conditions, action strategies and consequences. Table 10 
demonstrates axial coding by giving an example of some of the codes used in the 
development of the theoretical model presented in chapter 8. 
Table 10 Elements Used in Axial Coding and Examples 
Element Code Description 
Phenomenon Manager support  Difficulties in gaining support for CVC fund 
activities among the parent company operational 
unit managers 
Causal 
conditions 
Innovation  View on the importance of innovation within a 
parent firm of a CVC fund 
Context Industry values Traditions and value systems of energy industry, 
“way things are done”. 
Intervening 
conditions 
Success 
compensation 
Venture success often goes unnoticed in the parent 
company 
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Action 
strategies 
Investment 
decision-making 
Involvement of parent company managers in the 
investment decision-making 
Consequences Fund performance Problems in CVC fund performance 
 
(3) Selective coding and theoretical memos 
Selective coding means that one category is chosen as the core category to which all the other 
categories relate to. Another way of selective coding is an attempt to find a single “storyline” 
around which everything else is connected to. After the open and axial coding had been 
carried out, three storylines, one for each of the theory-building chapters (chapters 6 through 
8), started to take shape. With the help of working paper versions (theoretical memos) that 
were refined throughout the data analysis process, the three storylines evolved into three 
theoretical models. The data analysis process thus started when the first interviews were 
carried out (fall 2003) and continued until the last interviews had been carried out (spring 
2005). During this time several working paper versions of all the three theoretical models 
were developed and iterated towards a final model. For chapter 6, only survey data were used 
to construct the theoretical model. For theory-building of chapters 7 and 8, both survey data 
and VC and CVC interview data were utilized. Literature was consulted to refine the findings 
as had been the practice starting from the early versions of the working papers. Data display 
techniques, such as matrices and graphs, were used in constructing the theoretical models. 
Initial propositions were defined and evaluated to identify problems and make appropriate 
revisions.  
The end results of grounded theory are often displayed through presentation of text segments, 
such as quotes from informants, as exemplars of concepts and theories (Ryan et al. 2000). In 
this study, the results are presented in the form of frameworks, theoretical models, and 
propositions. Quotes from the informants, both from the interview and survey data, are used 
as prototypical examples of the study findings.  
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5. Cleantech and Clean Energy Market 
The empirical data of the study come from one cleantech sub-sector, clean energy. As was 
argued in the introduction and chapter 4.1, the most prominent investment activity in the 
cleantech market has taken place among clean energy technology-related ventures.  
The data analysis of this dissertation is organized around the following three issues: clean 
energy venture entrepreneurial challenges, venture capitalist and clean energy venture 
interaction, and clean energy corporate VC funds. This chapter provides the reader with an 
overview of both the cleantech and the clean energy market development. Drivers behind 
changes in the energy sector are also discussed. The goal of the overview is to acquaint the 
reader with the research context to a degree that allows the reader to challenge the 
interpretations put forth in this study. 
5.1. Cleantech VC Market 
Clean technology is a hot funding sector that is just coming into its own 
after being on VC’s back burner for so long.  
-- Sheahan (2004) 
The annual global revenues of cleantech markets are upwards $150 billion, with segments 
such as solar or wind growing at annual rate as high as 35% (Parker 2005). According to 
CleanEdge (2001), the following six factors can be identified as the source of today’s 
cleantech revolution: energy uncertainty, technological advances, pressing environmental 
issues, changing political winds, sustainable development, and new business opportunities. 
Among other factors, the strong growth figures have attracted venture capitalists and other 
investors to the cleantech space. De Callejon et al (2005) state five principal factors behind 
the emergence of cleantech as an investment category. First, many clean technologies serve 
large and fast-growing markets. Second, market trends and economic forces are behind the 
adoption of clean technologies. Examples of the trends and forces include rising commodity 
prices, technology innovation that has driven down the cost of resource-efficient technologies, 
and technology spillover effects from other industries. Third, experienced and professional 
management teams often run today’s cleantech companies; the emergence of serial 
entrepreneurs having the experience of taking their cleantech companies public is an 
important factor. Fourth, the cleantech sector is seeing a strong and growing flow of attractive 
deals. Finally, the strong venture returns in cleantech investments have confirmed that VCs 
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can find attractive returns in cleantech. LoGerfo et al. (2005) estimates, using a sample of 56 
publicly traded U.S. cleantech companies, that the median returns realized by investors in 
privately held cleantech companies were 433%, or about 5.3 times the invested capital. 
LoGerfo et al. also argue that cleantech companies are able to provide long-term shareholder 
value. The argument was supported by creating a cleantech index consisting of 11 segments 
and comparing the index to the NASDAQ and Russell 2000 indexes’ performance over a ten-
year period. Based on the cleantech index, LoGerfo et al. argued that the cleantech index had 
strongly outpaced the performance of the NASDAQ and Russell 2000 indexes it was 
benchmarked against. 
According to the Cleantech Venture Network (Parker 2005) over the past three years, nearly 
700 investors have invested more than $3.6 billion in over 500 VC deals in the cleantech 
sector, making cleantech at least the sixth largest venture investment category. Based on data 
from investments starting in 2002, North American VCs have allocated the cleantech VC 
money mainly to the three following sectors: clean energy –related technology (40%); 
materials recovery, clean manufacturing and enabling technologies (22%); and advanced 
materials and nanotechnology (17%) (Parker).  
Four main VC groups can be identified in the cleantech market. The first group consists of the 
traditional venture capital firms that have expanded their investment horizon to cleantech. The 
first group also includes top-tier VC firms (Rivlin 2005). The second group consists of firms 
that have specialized in the cleantech sector. An example of a VC firm from the second group 
is the Swiss Sustainable Asset Management Group7. The third group consists of VC firms that 
invest in a cleantech sub-group such as water technologies or hydrogen-related ventures. 
Examples of these tightly focused VC firms investing in a particular cleantech sub-sector are 
the Canadian Chrysalix8 and the Swiss Good Energies Inc9. The last and fourth group is CVC 
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funds that invest in the cleantech sector. CVC funds investing in clean energy technologies 
are discussed in more detail in chapter 5.2.  
5.2. Clean Energy VC Market 
The reason we see growing investment in energy technologies is obvious. As 
the industry and its customers find themselves going from crisis to crisis, 
there is a growing realization that patchwork solutions are not going to 
solve the challenges facing energy producers and users. The emergence of 
new technologies and their adoption are capable of fulfilling the promise for 
solving systemic problems involving how we generate, use, track, and 
manage electric power.  
-- Venture capital firm Nth Power (2004) 
Venture capital has been flowing into the energy sector since the late 1990s, when the first 
dedicated clean energy funds were established. According to CleanEdge (2005), sky-
rocketing oil-prices, conflicts in the Middle East, power outage concerns, and support from 
state governments are pushing clean-energy investments into the mainstream. Although the 
clean energy venture capital market has experienced a downturn from the figures of late 
1990s, as shown in Figure 2, this is a result of the overall lower venture capital investment 
levels. The relative share of energy VC of total venture investments has remained relatively 
stable, around 2.2-2.8% (CleanEdge), since 2001.  
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Worldwide vs. US energy VC investments 1998-2004
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Figure 2 Source: Nth Power, CleanEdge, PricewaterhouseCoopers / Venture Economics / NVCA money 
tree survey 
U.S.-based VCs have made most of the energy VC investments (Figure 2). To put the energy 
VC investment figure into perspective, the sum invested by the VCs is roughly equal to the 
yearly private sector energy R&D investment (Kammen et al. 2005). 
According to Prudencio (2005) the development of energy venture capital market consists of 
five periods. During the first period, from the early 1990s through 1995, venture capital 
investments into energy technology were practically non-existent, barely totaling about $90 
million over five years. In the second period, which started in 1995 and continued to 1997, 
Europe and Japan started to take steps to make power and energy markets more competitive, 
followed by New Zealand and the United States. Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists 
activated and in 1996, $122 million poured into companies developing new energy 
technologies and services. From 1997 to 2001, which constitutes the third period, more than 
266 investment rounds were closed, resulting in investments totaling more than $3.3 billion. 
The last period was 2002 to 2004, which started with the market cooling as investments in 
energy technology companies dropped by 45% in 2002. However, the relative share of energy 
investments to all investments grew to 2.7% by 2003, as compared to 1996, when the share 
was 1%. The overall size of deals shrank from the highs in 2000 and was just over $8 million 
in 2004 (CleanEdge 2005). It should be noted, however, that the average size of European 
energy VC deals tend to be smaller than their North American counterparts. 
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5.2.1. CVC Funds and Other Investors 
Energy sector CVC funds have followed an unusual market entry order when compared with 
CVC funds in other sectors, such as ICT or biotechnology. Many corporate VC funds entered 
the energy VC market before independent VCs started their own funds. The energy sector 
CVC funds have been established by three main groups of companies: oil and gas companies, 
electric utilities, and energy technology manufacturers. Most of the CVC funds investing in 
new energy technologies were established during the boom years of the late 1990s or during 
2000. Compared to capital investments going into infrastructure maintenance and power 
capacity additions, the sizes of the CVC funds set up by the largest European companies in 
the energy sector are still modest. According to International Energy agency estimates, based 
on current demand trends, the world will need to invest $16 trillion over the next three 
decades to maintain and expand the energy supply. This number is equivalent to 1% of annual 
global GDP over the period (IEA 2003). 
In addition to CVC funds, other strategic investors both from inside and outside of current 
energy sector major players are getting involved in clean energy technologies, either through 
venturing programs, mergers and acquisitions, or investments into basic research programs. 
Examples of recent acquisitions are two purchases carried out by General Electric, where 
Enron Wind was acquired in 2002 and AstroPower was acquired in 2004. Examples of 
successful clean energy products that have spun off from corporate internal R&D activities 
into major business units are Toyota’s Prius hybrid car and Sharp Electronics’ solar 
photovoltaic equipment business, worth $1 billion in 2004. An example of investments into 
clean energy services is Carlyle-Riverstone’s purchase of a majority interest in California’s 
solar-power-generating systems (RedHerring 2005). Several of the independent VCs that have 
focused on the clean energy market have large corporations as investors. One example is the 
Canadian hydrogen technology-focused VC fund, Chrysalix, whose investors include Ballard, 
Shell, Mitsubishi, and Boeing Corporation. Large corporations have also recently funded 
basic clean energy research related programs in research institutes and universities. One 
example of a corporate-funded research program is the Global Climate and Energy Project 
carried out by Stanford University, sponsored by Exxon, Toyota, Schlumberger, and General 
Electric. 
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5.3. Clean Energy Market Drivers 
Several drivers for emergence of the clean energy market can be identified. According to 
CleanEdge (2002), the following factors have placed clean energy technologies and 
companies in the spotlight: security issues, energy uncertainty, the need for increased power 
reliability and quality, technological advances, pressing environmental issues, the rise of the 
developing world, strategic investors, government commitments, and venture capital. An 
overview of some of these factors, including a short review of energy policy as a market 
driver, follows. 
5.3.1. Climate Change and Governmental Commitment 
Extraction, transportation, and conversion of fossil fuel, and generation and transmission of 
electricity have always had many local and regional environmental impacts. Carbon dioxide 
from the combustion of fossil fuels poses a different challenge: it remains the most important 
of anthropogenic greenhouse gases, and its rising emissions will be the main cause of higher 
tropospheric temperatures (Smil 2003). Smil argues that, in addition to climate change 
concerns, loss of biodiversity, human interference in the biogeochemical nitrogen cycle, and 
the health of the world ocean are other leading environmental concerns associated with the 
rising use of energy. 
Adverse impacts from greenhouse gases include severe heat-waves (Meehl et al. 2004), major 
storms (Knutson et al. 2004), frequent and serious droughts (Dai et al. 2004), great floods 
(Milly et al. 2002), and changes in species (Parmesan et al. 2003). The most recent discovery 
is the effect climate change is claimed to have on the Gulf Stream (Bryden et al. 2005). The 
speed of climate change has a regional aspect, as well. According to the eight-nation Arctic 
Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA 2004), the reported arctic average temperature has risen at 
almost twice the rate as the rest of the world in the past few decades.  
Increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) is the dominant driver of current 
global climate change. Among the greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide (CO2) is the most 
important source. Emission of CO2 from fossil-fuel combustion arises as the result of a 
process that currently supplies nearly 80% of our global energy demand. According to an 
IPCC scenario (IS92a) CO2 will account for 75% of GHGs in 2100. The dominant source of 
anthropogenic CO2 is fossil-fuel combustion. Concerns of climate change have pressured 
countries, firms, and individuals to start considering more environmentally friendly ways for 
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producing energy. A multi-national effort that is the most visible sign of this gradual 
movement is the formation of Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC)10.  
According to Holdren (2005), there is leverage in four areas to reduce CO2: population, GDP 
per person, energy intensity of GDP, and carbon intensity of energy supply. According to 
Holdren, energy intensity of GDP, in other words, getting more GDP out of less energy, is the 
cheapest, largest, and fastest leverage on carbon emissions. Reducing the carbon intensity of 
energy supply entails changing the mix of fossil and non-fossil fuel energy sources, such as 
introducing more renewable and/or nuclear energy, and the characteristics of fossil-fuel 
technologies, such as introduction of carbon capture and sequestration (Holdren).  
Various countries have introduced policy instruments to mitigate climate change. These 
instruments include fiscal measures, regulatory instruments, voluntary agreements, policy 
process and outreach, research and development programs, and tradable permits (IEA 2004). 
Some countries, such as France and the United Kingdom, have also published long-term GHG 
reduction targets. In 2003, the European Union published the European Union GHG emission 
trading scheme, often referred to as EU-ETS.  
For most International Energy Agency (IEA) member countries, energy efficiency is one of 
the key policy tools to achieve GHG emissions reduction targets, as well as energy security 
(IEA 2004). These policies include adjusting energy prices, establishing financial instruments 
to encourage the use of efficient products and practices, mandating minimum efficiency 
levels, and voluntary measures. New instruments, such as energy efficiency certificates, also 
referred to as white certificates, have also emerged.  
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5.3.2. Energy Uncertainty and Security 
Between 1900 and 2000, global consumption of fossil fuels rose almost fifteen-fold (Smil 
2003). This large expansion meant that, in spite of the near quadrupling of global population, 
average annual per capita supply of commercial energy more than quadrupled. When gains in 
useful energy per unit of primary supply are taken into account, the energy services have 
experienced eight-fold to twelve-fold increases in per capital supply of energy services, as 
well as improvements in comfort, safety, and reliability during the past century (Smil).  
Energy systems may also be used as targets and weapons for terrorists. In addition, they have 
potential for conflict over access to remaining supplies of inexpensive gas and oil. There are 
also links among nuclear energy technologies, nuclear weapon capabilities, political tensions, 
and upheavals resulting from energy strategy inadequacies that create economic or 
environmental impoverishment (Holdren 2004).  
Energy markets have experienced significantly higher energy prices since 2003 (IEA 2004). 
For example, in 2003, the average spot price for natural gas at Henry Hub was 63% higher 
than in 2002 (IEA 2004). The price of oil has often been connected with the health of the 
world economy. IEA estimates that in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries, every $10US increase averages to a loss of 0.4% GDP in 
OECD countries, 0.8% in Asia, and 1.6% in poor, heavily indebted countries.  
Most OECD countries have national policies that support renewable energy production. For 
example, in 2001, the EU agreed that the share of electricity from renewable energy sources 
in the EU consumption should reach 21% by 2010 (EU 2006). In 2003, it agreed that at least 
5.75% of all petrol and diesel should be bio-fuels by 2010. EU is currently preparing an EU 
action plan of energy efficiency that is planned to be put in place at the end of 2006 (EU 
2006). However, renewable energy research and development programs have experienced 
serious decline since the 1970s (Kammen et al. 2005 and 1999, and IEA 2004). Since the 
1970s, governments set up research and development programs for renewable energy, 
technology deployment schemes, investment incentives, tax measures, and incentive tariffs. 
Since the late 1990s, quota obligations with tradable certificates have become popular (IEA).  
However, according to the World Energy Outlook 2004 (IEA 2004b), the current set of 
national and international energy policies are not enough. If governments adhere to the 
policies in force as of mid-2004, the world’s energy needs will be almost 60% higher in 2030 
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than they are now. CO2 emissions are estimated to be 60% higher in 2030 than they are now 
(IEA). Fossil fuels will continue to dominate the energy mix, the share of renewable energy 
sources will remain limited, and short-term risks to energy security will continue to grow 
(IEA).  
5.3.3. Technological Advances and Solutions to Climate Problem 
Pacala et al. (2004) have suggested that humanity already possesses the fundamental 
scientific, technical, and industrial know-how to solve the carbon and climate problem for the 
next half-century. They suggest a portfolio of “potential wedges” as strategies available to 
reduce the carbon emission rate in 2054 by 1 GtC/year. The overview of potential wedges is 
presented in Table 11. A more detailed analysis of the effort needed is available from Pacala 
et al. (2004) article.  
Table 11 Strategies Available to Reduce Carbon Emissions 
Option Comments and Concerns 
Efficient vehicles Car size, power 
Reduced use of vehicles Urban design, mass transit, telecommuting 
Efficient buildings Weak incentives 
Efficient baseload coal plants Advanced high-temperature materials 
Gas baseload power for coal baseload 
power 
Competing demands for natural gas 
Capture CO2 at baseload power plant Technology already in use for H2 production 
Capture CO2 at H2 plant H2 safety, infrastructure 
Capture CO2 at coal-to-synfuels plant Increased CO2 emissions, if synfuels are produced 
without CO2 capture and storage 
Nuclear power to coal power Nuclear proliferation, terrorism, waste 
Wind power for coal power Multiple uses of land because windmills are widely 
spaced 
Photovoltaic power for coal power PV production cost 
Wind H2 in fuel-cell car for gasoline 
in hydrid car 
H2 safety, infrastructure 
Biomass fuel for fossil fuel Biodiversity, competing land use 
Reduced deforestation, plus 
reforestation, afforestation, and new 
plantations 
Land demands of agriculture, benefits to 
biodiversity from reduced deforestation 
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Option Comments and Concerns 
Conservation tillage Reversibility, verification 
 
Hoffert et al. (2004) have suggested, as future primary energy sources, terrestrial solar and 
wind energy, solar power satellites, biomass, nuclear fission, nuclear fusion, fission-fusion 
hybrids, and fossil fuels from which carbon has been sequestered. Non-primary power 
technologies that could contribute to climate stabilization include energy efficiency 
improvements, hydrogen production, storage and transport, super-conducting global electric 
grids, and geoengineering (Hoffert et al.). 
The aim of this chapter was to acquaint the reader with the cleantech and clean energy 
research context. The following three chapters will present the theory building of the 
dissertation. Chapter 6 develops a framework of clean energy venture entrepreneurial 
challenges, based on the empirical data gathered from the clean energy venture financing 
survey. Chapter 7 introduces a model of clean energy venture risk characteristics by taking 
into account the venture capitalist cognitive biases on clean energy entrepreneurial ventures. 
Chapter 8 develops a model that aims to explain the effect of a parent firm’s organizational 
culture on the performance of a corporate venture capital fund. The empirical data presented 
in chapters 7 and 8 is based on VC and CVC interviews and data from the clean energy 
venture financing survey. 
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6. Clean Energy Venture Entrepreneurial Challenges 
Chapters 6, 7, and 8 form the core of this dissertation. The previous two chapters review the 
methodology, research process, and the research setting of the study. The following three 
chapters contain the theory-building of this dissertation. In this chapter, clean energy venture 
entrepreneurial challenges are analyzed. The chapter forms a basis for the theory-building of 
the following two chapters, as one of the identified clean energy venture entrepreneurial 
challenges, financing, is explored further in chapters 7 and 8. 
6.1. Introduction 
Previous studies on sustainable, or cleantech, industry emergence have concentrated on 
system level and policy perspective (Kemp et al. 1998, Tsoutsos et al. 2005, Jacobsson et al. 
2000, and Russo 2003). Many of the previous studies use the energy industry, and especially 
the emergence of renewable energy and new transportation technologies, as the source of 
empirical data. Tsoutsos et al. studies the diffusion of renewable energy technologies and 
argues, “a successful policy for the speedy deployment of renewables should focus on the 
systemic innovation processes.” Kemp et al. develop a framework of barriers that impede 
regime shifts to sustainability. Berkhout (2002) studies the technological change in the energy 
sector and finds that institutional entrapment in large technological systems is the cause of 
barriers of technological change and entry of firms.  
These and other studies have widened the understanding of both system-level policy drivers 
and technological regime-induced barriers to clean technologies during the last ten years. 
However, cleantech industry firm-level studies have remained absent, even though 
entrepreneurial firms form the core elements of emerging industries. The need for further 
research among sustainable, or cleantech, technology entrepreneurial firms has been identified 
also in the previous studies. Jacobsson et al. (2000) noted that one of the key issues in 
technological transformation of energy systems is that more information is needed on how the 
“prime movers” in the creation of new technologies emerge. By “prime movers,” Jacobsson et 
al. refer to strong actors or group of actors within the energy system. Russo (2003) notes, “We 
cannot answer essential questions, such as where and when sustainable industries emerge.” 
The goal of this chapter is to study the clean energy venture entrepreneurial challenges, 
building on empirical data. In this dissertation, the term entrepreneurial challenge refers to a 
particular management task that emerges during the venture development (see chapter 2.3 for 
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a more detailed definition). Based on the study results, six propositions and a framework are 
developed.  
6.2. Methodological Notes 
Instead of studying the entrepreneurial challenges of an individual firm, in this study, the 
experiences of several clean energy entrepreneurs “running in packs” (Van de Ven 2005) are 
pooled and developed into a framework. The source of empirical data used in theory building 
is the clean energy venture financing survey that includes firms less than 10 years of age. The 
survey data collection and analysis was described in chapter 4.3. 
The analysis of clean energy venture entrepreneurial challenges proceeded in two stages. 
First, entrepreneurial challenges were identified on the clean energy industry level. Next, 
entrepreneurial challenges were studied separately in three clean energy industry categories 
that all were in a different industry development stage. The following three industry 
development stages were studied: early, rapid growth, and slow growth stage. Three clean 
energy industry categories selected to represent each of the three industry development stages 
were: fuel cell and other hydrogen-related industry (early stage), solar PV industry (rapid 
growth stage) and energy efficiency industry (slow growth stage). The analysis of different 
industry categories reveals additional entrepreneurial challenges, and also shows that some of 
the overall clean energy industry entrepreneurial challenges are less relevant on the individual 
industry category level. In other words, solar photovoltaic venture entrepreneurial challenges 
differ from the ones identified for energy efficiency ventures.  
One entrepreneurial challenge that remains the same for the clean energy industry and for the 
individual clean energy industry category level is venture financing. The clean energy venture 
financing survey, which was the source of empirical data of the study, contained several 
specific questions on financing background of clean energy entrepreneurial ventures and 
experience with independent and corporate venture capitalists. Therefore, the discussion on 
the financing challenge is presented in more detail, than is the case for the other two 
entrepreneurial challenges, growth management and market education, identified in the study. 
6.3. Entrepreneurial Challenges 
The survey data suggest that the three main clean energy entrepreneurial challenges are 
financing, market education, and growth management. These three entrepreneurial 
challenges and the factors within each challenge are demonstrated in List 3.  
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List 3 Framework of Clean Energy Entrepreneurial Challenges 
Market Education
-Public perception
-Market acceptance of technology
-Market Education & awereness 
Growth Management
- Partnering
- Recruiting and retaining
- Managing rapid growth
- Market dynamics
Financing
-Raising capital
 
The first entrepreneurial challenge, financing, is common to new ventures independent of 
industrial sector. For clean energy firms, the financing challenge consists of one main factor, 
raising capital for the venture. Gaining investor acceptance for a venture operating in the 
clean energy area was found to be particularly challenging. Market education constitutes the 
second entrepreneurial challenge. It includes factors related to public perception, market 
acceptance of the technology, the venture promoting it, and the need for market education 
among potential customers. The third entrepreneurial challenge is referred to as growth 
management, which includes a multitude of factors ranging from personnel recruitment to 
ability to react to dynamic market conditions.  
6.3.1. Financing 
Venture capital is the most common form of equity financing for early-stage ventures. Of the 
survey respondents, 72% had sought venture capital funding for their firm. The success rate in 
raising capital among the survey respondents was surprisingly high, 44%, exhibiting a bias 
based on the survey database, as discussed in chapter 4.3.1. The survey respondents were 
asked about the sources of funding for the venture. The three most important sources of 
financing, using a measure of raising at least half of the venture total financing needed from 
that particular source, were founder’s personal funds (37% of all respondents), venture capital 
(33% of all respondents), and angel investors (24% of all respondents). In other words, for the 
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survey respondent firms, venture capital funding had been the second most important source 
of capital after the founder’s personal funds. Based on the survey data analysis, the financing 
challenge consists of one main factor, raising capital. Survey response examples are exhibited 
in Table 12.  
Raising capital (Table 12, factor 1) in order to finance a new venture is a central part of 
entrepreneurial process as entrepreneurs are often wealth-constrained and need external 
financing (Shane et al. 2002). It is common for small businesses to frequently fail due to 
insufficient funding and heavy debt loads (Deeds et al. 2004). Raising funding from VCs is 
challenging, since “new technology ventures are typically resource-poor, possess few tangible 
assets, and can provide very little concrete data with which external constituents can predict 
performance” (Deeds et al. 2004). As one clean energy entrepreneur points out: 
[Our top three challenges are] 1) Raising money, 2) Raising money and 3) 
Raising money. And no, I'm not trying to be funny. Sufficient capital is 
becoming critical to the smaller companies in this sector. 
Venture capital, often referred to as “risk capital,” is a financial instrument often utilized by 
new ventures. The element of risk is always present for early-stage investors, since they 
cannot shift all the risk to entrepreneurs (Shane et al. 2002). All entrepreneurs seeking 
funding have psychological and financial incentives to convince investors that their 
opportunities are important and that they are entrepreneurial visionaries (Shane et al. 2002). 
An entrepreneur’s frustration with financiers who do not understand the value of the venture’s 
offering is evident in the following survey response: 
[Among our three biggest challenges is] overcoming the financial world’s 
attitude that they don’t want to be the first one to try something, but would 
wait to see what somebody else does first. [Another big challenge is] 
coming to terms with a public that is screaming for our product, but not 
having the financing to build the product because the financiers are too 
timid to take a chance. [The third big challenge our venture is facing is] 
seeing that the market is ripe with potential, but not being able to act on it. 
Gaining investor acceptance is challenging for new ventures. According to Aldrich et al. 
(1994), the lack of legitimacy hinders the new ventures from raising capital, as they have to 
convince investors of the formation of a new industry. Deeds et al. (2004) showed that 
legitimacy at both the industry and firm level increases the flow of financial resources into a 
venture. Cognitive legitimacy on the firm level has been shown to have a stronger influence 
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on the resource inflows than sociopolitical legitimacy (Aldrich et al. 1994). However, on the 
industry level, especially when it comes to IPO valuations, sociopolitical legitimacy has been 
found to be more important (Deeds et al. 2004). A clean energy entrepreneur may also 
experience the lack of industry-level legitimacy in trying to raise capital for the venture, as the 
following survey response demonstrates: 
[Among our top challenges is] raising risk capital in a non-risk, non-
environmentally oriented society. 
Table 12 demonstrates some examples of the financing challenge. 
Table 12 Survey Data Examples Regarding Financing Challenge 
Identified 
Factor 
Evidence: Answer to the Question, “Among our Top Three 
Challenges is....” 
 
Raising capital  
 
 
 
 
Raising money, raising money, raising money. 
Funding for full-scale demonstration and pre-commercial projects. 
Raising start-up capital. 
Raising pre-product capital. 
Issues with raising adequate capital. 
Financing the first deal. 
Finding the required additional funding. 
Raising capital. 
Raising sufficient equity capital to complete our business plan. 
Completing financing of same facility on a non-recourse project finance 
basis. 
Raising financing. 
Not give up too much ownership to hungry investors. 
Raising capital. 
Fundraising. 
Financing the company. 
Raising enough capital to start production. 
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Identified 
Factor 
Evidence: Answer to the Question, “Among our Top Three 
Challenges is....” 
 
Fundraising, fundraising, fundraising. 
Funding seems to be the largest problem. 
Availability of capital. 
Securing funding (particularly grant-related). 
Securing future financing. 
Obtaining equity financing that has a 5-7 year return window instead of 
3-5. 
 
Proposition 6-1: One of the top three entrepreneurial challenges facing clean energy 
entrepreneurs is venture financing, consisting of challenges in raising capital for a 
venture operating in the clean energy area.  
6.3.2. Market Education 
As these technologies get better, we’re seeing things being developed like 
solar panels integrated into roofing tiles. That way, they don’t look like a 
science project hanging on your roof.  
Walter V. Nasdeo, as quoted in Gray (2005) 
The second of the three main entrepreneurial challenges to emerge from the clean energy 
entrepreneur survey is named market education; it is shown in List 3. The market education 
challenge contains issues that were also identified in previous research. Examples from the 
previous research are cultural and psychological issues (Tsoutsos et al. 2005) and problems 
encountered through the experienced lack of cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy (Aldrich 
et al. 1994). Market education is used in this study as an umbrella term for three factors that 
surfaced from the survey data  shown in Table 13: public perception, market education and 
awareness, and market acceptance of technology.  
In order to have an impact on public perception (Table 13, factor 1) of the clean energy 
sector, several organizations and entrepreneurial firms have been involved in creation of the 
social movement (Van de Ven et al. 2004 and Dacin et al. 2002) for clean energy technologies 
  76 
for years. Interviews among clean energy stakeholders (chapter 4.2.3) confirm these clean 
energy market “social movement creation” efforts. However, the change in the public 
perception, at least judging by the responses of frustrated entrepreneurs, is slow. As one of the 
survey respondents notes:  
[Among our top three challenges is] changing the public perception of 
biofuels.  
Aldrich et al. (1994) emphasizes the importance of cognitive legitimization, which stands for 
the spread of knowledge about a new venture. For example, this can be measured as the level 
of public knowledge of an activity. In some cases, achievements or missteps of the clean 
energy entrepreneurs in the past can also have a negative impact on the cognitive 
legitimization of current clean energy entrepreneurs. As one clean energy entrepreneurs points 
out:  
The history of photovoltaics in United States [is among our top three 
challenges]. 
Educational campaigns that raise the market education and awareness (Table 13, factor 2) 
of both the clean energy entrepreneurial firm and the available clean energy solutions are 
essential. As one entrepreneur notes: 
[Among our top three challenges is to] explain why our technology works (it 
is revolutionary, and sometimes against old theories). 
In Tsoutsos et al. (2005), the cultural and psychological factors that form a barrier to a 
technological regime shift to renewable energy technologies, consist of four main elements: 
lack of social acceptance, fear of consumers that their life will become less comfortable with 
renewable energy, unfamiliarity or negative previous experiences with new energy 
technologies, and uncertainty that arises from the temporally variable nature of some 
renewable sources. Overcoming these fears and prejudices is also evident from the 
entrepreneur survey data, as is demonstrated in Table 13. 
Lack of sociopolitical legitimacy (Aldrich et al. 1994) was also evident in the form of market 
acceptance of the technology (Table 13, factor 3). In a conservative industry such as the 
energy industry, the technological solutions have traditionally changed very slowly. 
Therefore, gaining sociopolitical legitimacy may be especially challenging. As one 
entrepreneur points out:  
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[Among our top three challenges] is gaining acceptance as a viable 
technology in a very conservative arena. 
Previous research suggests strategies to overcome the entrepreneurial challenges of 
insufficient legitimacy, public perception, and market education. To build trust in the new 
venture and in order to gain cognitive legitimacy, Aldrich et al. (1994) suggest that 
entrepreneurs should follow a strategy that “concentrates on framing the unknown in such a 
way [that] it becomes believable.” The goal of the entrepreneurs is to “behave as if the 
activity were a reality” in order to convince others (Aldrich et al.). To gain sociopolitical 
legitimacy, Aldrich et al. (1994) suggest that entrepreneurs create stories that explain events. 
One solar thermal entrepreneur describes the entrepreneurial challenge of creating a simple 
and convincing story as follows: 
[Among our top three challenges is] marketing solar thermal to the masses 
demonstrating that it is easy to understand, it's safe and easy to use and 
saves the most on utility bills. 
Table 13 demonstrates some example responses to the three identified factors under the clean 
energy entrepreneurial challenge of market education: public perception, market education 
and awareness, and market acceptance of technology.  
Table 13 Survey Data Examples Regarding Market Education Challenge 
Identified Factors Evidence:  Answers to the question: “Among our top three challenges 
is...” 
Public perception Public perception of wind. 
Overcoming skepticism. 
Overcoming old technology "truths" about the Stirling [engine]. 
Adoption of new concepts in energy usage. 
Difficulty in communicating the value of R&D for renewable energy, 
especially cellulosic ethanol. 
Market education 
and awareness 
Educating the market, as this is a unique and revolutionary product. 
Lack of education among energy buyers. 
Marketplace awareness. 
Industry education, given that we are defining a new market and 
providing a new technology and service type. 
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Identified Factors Evidence:  Answers to the question: “Among our top three challenges 
is...” 
Showing the differences between solar electric (PV) [and] solar 
thermal: thermal is 2-5 times more efficient, less costly, and more 
practical for domestic uses. 
Market 
acceptance of 
technology  
Gaining acceptance for technology. 
Acceptance of [our] technology. 
Market acceptance of new [clean energy] products. 
 
Proposition 6-2: Second of the three main entrepreneurial challenges facing clean 
energy entrepreneurs is a lack of market education that is apparent in public 
perception, market acceptance of technology, and market education and awareness. 
6.3.3. Growth Management 
The third entrepreneurial challenge that is identified from the clean energy entrepreneur 
survey data is growth management, as shown in List 3. This entrepreneurial challenge, as the 
survey responses of clean energy entrepreneurs in Table 14 show, consists of four factors: 
partnering, recruitment and retaining of human resources, growth management, and market 
dynamics. 
A resource needed by all entrepreneurial firms, independent of the industrial sector, is 
external partners. Partnering (Table 14, factor 1) challenges have often, in previous research, 
been referred to as management of external networks. These networks involve relationships 
with customers, suppliers, and competitors, among others, and often extended across industry, 
geographic, political, and cultural boundaries (Hitt et al. 2001). Networks are important in 
creating legitimacy and credibility for new ventures (Cooper 2002) and are becoming ever 
more important for all types of firms, as the marketplace competition has increased (Gulati et 
al. 2000). As one of the survey respondents points out: 
[Among our top three challenges is] developing effective industry 
partnerships for financing, product development, etc. 
Human resource issues concentrate around recruiting and retaining (Table 14, factor 2) the 
right people, and managing to retain the key employees. Previous studies raise the recruiting 
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challenge of new ventures as the most frequent and important activity to manage, in addition 
to financing (Kaulio 2003). For clean energy entrepreneurs that participated in the survey, the 
human resource challenges were well known, as the following quote demonstrates: 
[Among our top three challenges is] hiring and retaining skilled and 
experienced employees.  
As the venture expands, changes are needed to the original management and the founding 
team. The change may become a source of additional human resource challenges. As one of 
the survey respondents describes: 
Dealing with founder issues and change of control [is among our top three 
challenges]. 
Managing rapid growth (Table 14, factor 3) is crucial in order to anticipate and understand 
the change the venture is undergoing, without discarding the values and techniques that 
allowed the growth in the first place (Hambrick et al. 1985). According to Hambrick et al., 
many rapid-growth firms fail because of growth mismanagement. The main challenges of 
rapid growth are the increase in size (per se), a sense of infallibility, internal turmoil, and 
extraordinary resource needs. In clean energy sectors facing rapid growth, management of 
resource needs in the area of human resources, sales channels, production, and other areas 
may become a major challenge. As one entrepreneur points out:  
[Among our top three challenges is] growth management as our expansion 
rates are 100% per annum. 
Understanding of market dynamics (Table 14, factor 4) and adaptation to the ever-changing 
environment is another key issue for successful entrepreneurship. Although there exists a 
folklore about the responsiveness of entrepreneurs across all kinds of situations and in the 
force of all sorts of adversity, this belief is misplaced and inaccurate (Mullins 1996). Growth 
decisions can prove to be risky because new ventures often lack the competencies and 
resources that larger firms have to pursue growth (Churchill 1983). Entrepreneurs may also 
become victims of over-optimism, which has been shown to be a known feature of 
entrepreneurs (Cooper et al. 1988 and  Shane et al. 2002). In an emerging market, the market 
demand may experience sudden changes, as is demonstrated by the following entrepreneur 
response: 
[Among our top three challenges is that] while we develop products, the 
market shifts. 
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Thus one of the major entrepreneurial challenges is, as one entrepreneur notes: 
[Among our top three challenges is] keeping abreast of rapid changes in the 
landscape of the industry. 
Hambrick et al. (1985) suggests that successful strategies to manage rapid growth in new 
ventures include a chief executive who is able to envision and anticipate the firm as a larger 
entity, the early hiring and development of the team needed in the future, constant 
reinforcement of the original core vision of the firm, gradual introduction of ''big company'' 
processes to supplement existing approaches, minimization of hierarchy, and giving 
employees a financial stake in the firm. Previous research has shown that a continuous 
competency development with regard to key operational, technical, market, and other issues is 
a central step in providing a firm with a basis for sustainable competitive advantage (Day 
1994). 
Table 14 demonstrates some example responses related to the four identified factors under the 
clean energy entrepreneurial challenge growth management: partnering, recruiting and 
retaining, managing rapid growth, and market dynamics.  
Table 14 Survey Data Examples Regarding Growth Management Challenge 
Identified factor Evidence: Answers to the question: “Among our top three challenges 
is...” 
Partnering 
challenges 
Expand sales channels. 
To find good and qualified resellers. 
Penetrating large OEM accounts. 
Marketing the technology to OEMs. 
Successful partnership with commercialization partners. 
Lining up sufficient distribution network. 
Getting noticed with the right commercial partners. 
Find the right partners. 
Recruiting and 
retaining 
Hiring top-notch people. 
Recruitment of suitably qualified staff. 
Organizational development. 
Finding good people. 
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Identified factor Evidence: Answers to the question: “Among our top three challenges 
is...” 
Ability to retain human talent and nurture their growth. 
Acquisition of quality personnel. 
Retaining key staff. 
Hiring new employees. 
Maintaining staffing requirements. 
Finding the right personnel. 
Attracting good employees when financing is in doubt. 
Hiring enough people at the right time to fulfil all of our objectives. 
Retaining and rewarding good people. 
Managing rapid 
growth 
Managing growth. 
Size and emergence of market, magnitude of development needed. 
Balance growth with capital outlay.  
Manage growth once we start selling. 
Keeping the financial requirements in pace with the company's growth. 
Scaling up in a timely and cost-effective manner to meet customer 
demand. 
Growth, given limited financial resources. 
Market dynamics Volatile carbon products market. 
The establishment of a hydrogen infrastructure. 
Delays in the commercialization of fuel cell and hydrogen technology. 
Lack of established market for bioenergy. 
 
Proposition 6-3: One of the three main entrepreneurial challenges facing clean 
energy entrepreneurs is growth management consisting of four factors: partnering, 
recruiting and retaining of human resources, rapid growth and market dynamics 
factors. 
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6.4. Entrepreneurial Challenges in Development Stages 
The second step in the data analysis process on clean energy venture entrepreneurial 
challenges was studying entrepreneurial challenges in different industry development stages. 
Analysis of how clean energy venture entrepreneurial challenges vary based on the industry 
development stage was carried out as follows. First, based on the S-curve terminology 
(Rogers 1983), three industry development stages were analyzed: early-stage, rapid growth 
and slow growth stage. The definitions of each of the three development stages used in this 
study are described in chapter 2.8. From the clean energy venture financing survey, empirical 
data on “fuel cells and other hydrogen technology related”-technology ventures were selected 
as an example of early-stage clean energy ventures. Solar photovoltaic technology ventures 
were selected as an example of rapid-growth clean energy ventures and energy efficiency 
technology ventures as an example of slow-growth clean energy ventures. Clean energy 
stakeholder interviews (chapter 4.2.3) were utilized in choosing the clean energy technology 
categories that represent each of the clean energy industry development stages. 
The “fuel cell and other hydrogen related”-technology industry development is in its infancy 
and large-scale commercialization plans are far in the future (Table 15). Governments all over 
the world have sunk billions of dollars in the hydrogen initiatives aimed at speeding up the 
technology development and propelling it to the market (Service 2004). Based on the clean 
energy stakeholder interview data (chapter 4.2.3), examples of this are George W. Bush 
administration’s 5-year hydrogen initiative, EU’s 10-year public-private partnership program 
around fuel cells, substantial investments into hydrogen-related R&D by the Japanese 
government, and smaller efforts by other countries, such as Canada and China. 
For solar photovoltaic (PV) firms, several technology generations exist. Many of the solar PV 
firms are struggling to ramp up their production and acquire financing for growth. As the 
information in Table 15 indicates, there are several firms in different stages of the growth 
curve and financing stage, employing both more mature and next-generation solar PV 
technologies. World solar photovoltaic market installations grew 62% over 2003 installations 
(Solarbuzz 2005). Germany led the pack with a startling 152% growth (Solarbuzz). The U.S. 
market showed 27% growth, Japan an increase of 27%. The world market for solar PVs has 
been growing, on the average, at 30% annually for the past five years (Ciorba et al. 2004). 
During the history of solar PV development, the U.S. and Japan have been the leaders. During 
the past five years, Europe has gained in position (Ciorba et al.). 
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According to Perrels et al. (2006), energy efficiency appears to be harder to sell than other 
options that focus on the supply side. Perrels et al. noted, “It is remarkable that, in this new 
era, the demand side still does not receive the same level of attention as the supply side.” The 
market rarely delivers energy efficiency improvements spontaneously, as there is no market 
push (Boardman 2004). According to Boardman, consumers are either ignorant or indifferent 
to the range on the market or the energy implications of their purchases. According to 
Boardman, policy has to be the driver for energy efficiency. Many energy efficiency ventures 
have remained in the slow-growth, R&D, and government grant funding stages, and have 
experienced great difficulties in raising growth capital (stakeholder interviews, chapter 4.2.3). 
In addition, energy efficiency technologies have remained very dependent on governmental 
push rather than market pull (Banerjee et al. 2003). 
Table 15 Industry Development Stages and Clean Energy Industry Categories Used in Study 
Sub-industry Example Sub-
industry 
Justification 
Early-stage 
Time
Industry 
development 
stage
 
Fuel cells and other 
hydrogen related 
technologies 
? Main emphasis currently on both 
governmental and private-sector 
funded development programs 
? Mainstream consumer products 
still several years away 
Rapid growth 
Time
Industry 
development 
stage
 
Solar PV 
technologies 
? Several technology generations 
already in the market 
? Solar PV market has been 
experiencing double-digit growth 
for several years  
Slow growth Energy efficiency 
technologies 
? Demand for energy efficiency 
solutions is seen as policy-driven 
rather than market-driven 
? Solutions have existed in the 
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Time
Industry 
development 
stage
 
market for years, but growth has 
been slow  
6.4.1. Early-Stage Ventures: Technology and Cost Challenge 
For fuel cells and other hydrogen-related technology ventures that are used as an example of 
an early-stage clean energy industry category, three entrepreneurial challenges were identified 
from the survey data. Two of these entrepreneurial challenges, growth management and 
financing, were the same as were detected at the clean energy industry level. An additional 
new entrepreneurial challenge, combined technology and cost challenge, was identified from 
the data. The three identified early-stage entrepreneurial challenges for early-stage clean 
energy ventures are demonstrated in List 4. The market education challenge that was 
identified to be among the three most important clean energy venture challenges in the clean 
energy industry level was not relevant for early-stage clean energy ventures. For “fuel cell and 
other hydrogen-related” technology ventures, this is most likely due to the fact that, for most 
ventures, large-scale market deployment is still a far-away target.  
List 4 Early-Stage Clean Energy Venture Entrepreneurial Challenges 
Technology and cost
Growth management
Financing
 
For early-stage clean energy ventures, most of the entrepreneurial firms are in the seed and 
VC funding stage or, alternatively, they still reside in the R&D stage. The firms are 
developing their technology with the help of government grants and other investors. Next, the 
entrepreneur sample is described, followed by a description of technology and cost challenge.  
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Thirty-seven of the survey respondents (i.e., 23% of the total) were firms operating in the fuel 
cells and hydrogen-related technology area. For these firms, 2001 was a banner year; 31% of 
the hydrogen-related firms were founded that year. Most of the firms were relatively small, as 
68% of the firms employed fewer than 25 people. Thirty-eight percent of the hydrogen-related 
firms that participated in the survey were headquartered in Europe. Respondents from the 
U.S. followed with the share of 32% and the share of Canadian firms was 19%. Sixty-
four percent of the survey respondent firms had sought venture capital funding. Of those 
firms, 57% managed to raise venture capital funding for the firm. 
Early-stage clean energy ventures struggle with technological problems and try to reduce the 
cost of the product through technological development. Technology and cost (Table 16, 
factor 1) issues were among the three most important entrepreneurial challenges that the fuel 
cell and other hydrogen-related ventures faced, as Table 16 demonstrates. The two other 
entrepreneurial challenges, financing and growth management, were the same as were 
identified earlier in the industry-level clean energy venture analysis. 
Fuel cell and other hydrogen-related technologies have aimed to provide both stationary and 
mobile application solutions. However, most of the emphasis has been on mobile 
applications, such as fuel-cell cars (Solomon et al. 2005, Farrell et al. 2003, Arnason et al. 
2000, and Mourato et al. 2004). Spencer Abraham, the U.S. secretary of energy, has stated 
that the transformation into hydrogen economy has “the potential to change our country on a 
scale of the development of electricity and the internal combustion engine” (Service 2004). 
The hydrogen economy vision has its skeptics. A large part of the criticism has been aimed at 
the long timeframes that are needed in order to bring the change about (Service 2004) and the 
uncertainty related to these timeframes. As one of the survey respondents points out: 
[Among our top three challenges is] delays in the commercialization of fuel 
cell and hydrogen technology. 
In addition, the high cost of fuel cells and hydrogen production, making fuel cells rugged 
enough, safety issues, and challenges in building the hydrogen infrastructure have been 
mentioned as the biggest economic and political difficulties the hydrogen-related technologies 
industry currently faces (stakeholder interviews, chapter 4.2.3). In the words of one fuel cell 
entrepreneur: 
The major challenges of the fuel cell industry in order are: cost, cost, cost. 
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For example, converting a carbon economy into a hydrogen economy would require 150 
million tons of hydrogen each year to change the U.S. economy (Service 2004). Despite these 
entrepreneurial challenges, hydrogen ventures have experienced hype from investors and the 
press. Table 16 demonstrates the clean energy entrepreneurial challenge of technology and 
cost. 
Table 16 Survey Data Examples Regarding Technology and Cost Challenge of Early-Stage Clean Energy 
Ventures 
Identified factor Evidence 
Answers to the question: “Among our top three challenges is...” 
Technology and cost Magnitude of development needed. 
Maintaining focus of R&D and product development. Activities. 
Getting product into field trials. 
Technology development. 
Final proof of concept, time for prototype development. 
Getting the technology right fast enough. 
Ensuring that the technical program delivers. 
Achieving product performance and cost goals. 
Increasing the reliability of fuel cell. 
Manufacturing cost-competitive fuel cells. 
Cost reduction. 
 
Proposition 6-4: Early-stage clean energy ventures face their biggest entrepreneurial 
challenges in the area of financing, growth management, and technology 
development with cost reduction. 
6.4.2. Rapid Growth Ventures: Production and Cost Challenge 
According to Solarbuzz (2005), the worldwide annual photovoltaic (PV) installation rate will 
reach 3.2 Gigawatts by 2010, a three-fold increase over 2004 market installations. World PV 
industry annual turnover will grow from $6.5 billion in 2004 to reach $18.5 billion by 2010 
(Solarbuzz). For rapid-growth clean energy ventures, using empirical data for solar PV firms 
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that participated in the clean energy venture financing survey, altogether four main 
entrepreneurial challenges were identified from the survey data. Three of the entrepreneurial 
challenges: financing, market education and growth management, were the same as for clean 
energy industry level in general. An additional fourth entrepreneurial challenge was named 
production and cost. The four entrepreneurial challenges are demonstrated in List 5. 
List 5 Rapid Growth Clean Energy Venture Entrepreneurial Challenges 
Production and cost
Growth management
Financing
Market education
 
Next the entrepreneur sample is described, followed by a description of production and cost 
challenge. 
Twenty-six of the survey respondents (i.e., 16% of the total) were firms operating in the solar 
PV area. For these firms, years 1999 and 2002 were banner years, as 38% of the solar PV 
firms were founded during those two years. Most of the firms were relatively small, as 62% of 
the firms employed fewer than 25 people. Forty-six percent of the solar PV firms that 
participated in the survey were headquartered in the U.S. Respondents from Europe followed 
with the share of 42%. Sixty-one percent of the survey respondent firms had sought venture 
capital funding. Of those firms, 57% managed to raise venture capital funding for the firm. 
The solar PV technology can be divided into two generations: (1) crystalline silicon 
technology and (2) thin-film solar cells (Green 2000). The crystalline technology generation 
borrows heavily from the microelectronics industry and is based on the use of silicon wafers 
(Green). The thin-film technology is non-wafer based and five different thin-film technologies 
can be commercially identified (Green). 
Larger markets will lead to increased production scales and gains in cost reduction (Oliver et 
al. 1999). Production and cost factors (Table 17, factor 1) were identified as one of the 
major entrepreneurial challenges for solar PV ventures that participated in the survey. The 
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ability to respond to rapidly growing demand is demonstrated by the following response from 
a solar PV entrepreneur: 
[Among our top three challenges is] being able to match product production 
levels with the increased demand. 
Crystalline technologies have profited from economies of scale in the microelectronics 
industry, especially since solar PV cells can be manufactured from material of lower quality 
than that in microelectronics, gaining access to off-specification silicon wafers from the 
microelectronics industry (Green 2000). Current production of PV generation is mostly based 
on the crystalline silicon technology, using either single- or multi-crystalline approach 
(Ciorba et al. 2004). The following response demonstrates how solar PV production has 
benefited from the symbiosis with microelectronics industry: 
[Among our top three challenges is] starting in a region of the U.S. that 
lacks a high-tech semiconductor manufacturing infrastructure. 
Thin-film technology has the most potential for ongoing cost reduction and has been called 
the photovoltaic technology of the future (Green 2000). The key advantage in cost reduction 
is the reduced use of material. Another production-related advantage is the possibility to grow 
the unit of production by using large sheets of glass. Crystalline-based technology is tied to 
the size of the wafer. 
According to Solarbuzz (2005), during 2005-2006, there will be insufficient silicon feedstock 
to meet the planned cell manufacturing capacity expansion announcements and, as a result, 
overall PV market growth will be restricted. In the words of one solar PV manufacturer: 
[Among our top three challenges is] to secure enough feedstock. 
Table 17 demonstrates some examples regarding the clean energy entrepreneurial challenge 
production and cost.  
Table 17 Survey Data Examples Regarding Production and Cost Challenge of Rapid-Growth Clean 
Energy Ventures 
Identified Factor Evidence: Answers to the question: “Among our top three challenges 
is...” 
Production and 
cost 
New thin-film technology based on a simplified cell structure and a 
robust production process. High cost reduction potential. First pilot 
production (max. capacity 5 MW). 
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Identified Factor Evidence: Answers to the question: “Among our top three challenges 
is...” 
To build up production capacity fast enough. 
Being able to match product production levels with the increased 
demand. 
Ramping up production to 50 MW. 
Production scale-up. 
Ability to source raw materials and build higher capacity utilization. 
Maturity of production technology. 
To be able to reduce unit costs. 
Developing a module level product. 
Getting the volume to reduce costs. 
 
Proposition 6-5: The major entrepreneurial challenges of rapid growth clean energy 
ventures are financing, growth management, market education, and ramping up 
production while reducing unit costs.  
6.4.3. Slow Growth Ventures: Marketing Challenge 
For slow-growth clean energy ventures, using the energy efficiency industry as an example, 
two main entrepreneurial challenges, namely financing and marketing, were identified from 
the survey data. The marketing challenge is similar to the market education challenge 
identified in the clean energy industry level. However, the marketing challenge was 
specifically emphasized in the slow-growth clean energy venture data. The two identified 
entrepreneurial challenges of slow growth clean energy ventures are demonstrated in List 6. 
List 6 Slow-Growth Clean Energy Venture Entrepreneurial Challenges 
Financing
Marketing
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Twenty-four of the survey respondents (i.e., 15% of the total) were firms operating in the 
energy efficiency area. For these firms, 2001 was a banner year, as 17% of the energy 
efficiency firms were founded that year. Most of the firms were relatively small, as 83% of 
the firms employed fewer than 25 people, 63% had fewer than 5 people. Most of the energy 
efficiency firms (58% of total) that participated in the survey were headquartered in the U.S. 
Respondents from Europe followed with the share of 33%. Forty-eight percent of the survey 
respondent firms had sought venture capital funding. Of those firms, 30% managed to raise 
venture capital funding for the firm. 
Providing a precise definition of energy efficiency solutions is not easy, as energy efficiency 
products exist in every industrial sector (stakeholder interviews, chapter 4.2.3). Perrels et al. 
(2004) have divided energy efficiency solutions in terms of client groups. Examples of the 
client groups are markets for delivery of energy carriers, industrial energy-intensive users, 
building sector, agriculture, transportation, households, and public sector. Use of eco-labels, 
such as Green Seal, Scientific Certification Systems, Energy Guide, Energy Star and Green-e, 
has been one approach to promote and market energy efficiency solutions (Banerjee et al. 
2003). The governmental role has been important in eco-labeling, since public programs, such 
as Energy Star, have been far more successful than private initiatives (Banerjee et al.).  
The complexity of managing products in different industrial sectors and markets is 
demonstrated by the response of one energy efficiency entrepreneur who participated in the 
survey: 
[Among our biggest challenges is] complexity management in different 
geographies, product segments, and technology streams. 
Birner et al. (2005) offer examples of supply-side interventions for promoting energy-
efficiency products, as shown in Table 18. Most of the interventions suggested by Birner et al. 
have to do with consumer education and general marketing efforts. The survey data analysis 
for slow-growth clean energy ventures, using data for energy efficiency firms that participated 
in the survey, shows similar results. 
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Table 18 Demand-Side Interventions 
 
Inability to sufficiently market the energy-efficient products was clearly demonstrated by 
those ventures that participated in the survey. Previous research on market creation for 
energy-efficient solutions indicates that, although consumers are concerned about climate 
change and generally understand the causal role of fossil fuels, they believe that they have 
done everything they can or that one person cannot make a difference (Boardman 2004). As 
one of the entrepreneurs who participated in the survey points out: 
[Among our top three challenges are] MARKETING, MARKETING, 
MARKETING. 
Table 19 demonstrates some examples responses regarding the clean energy entrepreneurial 
challenge of marketing.  
Table 19 Survey Data Examples Regarding Marketing Challenge of Slow-Growth Clean Energy Ventures 
Identified Factor Evidence: Answers to the question: “Among our top three challenges 
is...” 
Marketing Explain why our technology works. 
Money for marketing. 
Now we are struggling with marketing. 
Access to market, marketing efforts. 
 
Demand-side interventions to promote energy-efficiency products 
Educate consumers about the characteristics, costs, and benefits of energy-efficient 
technology 
Conduct media campaigns to increase consumer awareness of energy-efficient technology, 
and to increase its mass appeal 
Educate professionals about the characteristics, costs, and benefits of energy-efficient 
technology 
Reduce retail prices of technology through rebates or subsidies 
Conduct bulk purchases and procurements 
Provide consumer financing 
Offer payback / recycling programs 
Facilitate voluntary agreements by industrial consumers to improve efficiency 
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Proposition 6-6: Slow-growth clean energy ventures face their biggest 
entrepreneurial challenges in the area of financing and marketing their solutions. 
6.5. Discussion 
The Van de Ven et al. (1989 and 1993) model for industry development is presented in 
chapter 3.1. The Van de Ven et al. model includes four subsystems: institutional 
arrangements, resource endowments, market consumption, and propriety activities. As 
explained in the literature review (chapter 3.1), the model has been applied to various 
industries. The Van den Ven et al. model is shown in more detail in Figure 3.  
Industry
Institutional 
arrangements
Proprietary 
activities
Resource 
endowments
Market 
ConsumptionFinancing
Competence 
Training
Legitimation
Cultural 
Norms
Business 
Functions
Resource 
Channels
Product 
Development
Market 
Creation & 
Demand
Science & 
Technology
Competition
Laws, 
Regulations
Standards
 
Figure 3 Van de Ven et al.  (1989 and 1993) model for industry development 
The institutional arrangement subsystem includes the governmental agencies, professional 
trade associations, and scientific/technical communities that legitimize, regulate, and 
standardize a technology. The resource endowments subsystem includes advancements in 
basic scientific and technological knowledge, financing and insurance arrangements, and 
training of competent professionals. The market consumption subsystem includes informed, 
competent, and responsible consumers. The proprietary activities transform the available 
supply of public resources, such as scientific knowledge and work force competence, into 
proprietary products and services to meet the customer demand.  
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The clean energy industry-level entrepreneurial challenges that were identified in the study 
are made apparent by applying the Van De Ven et al. model. A representation of the three 
main entrepreneurial challenges identified by clean energy entrepreneurial ventures is shown 
in Figure 4. Factors under each of the three identified entrepreneurial challenges shown in 
List 3 have been placed under appropriate component in the Van de Ven et al. model.  
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Figure 4 Van de Ven et al. (1989 and 1993) model for clean energy ventures 
As the Figure 4 demonstrates, the clean energy venture entrepreneurial challenges are found 
in each of the four components of the Van de Ven et al. (1989 and 1993) model. However, at 
the industry level, clean energy ventures do not seem to be hamstrung by laws, regulations, 
and standards, or even science, technology, or product development issues. The main 
entrepreneurial challenges the clean energy venture faces are found in the area of resource 
endowments, such as capital and human resources, and market consumption, such as market 
education and public perception. The area of proprietary activities, including management of 
rapid growth and partnering with external players, is another major entrepreneurial challenge 
facing clean energy ventures.  
In the introduction of this chapter (chapter 6.1), it was noted that previous research on 
sustainable industry emergence has concentrated on the system level and policy perspective. 
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Sustainable or cleantech industry firm level studies have remained absent. This study on clean 
energy venture entrepreneurial challenges shows that clean energy ventures struggle with 
issues other than institutional arrangements, which has been the main focus of previous 
studies. Further studies that concentrate on resource endowments (e.g., raising capital, 
recruiting and retaining personnel), proprietary activities (managing rapid growth, partnering), 
and market consumption (public perception, market education and awareness, market 
dynamics) are needed. This may help to increase our understanding of the market solutions 
that are needed to facilitate the further growth of the clean energy industry or cleantech 
industry in general.  
The identified clean energy venture main entrepreneurial challenges are similar to the 
challenges one may expect to find in other innovative industries. However, as previous 
research has found, entrepreneurial challenges may vary based on the industry development 
stage (Low et al. 1997 and Aldrich et al. 1994), nature of technology (Kassicieh et al. 2002), 
industry context (Chesbrough 1999), or the difference in time the industry takes to evolve 
(Klepper et al. 1990 and Low et al.). In this study, the entrepreneurial challenges of clean 
energy ventures in different industry development stages were also analyzed. The industry 
development stage analysis brought to light differences when compared with the clean energy 
venture main entrepreneurial challenges identified earlier. This result indicates that a further 
study that would analyze clean energy entrepreneurial challenges from the perspective of the 
nature of the technology or the time the particular clean energy industry category has taken to 
develop would be likely to bring even more variance to clean energy venture entrepreneurial 
challenges. Low et al. noted that it has not been possible to identify factors that have 
consistently led to entrepreneurial success. Based on the results of this study and the findings 
of previous research, it is argued that no generic strategies that could be applied over different 
industries, technologies, and development stages even exist. In order to provide clean energy 
ventures or any other innovative industry ventures with efficient strategies to tackle the 
entrepreneurial challenges the ventures face, an in-depth understanding of the industry 
context, technology, industry development stage, institutions, and industry history is needed.  
Chapter 9 contains a more detailed discussion on the findings, limitations, and contributions 
of the findings of this chapter. 
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7. Clean Energy Venture Risk Characteristics 
The previous chapter showed that venture financing is a common entrepreneurial challenge 
for clean energy ventures independent of the firm’s development stage. This chapter takes a 
closer look at clean energy ventures’ search for one particular type of venture financing: 
venture capital. The chapter develops a model of clean energy venture risk characteristics 
from the VC perspective.  
7.1. Introduction 
Previous studies suggest that the decision-making behavior of venture capitalists is affected 
by biases similar to those affecting all the other humans, despite the “homo economicus” 
rational decision-makers that they are supposed to be (Zacharakis et al. 2001 and 1998). The 
essential argument of this chapter is that, in addition to risk characteristics that are generally 
recognized by both the VCs and the clean energy ventures, venture capitalists’ cognitive 
biases in decision-making create additional risk characteristics. These additional cognitive 
risk characteristics are demonstrated to be especially severe for ventures that operate in a 
complex environment involving not just economical, but also social and environmental 
aspects. Gompers et al. (2001) point out that understanding VC risk and return is one area of 
empirical academic research on venture capital that still remains relatively unexplored. The 
goal of this chapter is to build understanding on clean energy venture risk characteristics from 
the VC perspective.  
Studying venture capitalist decision-making is not novel. However, at the same time that 
certain aspects, such as the VC decision-making process, have been widely studied (Tyebjee 
et al. 1984, Fried et al. 1994, and Roberts 1991), cognitive factors in VC decision-making that 
try to explain “how decision actually happen rather than how they ought to happen” (March 
1994) remain understudied. During the past decade, some steps have been taken on the 
cognitive side of the venture capital decision-making process (Shepherd 1999 and Zacharakis 
et al. 2001 and 1998). Based on the study results, clean energy venture risk characteristics can 
be divided into two groups. The first group, consisting of five risk characteristics, is named 
generally recognized risk characteristics. The second group, consisting of four risk 
characteristics, is named cognitive risk characteristics. Based on the study, nine propositions 
that can be tested in future research were developed. The developed model on clean energy 
venture risk characteristics suggests that cognitive risk characteristics of venture capitalists 
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are key to understanding why clean energy ventures have received only a small amount of 
venture capital investment. 
7.2. Methodological Notes 
Both the VC and CVC interviews and the clean energy venture financing survey were utilized 
as the source of empirical data in the theory-building of this chapter. Both the interviews and 
the survey are described in detail in the methodology chapter (chapter 4). The main flow of 
the data analysis proceeded as described in chapter 4.3.2. The Sitkin et al. (1992) model on 
risky decision-making behavior was utilized in refining the results of this study. The Sitkin et 
al. model is described in more detail in chapter 3.4. The Sitkin et al. model was chosen since 
the model has been previously successfully applied to entrepreneurship and venture capital 
research (Mullins et al. 2002, Carpenter et al. 2003, Manigart et al. 2002, and Simon et al. 
2000). When quotes from the empirical data are used as prototypical examples of the study 
results in the chapter, labels [VC] and [Venture] are used to indicate whether the quote came 
from the clean energy venture financing survey or the VC and CVC interviews. 
7.3. Clean Energy Venture Risk Characteristics 
Results of the previous chapter show that seeking funding from venture capitalists is a 
strenuous exercise for most clean energy ventures. As Zider (1998) notes, “Many excellent 
entrepreneurs are frustrated by what they see as an unfair deal process and equity position.” 
Venture capital investing is all about balancing risk and return; this applies to both the clean 
energy or cleantech ventures (Wuestenhagen et al. 2006 and Ruhnka et al. 1991). According 
to Zider, venture capitalists focus on the middle part of the classic industry S-curve, avoiding 
both the early stages, when technologies are uncertain and market needs are unknown, and the 
later stages, when competitive shakeouts and consolidations are inevitable and growth rates 
slow dramatically.  
Based on an iterative process between empirical data and previous literature, a model 
emerges. The model that emerges from the study is shown in Figure 5. The model consists of 
two types of risk characteristics: generally recognized risk characteristics and cognitive 
risk characteristics. Altogether, nine risk characteristics are identified. Next, both risk 
characteristic types will be discussed in more detail. 
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Figure 5 Clean energy venture risk characteristics 
 
7.4. Clean Energy Venture Generally Recognized Risk 
Characteristics 
Based on the clean energy venture financing survey and VC interviews, five generally 
recognized risk characteristics are identified. These five characteristics are: (1) market 
demand and adaptation, (2) incompatibility with the VC model, (3) technology, (4) 
regulatory control, and (5) exits. These five characteristics are similar to the ones identified 
in previous research (Wuestenhagen et al. 2006, Tyebjee et al. 1984, and Zider 1998). Next, 
all five risk characteristics are discussed in more detail. 
7.4.1. Market Demand and Adaptation 
Under the risk characteristic of market demand and adaptation, several themes could be 
identified. These are scale of change, dominance of market incumbents, and speed of market 
adoption, as shown in List 7. These themes will be discussed in more detail. 
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List 7 Risk characteristic: Market Demand and Adaptation 
Market Demand and Adaptation
-Scale of change
-Dominant position of market incumbents
-Speed of market adoption
 
The first identified theme associated with the market demand and adaptation risk 
characteristic is the scale of change needed to alter the current industry infrastructure, in this 
case, the energy infrastructure. The interviewed VCs expressed this concern as the “need to 
change the world” before a large-scale market adaptation could take place. In the words of 
one interviewed VC: 
[VC]: And you have to change the way the infrastructure is and so many 
other big things that, when you look at it, you think, “This technology is 
fantastic and it can really solve some problems, but it will take ages for it to 
have real breakthrough.” 
Another point of concern is whether the energy market has intrinsically different qualities that 
would inhibit successful market introduction of new products. As expressed by one VC: 
[VC]: And I think the thing that is still the big question mark is [whether] 
the electricity and power market just has a different kind of technology 
adoption practice or curve or time line, [which] really affects how 
successful venture capital can be in this area. So it’s how we tend to think 
about it here and observe it. There is obviously nothing we can do, very 
little we can do other than focus on making our investments that can 
actually shift the balance of power here. It’s really watching how the big 
electricity and power customers or power providers, you know, companies 
like Shell and BP, [are] doing as they identify new market areas. And then 
[you] look at the companies they need to work with or invest in to take 
advantage of those new market areas. So, [there is] a lot to do. 
Second theme that emerges is the dominant position of market incumbents. In the current 
study context, this indicates the dominant position electric utilities and oil firms have of the 
energy market. This concern is expressed both by VCs and clean energy ventures. In the 
words of an interviewed VC: 
[VC]: The energy market is not really a competitive market when you have 
five players really controlling the market. They are doing what they can to 
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protect their business. I’d say it is more cartel- looking business. It 
sometimes takes months to change supplier[s], or changing the network 
supplier is almost impossible. That’s their way of keeping the market. 
Another interviewed VC describes the control the market incumbents have as follows: 
[VC]: All of the energy sectors are within the control of the environment. 
Extremely controlled with very large players. So there is very little 
innovators can do to change the roles. In information technology, you just 
invent the Internet. You invent a new protocol to communicate over the 
Internet and you can compete with Goliath. 
Clean energy ventures experience the reluctance of VCs to invest in the energy sector 
dominated by large corporations that have strong business models. In the words of one survey 
respondent:  
[Venture]: Engine industry is dominated by big corporations. VCs don't 
want to deal with large, lethargic corporations controlling markets and 
prices that makes the work of small start-ups all the more difficult. 
The size of the industry incumbents may not necessarily scare VCs away. One example is the 
pharmaceuticals sector, where the industry incumbents are large players. However, the 
pharmaceuticals market is not as concentrated as the energy sector, and this makes VCs more 
at ease when compared with investing venture capital into the energy sector. As one of the 
interviewed VCs comments: 
[VC]: The pharmaceutical sector is very competitive. The largest pharma 
company right now is GlaxoSmithKline, [which] has 8% of the market. If I 
give you another example in the field of transmission equipment, which I 
know well in detail, if you look at power equipment for transmission lines or 
transformers or all of that. Three players control over 70% of the market. 
ABB, Siemens, GE. […] It’s way more concentrated than pharma. 
The third identified theme is the speed of market adoption. For a VC to invest, the 
opportunity, mainly concerning the growth rate in the area, needs to be perceived as big 
enough (McDougall et al. 1994). By investing in areas with high growth rates, VCs primarily 
consign their risks to the ability of the company’s management to execute (Zider 1998). Zider 
continues: “Picking the wrong industry or betting on a technology risk in an unproven market 
segment is something VCs avoid.” Clean energy technologies, such as solar PV and wind, 
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have experienced rapid growth curves during the past ten years. Despite of the impressive 
growth rates, market adoption rates are still a concern for VCs: 
[VC]: I think the two things that are constraining, so that’s one thing 
certainly that constrains electricity, is that your adoption of a technology 
still is in [the] hand[s], largely, of utilities.  
One aspect of market adoption speed is how fast the habits of consumers are changing. The 
majority of the interviewed VCs express concern over the knowledge level and motivation of 
consumers to change. An interviewed VC comments: 
[VC]: People use energy without being aware of that. When they enter a 
room, [they] turn on the air conditioning, [thus] they buy something from 
the electric utility. So they don’t see the value. They just see the downside; 
they see when the lights go off. They see the bill. It’s just negative. They’re 
not aware where the energy comes from. 
Most of the concerns related to consumer habits expressed by the VCs are associated with 
insufficient knowledge of end-users on the available alternative solutions. In the words of an 
interviewed VC: 
[VC]: Energy is not visible. People have an opinion about it. They don’t 
have knowledge about it. Ok? […] When it comes to energy, […] in the 
traditional energy supply system, it’s always being top-down. It’s always 
being top-down whether it’s electricity or oil or gas. You have some big 
companies owning some sources, you have some transmission systems, 
which are still owned by some big companies. And then the companies tend 
to get a little bit smaller when it comes to distribution, but it’s still kind of 
anonymous. It’s just there, whether it’s oil or gas or electricity or fuel for 
your car, you know. It’s just there and you don’t think about it. As a 
consumer, as an energy consumer, when do you, how many people decide 
upon fuel consumption? 
The venture survey respondents experience difficulties in convincing the VCs on the market 
adoption speed, as is demonstrated by the example survey responses shown in List 8. 
List 8 Example Venture Responses Regarding Speed of Market Adoption 
[Entrepreneur]: [The problem we experienced with the VCs was] industry growth and 
potential market. 
[Entrepreneur]: [The problem we experienced with the VCs was] acceptance of the slower 
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growth of the business in the energy sector compared with IT. 
[Entrepreneur]: [The problem we experienced with the VCs was] size and emergence of 
markets. 
 
Proposition 7-1: One of the five most important generally recognized risk 
characteristics of clean energy ventures is market demand and adaptation risk, 
consisting of the large scale of change needed, dominant position of market 
incumbents, and insufficient market adoption speed.  
7.4.2. Incompatibility with VC Model 
The optimal VC investment target is generally described as having a short lead time, 
preferably leading to an IPO (Zider 1998). Typically, the VCs look at exiting their 
investments within two to eight years after the investment. Naturally, some variations to 
optimal VC investment targets exist. For example, Baum et al. (2004) studied the 
biotechnology industry and identified three types of capital that determine the VC’s decision 
to invest in a start-up: alliance capital, intellectual capital, and human capital. Biotechnology 
start-ups financed by VCs typically have high intellectual capital, in the form of patents. 
Although the lead time to an IPO for many biotechnology firms may be long, this is 
compensated by the high intellectual capital of the start-up, which enables the VC to make an 
early exit in the form of a trade sale or a secondary sale (Cumming et al. 2003).  
Capital intensity of a deal also increases the downside risk, forcing the VCs to build large 
investment consortiums in order to make sure their portfolios remain diversified. Both of 
these two themes, long lead times and capital intensity, emerge from the VC and CVC 
interviews and the clean energy venture survey data, as a generally recognized risk 
characteristic. This risk characteristic is named incompatibility with the VC investment 
model, as shown in List 9.  
List 9 Risk characteristic: Incompatibility with the VC Model 
Incompatibility with the VC Model
-Long lead times
-Capital intensity
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The first theme, capital intensity of the energy sector investments, is a cause of concern for 
VCs: 
[VC]: Another thing is the capital intensity. There are so many big projects. 
Either you have a windmill park of hundreds of stations costing billions or 
you have some wave energy project costing large amounts.  
Clean energy venture survey responses resonate with the VC interview findings, as is 
demonstrated by the following comment: 
[Venture]: Entering into the mass market of consumer electronics is difficult 
for a small company. In consequence, the capital need is rather high and 
might not be raised by one VC but rather a VC consortium. 
The second theme that emerges has to do with long lead times. Most venture capital funds 
have a limited lifetime of seven to ten years, making multi-year investments impossible. As 
Zider (1998) notes: “The idea is to invest in a company’s balance sheet and infrastructure 
until it reaches a sufficient size and credibility so that it can be sold to a corporation or so that 
the institutional public-equity markets can step in to provide more liquidity.” Not being able 
to create a credible short-term story to support a VC investment decision may thus become a 
barrier for a VC investment. In the words of an interviewed VC:  
[VC]: In the energy field, the investment times are often too long for a VC. 
Even though a VC would say five to eight years, what they really mean is 
three to four years and then they want to exit. The venture has gone badly if 
they wait until the end of the discussed period (eight years). Since they don’t 
want to sound opportunistic, they make it sound like they are a good partner 
instead of saying that [their] investment times are one to three years. You 
start planning the exit right away: this is what the professional investors do. 
Since you want high profits, you wait until the firm is worth enough ( i.e., 
you wait a few years). 
Long lead times have created difficulties for most of the ventures that participated in the 
survey. Several ventures that were asked what challenges they had faced in selling their 
business ideas to the VCs reflected time-scale concerns as a common hurdle. Some examples 
from the survey are collected in List 10.  
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List 10 Example Venture Responses Regarding Long Investment Lead Times 
[Venture]: [VCs] think that the timescales are too long for VC investment. They need an exit 
and positive cash flow in three years from a start - this is unrealistic, but what they require. 
 [Venture]: The future business is still far away, so the risk seems big for a VC; therefore 
they ask a big share of the company for relative little sum of money. 
[Venture]: The time to market for our product, the micro fuel cell, is rather long. 
[Venture]: [Our challenge with the VCs is] lack of a defined market in the short term 
because the hydrogen economy has been delayed. 
[Venture]: [Our challenge with the VCs is that] we cannot show a big pop in three years. 
[Venture]: [Our challenge with the VCs is the] time horizon to commercialize and deploy 
technology necessary to meet fund/return objectives 
 
The investments in clean energy technologies remain relatively modest, and experience from 
clean energy venture investment exits is scarce among the VC community. Therefore, many 
VCs rely on the image, not actual personal experience, they have of the energy sector lead 
times. An interviewed VC comments on the long lead time perception among VCs as follows: 
[VC]: At least the perception among venture capitalists is that [the] energy 
field has long investments times, whether or not this is true. There have been 
so few investments and exits that this has not been verified yet. Everything 
in the energy field works on a longer time horizon, so investors feel that the 
same is true for their capital. 
 
Proposition 7-2: One of the five most important generally recognized risk 
characteristics of clean energy ventures is incompatibility with the VC model 
consisting of long lead times and capital intensity. 
7.4.3. Technology  
The third generally recognized risk characteristic that is identified from the interview and 
survey data is technology risk. The concerns concentrate around lack of intellectual property 
rights (IPR) protection and technological uncertainties, as shown in List 11.  
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List 11 Risk characteristic: Technology 
Technology
-Lack of IPR protection
-Technological uncertainties
 
The interviewed VCs point to a lack of IPR protection as a potential weak point in the clean 
energy ventures and cleantech ventures in general. The interviewed VCs tend to contrast the 
clean energy ventures with biotech ventures, for which patenting practice is more widely in 
use. A survey respondent venture comments on the patent protection issue as follows: 
[Venture]: Biotech and IT investors require levels of IPR protection that are 
difficult for us to provide. We are basically an engineering company, where 
to steal the IPR would be easier in the longer term than a formula for 
biotech or [a] piece of nanotechnology or minute component in IT. 
However, non-patentability is not necessarily a show-stopper in raising venture capital, as the 
nature of the business opportunity may differ fundamentally from a biotech venture. An 
interviewed VC comments the lack of patentable technology among clean energy ventures as 
follows: 
[VC]: What I want to emphasize is that these new companies are not 
technology companies that have extensive patent portfolios. Of course this 
would be nice, but the companies coming to the field are either distribution 
channel[s] or concept innovations. I think these are the most interesting 
innovations. Examples of this are services that do off-site reading of 
electricity meters and send it to reporting software. This is not rocket 
science technology and often not even patentable. But the [genius] is in the 
concept itself and it may be based on conventional technologies. 
Technological uncertainties are common for all new ventures. At the time of raising growth 
capital for the venture, only an early version of the final product or a preliminary prototype of 
the technology may exist. Demonstration, testing, future development of the technology, and 
the impact the new technology will have on the market all contain uncertainties that raise the 
VC investment risk. The risk of whether the technology actually works and can be 
successfully demonstrated to potential customers is expressed by the majority of the 
interviewed VCs and the ventures that responded the survey. Some example responses are 
collected in List 12.  
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List 12 VC and Venture Responses Regarding Technological Uncertainty of Clean Energy Ventures 
[Venture]: Our technology is new to the iron-making industry and to achieve market 
acceptance, full-scale testing of our product will be required, even though it meets all 
necessary quality requirements. Producing enough products for full-scale testing requires a 
sizeable investment into building a demonstration facility. The risk associated with the 
demonstration facility and possible market rejection of an unproven product is viewed by 
potential investors as high. 
[VC]: Because I don’t think [fuel cells] are financeable right now, [the] same goes for high 
energy stuff. They probably would be financeable in 15 years or so, but not right now with 
venture money. 
[VC]: One of the things that we have been seeing in the fuel cell scene is that, for instance, 
your technology development time continues to be long. 
[Venture]: The toughest problem [we have encountered] has been the time to develop our 
revolutionary technology, which can make investors nervous. 
 
Proposition 7-3: One of the five most important generally recognized risk 
characteristics of clean energy ventures is technology risk consisting of lack of patent 
protection and technological uncertainties. 
7.4.4. Regulatory Control 
The fourth generally recognized risk characteristic that is identified from the interview and 
survey data is regulatory risk. Although many industrial sectors are regulated, the interviewed 
VCs tend to view the energy sector as particularly strongly affected by regulation. The central 
problem with regulation, according to survey respondent ventures, is that the control of 
market direction is in the hands of the regulators, and not VCs or the ventures themselves 
(List 13).  
List 13 Risk characteristic: Regulatory Control 
Regulatory Control
- Regulators have control of the market direction
 
The interviewed VCs recognize that the governmental intervention may also create new profit 
potential, but with the price of handing the control over to governmental regulators. 
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[VC]: I think that in the late [19]80s and early [19]90s, there was a big 
interest, particularly in California, [in] what they called environmental 
technology. [..] But the problem was that most of it, or all of it, was an 
added cost and that it was regulated. And as long as it remained, so that the 
law was in place but it wasn’t enforced, a lot of companies and their good 
technology ended up on a shelf and the companies went bankrupt. [..] I 
think a lot of people who remember that [California experience] that when 
it is regulated, it is not true market force, there are too many unknowns and 
you will shy away from investing. 
Whether or not the interviewed VC see opportunities or threats with regulatory intervention, 
the majority of the interviewed VCs view regulatory power as a definitive risk for clean 
technology market formation. Some example responses from both the interviews and the 
survey are collected in List 14.  
List 14 VC and Venture Responses Regarding Regulatory Risk of Clean Energy Ventures 
[Venture]: [VCs] are nervous of the [energy] market, as it depends on government 
intervention. 
[VC]: A lot of business plans rely on other extensive factors that you cannot control and VC 
is getting very nervous when you see big investment in capital-intensive and regulated 
market[s] relying on a fundamental change in the environment. 
[VC]: So it might be that some of these political aspects might favor you. Because you are 
investing and suddenly there is a new law and you capitalize on that by selling. And two 
years later that law is changed. So you have to make a distinction between your holding 
period and your success as a VC and the success of the technology in the long run. […] If 
you are well informed, [regulation] brings an extra opportunity. 
[VC]: I have to say, the regulation in the energy sector is not easy. I mean, it’s easy to 
blame all the governments. California crisis […] was caused by deregulation but I’m pretty 
careful to [not] blame anybody because I don’t have any better suggestion. 
[VC]: If there is no clear need for the government, make them stay out of the way. 
[VC]: VCs often see a red flag with government money. The nice way of doing it is to put the 
government money into a professional fund or institutions to support the industry. 
[VC]: Tthe problem with governments is they always have to make sure everybody gets 
treated equally. And that’s very difficult because certain things aren’t equal. So they have to 
establish certain rules and publish them […] The rules say white shirts, and it was too easy 
to get to the money, and investments were made too fast before we really knew what we 
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needed, because the money was there, you know. So, I doubt that [governmental 
intervention] is good. 
 [VC]: In energy, you have two compounding uncertainties. You have one uncertainty, 
which is the technology and will it work, does it work. This is the same as in biotech, ok? 
But you’re compounding another uncertainty, which is the regulatory uncertainty. And that, 
in most cases, you don’t have that in biotech. 
 
Proposition 7-4: One of the five most important generally recognized risk 
characteristics of clean energy ventures is regulatory risk, as the VCs feel that the 
regulators have too much control over the market direction. 
7.4.5. Exits  
The fifth generally recognized risk characteristic that is identified from the interview and 
survey data is insufficient amount of exit opportunities for clean energy ventures. Exits are an 
essential part of the VC business model and are considered carefully at the time of 
investment. Two routes, initial public offerings (IPOs) and trade sales, are the most common 
forms of VC exits. Other exit routes include  a secondary sale, where the VC sells its share to 
a strategic investor or another VC, management buyout, where the VC sells its share to the 
entrepreneurial firm or its management, and a write-off in case the venture fails 
(Wuestenhagen et al. 2006, Cumming et al. 2003, and Gladstone 1989).  
Many of the interviewed VCs express concern with the fact that they feel there are not 
enough exit opportunities in the clean energy market, whether in the form of IPOs or trade 
sales (List 15).  
List 15 Risk characteristic: Exits 
Exits
- Scarce exit opportunities
 
 
An important part of the scarcity problem is the concentration of market power in the hands of 
relatively few players, as discussed earlier (chapter 7.4.1). 
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[VC]: I think what the industry is lacking is [exit opportunities]. […] You 
remember the joke that is always made on the water deals where every 
single business plan has a section about a potential exit and they say, “We 
could be bought one day by Vivendi.” And Vivendi doesn’t know how many 
companies they’re supposed to buy. 
Some example responses regarding the exit opportunity scarcity are collected in List 16. 
List 16 VC and Venture Responses Regarding Scarcity of Exit Opportunities 
[VC]: Currently there is not enough exit potential in the market. The market is still too 
immature. I think the exit market is immature and you have to see some success stories in 
the exit market for this sector to take[off]. 
[VC]: Well, it could be, just again my perspective of looking out for the interests of the 
investor, but I almost think that it starts with not enough sustainable exit opportunities. 
Following that logic, [...] if you put the emphasis on the exit, not enough exits means that 
VCs need to spend their time looking at different kinds of deals in different industries or 
whatever. And therefore they pay less attention to the broad base of business plans/ They 
might only pick amongst the very very best in the energy sector. 
[Venture]: VCs believe that utilities are a “bad” or difficult market to sell to and are thus 
hesitant to invest in this space. 
[VC]: My belief is that not so [many] traditional utilities are [exit targets] yet. Maybe we’ll 
see the same trend as in telecom, that they first try to solve the problem themselves and then 
they realize that it is cheaper and easier to buy an existing company that has looked into this 
field for several years, to buy incompetents in a way. 
 
Proposition 7-5: One of the five most important generally recognized risk 
characteristics of clean energy ventures is exit risk, as the VCs perceive that the exit 
opportunities in the clean energy market are too scarce. 
7.5. Clean Energy Venture Cognitive Risk Characteristics 
7.5.1. Investment Outcome History 
The first cognitive risk characteristic that is identified is the outcome history of venture 
investments. According to Sitkin et al. (1992 and 1995), the decision–makers’ propensity to 
take risks is contingent upon the degree of outcome success associated with their propensity 
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to take risks. In other words, if previous risk-taking was successful, decision-makers will seek 
new opportunities in similar situations.  
For clean energy ventures, this implies that those venture capitalists that have not yet made 
investments into clean energy ventures have to base their investment decision on the 
experiences of other investors. Survey respondent clean energy ventures are more inclined 
than the VCs to argue that VC risk aversion is a product of the recent technology bubble 
collapse in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Some of the early experiences in clean energy 
investing may have been very negative, as the following quotes demonstrates: 
[VC]: Based on our experiences, I could say bitter experiences with the 
energy sector, I can say this. We have had two investments into [clean 
energy] and both of them have gone bust. 
Among the interviewed VCs, lack of clean energy success stories or absence of clean 
energy investment category track record is the most often quoted risk related to investment 
outcome history, inhibiting new investors from entering the market (List 17). 
List 17 Risk characteristic: Investment Outcome History 
Investment Outcome History
-Lack of clean energy success stories or absence 
of a track record
 
Some example responses regarding the lack of clean energy success stories or absence of a 
track record are collected in List 18. 
List 18 VC and Venture Responses Regarding Clean Energy Venture Outcome History 
[VC]: With information technology, this bubble happened and you could earn a lot of money 
and I know many investors who have this wet dream of doing it again because it happened 
once, so why cannot it happen twice. But in the energy field, this has not happened yet. So 
you don’t know yet whether you’re going to see these huge valuations. 
[VC]: We don’t have enough track record in the sector, where we could say, look at  this. 
[Venture]: The situation is improving, but the problem of few success stories remains and 
[there is] only modest participation by mainstream VCs. 
[Venture]: Energy-focused funds do not have a poster child success story to point to. These 
funds tend to be smaller. The size and ability to participate in follow-on financing is a 
concern for large, traditional VCs. When we started to look for funds in early 2003, the VC 
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industry was still licking their wounds from the dot-com bust. VCs were reluctant to invest 
and few of the traditional funds had any understanding of the PV market. Draper-Fisher-
Jurvetson’s investment in Konarka got many funds interested in looking at the PV sector, but 
many of these funds were primarily trying to get educated on the investment opportunities, 
as opposed to being committed to making an alternative energy investment.  
 
Proposition 7-6: One of the four most important cognitive risk characteristics of 
clean energy ventures is the lack of clean energy success stories and absence of a 
clean energy investment category track record. 
7.5.2. Venture Capitalist Risk Preferences 
The second cognitive risk characteristic that is identified from the research and survey data is 
venture capitalist risk preferences. According to Sitkin et al. (1992), the risk propensity of 
decision-makers is consistent with their preferences concerning risk. For a venture capitalist, 
venture decisions are about weighing the risks and the potential returns of an investment 
(Tyebjee et al. 1984). In order for a venture capitalist to take on more risk, the expected return 
on an investment needs to be higher as well. 
Clean energy venture investing attracts both generalist and specialist venture capital funds. 
For early-stage ventures, going with a specialist fund may be a better strategy in regards to 
venture capitalist risk preferences, as specialized venture capital funds are associated with 
lower required returns for early-stage ventures (Manigart et al. 2002). Among venture capital 
funds that have invested in clean energy, specialized funds, such as Nth Power11 and 
Sustainable Asset Management12, have been more active in their investments in energy sector 
than generalist funds. 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
11
 www.nthpower.com 
12
 www.sam-group.com 
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Three main themes emerge from the study: strong risk aversion among investors, reluctance 
to invest in early-stage deals, and unwillingness to be seen as the “first mover investor” in the 
market (List 19).  
List 19 Risk characteristic: VC Risk Preferences 
VC Risk Preferences
-VC risk aversion
-Avoidance of early stage deals
-Reluctance to be seen as the first mover
 
The interviewed VCs exhibit high levels of risk aversion in regard to clean energy 
investments. Some example responses regarding the VC risk aversion are collected in List 
20). 
List 20 VC and Venture Responses Regarding VC Risk Aversion 
[VC]: Venture capitalists are risk-averse, even if they are venture capitalists. They basically 
look for opportunities that other people didn‘t understand, not opportunities [where] they 
feel they‘ll be taking a very large risk. They feel and they know they’re taking a very low 
risk, but that the other people didn’t understand [the opportunity]. If that technology has to 
change habits and ways that people work, think, buy, sell, then that risk is extremely high, so 
they won’t touch that billion-dollar opportunity if it means that everybody has to change 
their way of working or thinking, which is the case of energy. 
[Venture]: VCs prefer to invest many millions in one risk-free company [than] to invest 
small sums in many start-ups. VCs have forgotten what "V" means venture. 
[CVC]: We are actively looking for fuel cell investments. But I think they will still require 
quite a lot of money and you will not be punished not to invest right now […] To get fixed on 
one technology right now is very dangerous and you will not be rewarded by taking this risk 
right now. […]If you see [how many] funds are going for fuel cells, it is like [the 3rd 
generation mobile networks in the telecom sector], you can never get this money back. 
[VC]: And what happened was that, in the boom time, [the] late 1990s, so much money 
came into VC that VCs shifted over here in order to chase deals and returns, crowded out 
the angels, who stayed here, because that’s all they could afford to do. And the risk profile 
of the public companies came over here. [A clean energy venture called] Proton Energy 
raised, what was it, $240 million on the public market with a trickle of revenue, right. You 
can’t do that in today’s market. But it was a sort of a sign of the market times. Well, now 
today the problem is that everyone [is] risk-averse. VC now wants to be over here. The 
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public market wants to be over here. And angels are still over here. So, two effects, there are 
two effects: one is there’s a financing gap for start-ups, the second is these people are not as 
wealthy, so the overall size of this pie, […] has got smaller. 
[Venture]: [VCs exhibit] risk aversion due to [the] tech bubble collapse. 
[Venture]: Venture firms have strong ideas of what kind of company they want to fund: Low 
risk, existing revenue stream. 
[Venture]: Risk-adverse nature of investment in energy sector, particularly for electricity 
industry, is next single biggest obstacle - most investors are in a wait-and-see mode - 
wanting to invest in plays that actually are profitable. 
[Venture]: VCs do not want to invest in innovative start-ups, but prefer no-risk, mid-size 
companies with some years of profitable business.  
[Venture]: VCs do not take real risks. They are only looking for companies they can expand 
with little or no risk. 
[Venture]: VCs as a rule -- energy sector/other, corporate/independent, whatever -- are 
much more conservative than they like to appear. 
 
Most of the interviewed VCs are very reluctant to enter early-stage deals in the clean 
energy sector. Some example responses are collected in List 21. 
List 21 VC and Venture Responses Regarding Reluctance to Enter Early-Stage Deals in Clean Energy 
Sector 
[Venture]: There is a total reluctance, by both corporate and independent VCs, to invest in 
early stage development. The interest is solely in commercializing proven technology. 
[VC]: About the companies presenting [in the European energy venture fair], an analogy can 
be drawn to companies in the [clean energy] field in general: so many of them are in such an 
early phase. This is why there are so few investments. Many of them are in the seed phase. 
They have [...] very capital-intensive products. This is [a] very unfortunate position. 
[VC]: And it takes longer or it’s harder for start-ups to even get their first round of money, 
because the VC team wants to play [with] more mature companies and angels are harder to 
find to support the companies. And even the angels, if you can find them [...] the company has 
to raise enough or to make progress enough that VCs will pay attention to them. Eventually 
this will normalize, this should normalize back to the point where VC is moving back to early-
stage risk. The public market becomes a place where public or IPOs or mergers and 
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acquisition markets become a place where VC-backed start-ups have a place to go. But that 
adjustment will take some time and I don’t think we will see a return to the time when the 
overall VC market is, you know, investing in a hundred billion dollars of start-ups in a given 
year. You know, in the year 2000, a hundred billion dollars of investment went into venture 
capital start-ups. 
 
The third theme that is identified is that the VCs are very reluctant to be seen as the first 
movers in the clean energy VC market. Survey respondent clean energy entrepreneurs view 
the reluctance to commit until others commit as VC herd-like behavior. Some example 
responses are collected in List 22. 
List 22 VC and Venture Responses Regarding Reluctance to be First Movers 
[Venture]: Herd effect - going where others have gone. 
[Venture]: Expectation for others to commit first. 
[Venture]: We had no lobbying power. It seems these guys just give to the kind that one of 
them already invested. Nobody wants to be the first to invest. 
[Venture]: They are pack animals. 
 
Proposition 7-7: One of the four most important cognitive risk characteristics of 
clean energy ventures is the VC risk preferences consisting of VC risk aversion, 
avoidance of early-stage deals, and reluctance to be seen as the first mover in the 
market. 
7.5.3. Clean Energy Venture Investment Domain Familiarity 
The third cognitive risk characteristic that is identified is clean energy venture investment 
domain familiarity. According to Sitkin et al. (1992), decision-makers with moderate levels of 
domain familiarity will have more accurate estimates of risk than will decision-makers with 
high or low levels of domain familiarity. In the venture capitalist decision-making process, 
investment domain familiarity is just one measure of venture capitalist experience. Zacharakis 
et al. (2001) found a curvilinear relationship between experience with the venture capital task 
and the accuracy or efficiency of their decision processes. In other words, as the venture 
capitalists become more familiar with the investment domain and other factors related to the 
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venture capitalist decision-making process, their reliability first increases but then decreases. 
The finding of Zacharakis et al. resonates well with Sitkin et al., who note, “As experience 
increases, decision makers are more likely to focus on their own abilities and past successes 
rather than current situational constraints.” 
Clean energy venture investing is still an emerging area and thus the curve depicting the 
relationship between venture capitalist experience and accuracy of their decision-making is 
argued to be still increasing for most venture capitalists.  
Many clean energy ventures who participated in the survey feel that their business ideas are 
not appreciated and understood by venture capitalists used to investing in IT or biotech 
sectors. According to Zider (1998), the lack of understanding goes both ways: “Most VCs 
have never worked in the funded industry, or have never been in a down cycle. And, 
unfortunately, many entrepreneurs are self-absorbed and believe that their own skills and 
ideas are the key to success.” Zider continues that the growth in fund size and the amount of 
investments one partner needs to manage leads to a situation where “the partners are usually 
far less knowledgeable about the industry and the technology than the entrepreneurs.” Finding 
a suitable VC firm to fund the venture was a painstaking activity for most of the survey 
respondent ventures. The following quote demonstrates well the challenges of the fundraising 
process: 
[Venture]: Also, there is huge variability in knowledge, experience, 
technical savviness, ethics, etc. across all categories of VCs. And contrary 
to the popular expression, a dollar is not a dollar. It takes a great deal of 
effort to find a good match with an investor who brings not only the right 
amount of money on acceptable terms, but also good practical value. 
Lack of clean energy venture business domain familiarity is the most often quoted challenge 
clean energy ventures face with the VCs. The VC interviews confirm the ventures’ view of 
insufficient clean energy category knowledge. Two main themes can be identified, as is 
shown in List 23. First, due to a low level of sector knowledge, VCs have difficulties 
identifying clean energy business opportunities they would be willing to fund. Second, VCs 
are hesitant to invest in a sector where they feel they have not enough knowledge.  
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List 23 Risk characteristic: Investment Domain Familiarity 
Investment Domain Familiarity
- Difficulties in identifying business opportunities
Hesitance to invest in an unfamiliar area
 
The difficulty of identifying clean energy business opportunities due to insufficient sector 
knowledge is described as follows by an interviewed VC: 
[VC]: Are VCs competent enough to see, to think in a contrarian fashion 
and see the opportunities today that aren’t obvious in the market today? 
Because that’s ultimately where VCs, where the really good venture 
capitals, make their money: investing their time where nobody sees it 
coming. And that may be just an issue [that there] aren’t enough 
practitioners in the energy area. How many […] really creative 
revolutionary thinkers are out there investing in energy and really see 
where this industry is transforming and changing? There aren’t that many 
and there aren’t that many that have funds behind [them]. 
Naturally, the survey respondent ventures are more eager than the interviewed VCs 
themselves to point out that the VCs are not competent to understand the presented business 
opportunities due to their low level of knowledge of clean energy market drivers. Example 
responses regarding the clean energy opportunity recognition difficulty are collected in List 
24.  
List 24 VC and Venture Responses Regarding VC Ability to Identify Clean Energy Business 
Opportunities 
[VC]: Software has no limitations; it is just people. Electricity, power has limitations. It is 
certain. Newton’s laws you have to follow. So now [the] whole IT sector is spinning into 
services and entertainment and there is no limit, you can use it everywhere. You can also 
say that energy is everywhere, but it is almost always in the same form. There is always this 
sine wave. I mean, “How’s your sine wave today?” We are not that interested. 
 [Venture]: Investors tends to look at the payback time as the one criteria; unless the buyer 
makes profit within a few years, they expect nobody is interested to buy a renewable energy 
system. 
 [Venture]: VCs are just not interested. 
[Venture]: We have a PV technology based on crystalline silicon, and it was often judged as 
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"not radical" when compared to nanotechnology or thin-film companies. 
 [Venture]: Because our initial focus is renewable energy, VCs feel that our potential market 
is too small. They don't want to consider that the technology, once developed for renewable 
energy, can transfer easily to other energy and monitoring applications. 
[Venture]: The biggest problem with the VCs is the Silicon Valley high-tech mentality of the 
VCs. 
[Venture]: They do not like the marine risk - they cannot assess it, and believe that it 
requires too much capital. 
[Venture]: VCs are investing in low-risk, ongoing expansionary vehicles and do not have 
technical basis to understand exotic, new energy (mechanical) technology concepts. 
[Venture]: [VCs]’ lack of knowledge of sector and opportunities in the sector are the 
biggest obstacle [we have faced with the VCs]. 
[Venture]: VCs are morons, or at least the ones that operate the local circuit. They are pack 
hounds, scared shitless to do anything the big dogs are not already doing. They talk up 
prospects that are already obvious prospects. They also are full of buzzwords and, this is 
just my opinion, achieved their personal success because of their verbal prowess, as 
opposed to any innate knowledge or true skill […]. Then there are a few who do have 
experience and are true good guys, but they don't understand climate, and grasp why others 
would be pushing renewables, while coal is so much cheaper. Alas. 
[Venture]: My experience with non-energy specialized VCs is they are arrogant in their 
assessments and not very capable either. [For them,] energy is special, long-term, small 
number of players, etc. Those who aren't in it should get out, and those who are in it should 
continue to invest. 
[VC]: The media publicity that IT and telecom got during their years of boom [was great]. If 
the energy sector could have more media attention, it probably would boost the investments 
as well. 
[VC]: I think this is one of the problems: there are not enough people that made their money 
from [the energy] sector. No Bill Gates. 
 
Following the money trail of previous investments allows VCs to accumulate the knowledge 
of certain sectors, such as biotech and ITC. The second identified theme is that the VCs are 
hesitant to invest in an unfamiliar area. The following quote from an interviewed VC 
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demonstrates the power of previous sector exposure in driving the investment interest into a 
familiar direction: 
[VC]: Venture capital was nothing like an industry in the 1970s. It was 
really small-scale stuff and, in the [19]80s and [19]90s, it really grew. And 
it grew, I think, in the area of communications, biotech, software systems, 
and information technology. So the returns come and the investments go 
into areas that the managers know. 
Some example responses regarding the hesitancy to enter an investment area where the VC 
has no previous experience or knowledge are demonstrated in List 25. 
List 25 VC and Venture Example Responses Regarding VC Hesitancy to Enter Unfamiliar Investment 
Areas 
[Venture]: The VC community, at least in California, does not understand energy 
technology and has no sound basis for making logical early-stage funding decisions. One 
VC told me, "There are at least 500 companies like yours. I don't understand any of them. 
You can sort yourselves out and I will invest in the survivors for the next stage.” 
[VC]: It’s kind of hard to get [venture capitalists] to invest in new type[s] of technologies, 
new type[s] of green or environmentally safe technologies. It’s a question of identifying of 
what he understands best. Most of the venture capitalists, when they have operational 
backgrounds, the operational backgrounds are actually in research or managing IT, telecom 
or bio companies. 
[VC]: People tend to invest in technologies that they know, where they know people they can 
talk to, where they can check the technology is good. 
[VC]:  When [VCs] hit an energy deal, they don’t want to do it […] because you have so 
much work to do when you have a deal and it’s difficult to find [...] and they just put it away 
and never answer to it. And it just dies because people don’t get it and that’s probably 
certainly one key reason for the lack of people in funds. 
[Venture]: If VCs don't understand the market, they don't want to look at the deal. 
[Venture]: No one has enough background in our particular technology to be comfortable 
leading an investment round. Same lack of background or knowledge means they can not 
share our vision and passion. 
[Venture]: Most VCs who operate in the technology sector do not understand energy, and 
those that operate in the energy sector are interested in asset-based companies and not 
energy technology. 
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Proposition 7-8: One of the four most important cognitive risk characteristics of 
clean energy ventures is VCs’ low level of clean energy venture investment domain 
knowledge, consisting of difficulties in identifying business opportunities and 
hesitance to invest in an unfamiliar area. 
7.5.4. Venture Framing 
The fourth cognitive risk characteristic that is identified is clean energy venture framing. 
According to Sitkin et al. (1992), positively framed situations will be perceived as involving 
higher risk than negatively framed situations. Zacharakis et al. (2001) studies framing of 
information in venture capitalist decision-making and shows that venture capitalists are more 
confident with decisions based on information framed in a familiar way than information 
framed in an unfamiliar way. This result shows that venture capitalists are intuitive decision-
makers (Zacharakis et al.) who formulate the venture information into a mental model, which 
is then used to make a decision.  
Clean energy venture proposals emphasize economical, social, and environmental factors. 
This may lead to a situation where the venture is framed as a way of solving problems 
outside of the traditional scope of economical factors, affecting the venture capitalist risk 
perception (List 26).  
List 26 Risk characteristic: Venture Framing 
Venture Framing
- Framing the venture outside of the traditional 
economic factors
 
Some example responses regarding the venture framing issue are demonstrated in List 27. 
List 27 Entrepreneurs' Tendency to Solve Problems Beyond Traditional Economic Scope 
[VC]: [Clean energy entrepreneurs]’ drive for doing [the venture] is to solve the energy 
problem of the world. So they have this ideological way of trying to solve the global energy 
problem. 
[VC]: Enough people in the renewables space, their primary motivation is to save the world, 
create jobs, equal opportunities, and interestingly enough, many times making a lot of 
  119 
money is almost unethical, you know. And obviously, VCs, they shy away from that. 
[VC]: Environmentally oriented people, they see the end of the world coming. 
 
Proposition 7-9: One of the four most important cognitive risk characteristics of 
clean energy ventures is the tendency of ventures to frame the venture proposal so 
that it argues to solve problems outside of the traditional economic scope, raising the 
VC’s perceived risk. 
7.6. Discussion 
The study presented in this chapter argues that, in addition to risk characteristics that are 
generally recognized by both the VCs and the clean energy ventures, venture capitalists’ 
cognitive biases in decision-making create additional risk characteristics that make it more 
difficult for clean energy ventures to raise venture capital funding. Results of this study 
demonstrate that clean energy venture risk characteristics can be divided into two groups. The 
first group, consisting of five risk characteristics, is generally recognized risk characteristics. 
The second group, consisting of four risk characteristics, is cognitive risk characteristics. 
Based on the study, nine propositions that can be tested in future research were developed. 
Chapter 9 contains a more detailed discussion of the findings, limitations, and contributions of 
the findings in this chapter.  
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8. Parent Firm’s Organizational Culture and CVC Fund 
Performance 
The previous two chapters argue that venture financing is one of the main challenges of clean 
energy ventures and that complex clean energy venture risk characteristics may diminish the 
willingness of VCs to invest in the clean energy sector. This chapter complements and 
expands the clean energy venture financing challenge argument by empirically developing an 
organizational culture-based model that aims to explain how the organizational culture of the 
corporate venture capital (CVC) fund’s parent firm affects the performance of the fund. 
8.1. Introduction 
A review of previous literature (chapter 3.3) shows that large corporations play an important 
role in new industry development. For example, they provide exit opportunities for VCs, 
supply competent personnel for start-ups to recruit, and offer partnering opportunities for new 
ventures. Corporations have also become important funders of new venture activity through 
corporate venturing programs. One form of corporate venturing is a corporate venture capital 
(CVC) fund, as discussed earlier in the literature review (chapter 3.3.3). A fair amount of 
academic research has been carried out regarding CVC activities during the past decade. 
However, one of the central and enduring research questions in corporate venture capital 
(CVC) research is: Why is the outcome of CVC funds often disappointing, leading to poor 
performance or even a failure of a fund? 
The strategic and financial outcomes of CVC funds of large corporations, in the form of 
equity investments in entrepreneurial ventures, are found to vary substantially (Sykes 1986, 
Siegel et al. 1988, Gompers et al. 1998, and Chesbrough 2000). Part of the variance is due to 
differences in goal-setting, as some parent firms emphasize strategic benefits over financial 
returns. Also, the life span of a CVC fund is found to be shorter and, in general, more volatile 
than that for an independent VC fund (Gompers et al.). In short, CVC investing is a 
painstaking activity for many parent firms, in some cases leading to failures reported by 
several studies (Baird et al. 2002, Rind 1981, Sykes 1990, and Gompers 2002). 
This chapter develops an organizational culture-based model that aims to explain how the 
parent firm organizational culture affects the performance of a CVC fund. The chapter utilizes 
empirical data gathered from CVC and VC interviews and the clean energy venture financing 
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survey. Prior to introducing the model, the motivational factors for a corporation engaging 
itself with corporate venture capital activity in the clean energy sector are presented, followed 
by a brief review of difficulties the survey respondent clean energy ventures face with CVC 
funds. The developed model on the effect of the parent firm’s organizational culture on CVC 
fund performance is introduced in chapter 8.5. The model consists of the following 
components, each of which will be discussed in detail: (1) industry context, (2) parent firm 
organizational culture, (3) organizational decision-making practices, (4) managing, 
measuring and compensating success, and (5) CVC fund performance. Propositions are 
developed that can be tested in future research.  
8.2. Methodological Notes 
Both the VC and CVC interviews and the clean energy venture financing survey are utilized 
as the source of empirical data in the theory-building of the chapter. The interviews and the 
survey are described in more detail in the methodology chapter (chapter 4). The data analysis 
proceeded as described in chapter 4.  
As shown in Table 7 most of the parent firms of the interviewed CVC funds are electric 
utilities. The organizational culture of electric utilities can be regarded as having been 
founded on similar “assumptions about customers, competitors and society” (Gordon 1991). 
The energy industry context is briefly reviewed in chapter 5. The organizational culture part 
of the developed model, shown in Figure 6, is based on interviews with CVC funds whose 
parent firm is an electric utility. Interview data from other than electric utility-backed CVC 
funds are used in understanding the energy industry context. When quotes from the empirical 
data are used as prototypical examples of the study results in the chapter, labels [VC], [CVC], 
and [Venture] are used to indicate whether the quote came from the clean energy venture 
financing survey respondent or the CVC or VC interviews. 
8.3. CVC Fund Motivation for Investing in Clean Energy 
CVC funds backed by large corporations have become significant players in the VC market. 
By 2000, CVC funds were managing approximately 15% of all VC investment that year 
(Dushnitsky 2004).  
All of the interviewed CVC funds had made investments into clean energy ventures. Among 
the interviewed CVC funds, strategic reasons dominate the investment motivation. The most 
important strategic benefit for the interviewed CVC funds is to engage the organization in a 
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learning process, providing inside information of the market trends and technological 
development that could not be gained from the corporation’s everyday business activities. 
[CVC]: You don’t see the same things when you invest in a company and 
when you monitor from outside. If you check from the Internet, you don’t get 
the same information. That is information that is available for everybody. If 
you invest, you feel what the ecosystem of a sector is: all the relationships 
with the players and so on.  
Many of the interviewed CVC funds note that, prior to establishing a CVC fund that invests in 
external ventures, internal venture activity had been tried out. In some cases internal venture 
activities are run side by side with external CVC activities. 
[CVC]: We had this internal incubator... In fact, to have this incubator, we 
saw that there were much more interesting projects outside of [our 
company] than inside. 
Another interviewed CVC fund manager comments on the reasons behind setting up a CVC 
fund as follows: 
[CVC]: So we had projects that were not in the hands of anybody and there 
was a [connection missing] [...] between R&D and the market. So the board 
of [our company] asked us to create this [CVC fund]. 
However, the vision of the fund direction and purpose are not always clear for the CVC fund 
manager running the fund. The original goals or the market situation from the time of fund 
initiation are modified or changes in the parent company leadership alter the parent company 
priorities. Many of the interviewed CVC fund managers find themselves defending the 
existence and continuation of the fund. 
[CVC]: [Our company] is very core-areas focused and lots of companies 
are these days. That means it is not obvious why you need a CVC unit. You 
still need it to spot migration opportunities. 
As CVC funds have grown to be significant players in the VC market, many of the 
interviewed independent VCs followed closely the activities of the CVC funds investing in 
the clean energy sector. Several of the interviewed independent VCs remain skeptical about 
the motives and dedication of the corporate venture capital activity they saw sprouting around 
them. The interviewed independent VCs comments about the CVC activity as follows:  
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[VC]: You see Norsk Hydro, BP, and others having their own venture fund 
doing separate venture investments in this field.  My analysis of that is that 
they still want to believe that the oil will be there for so many years yet that 
they don’t have to worry about it during their life cycle. They are not so 
sure that they can bet on that the new technologies won’t happen so they 
“buy insurance” in case fuel cells are going to hit. They have to be 
somewhere in that market. 
During the past decade, some large firms have acquired clean energy start-ups or have 
launched clean energy R&D activities within the corporation. The activity of these strategic 
investors is reviewed briefly in chapter 5.2.1. Many of the strategic investors active in the 
energy sector are potential trade-sale partners for VCs that invest in the clean energy sector. 
Despite this, the interviewed VCs express skepticism about the motivations of large energy 
firms entering the alternative energy business: 
[VC]: BP has got a big solar business, and so does Shell. What did they see 
in this? The efforts in renewables so far are such a small piece of the 
business […] I think [these businesses] allows them to be present and 
involved in new power sources. But it’s, you know, I think it’s still a mystery 
about whether they’re planning that ever to be a huge business. 
The interviewed VCs see the CVC activity as a way for the industry incumbents to control the 
industry direction and protect their own business interests. However, based on the interviews 
carried out with the CVC units of European energy companies, there is no large-scale concern 
among the power producers that their dominant position in the power sector is under a threat 
unless regulatory conditions in the industry toughen. This would seem to suggest that the 
current regulatory framework largely insulates at least the European energy firms from some 
of the environmental uncertainties. 
[VC]: Most oil companies are very protectionist and, in their heart, they 
want cars to be driven with petroleum. They don’t really like the idea of 
hybrid cars and that stuff. But they have to be proactive so that, in 20 years, 
they don’t have to look at others taking their business. 
Most of the interviewed European CVC funds were founded during the height of the 
technology investment boom of the late 1990s. The frenzied investment activity of the so-
called dot-com era activated many traditional energy companies to set up their own corporate 
venture capital funds and other venturing activities in the energy sector: 
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[CVC]: At the time [of founding the fund], it was very hip to speak about e-
commerce and Internet and so on, and we were thinking, “Let’s do this 
game in the energy sector, why not.” 
Most of the interviewed electric utility-owned CVC fund managers have a long career 
working for the parent company and an extensive career in the energy sector. Most of them 
had been working with either business development or corporate finance related activities 
prior to their appointment with the CVC fund. They are familiar with the problems of pushing 
through new radical innovations within the operational units, and see the CVC fund as a way 
to ensure that disruptive innovations were pursued within the firm. 
[CVC]: Disruptive innovations were not taken up by the operative branches 
of [our company]… They could handle the incremental R&D, like 
improvements for the nuclear plant or some other existing business. But if 
you had a disruptive innovation for new activities and business, they didn’t 
know how to do it. It was not in [our company] culture to create companies 
and new activities…The only movement that is done is to reduce the 
personnel and the budget by 3-5%.   
8.4. Clean Energy Venture Experience with CVC Funds 
The clean energy venture financing survey respondents express problems with CVC funds in 
three main areas, when compared with independent VC funds: incompatibility between the 
venture offering and the CVC fund strategic goals, CVC fund decision-making process, 
and unprofessional management practices (Table 20). 
Corporate venture capital funds have dual goals: to reach both strategic and financial gains 
(Chesbrough 2000, Siegel et al. 1988). A venture offering needs to be compatible with the 
CVC fund strategic goals in order to enter an investment. The “strategic fit” criterion is 
recognized by most of the interviewed CVC funds, but slowness in decision-making or 
unprofessionality is not brought up by the CVCs themselves as a factor affecting the CVC 
fund deal flow. Table 20 demonstrates the three problem areas clean energy ventures 
experience when trying to raise capital from the CVC funds.  
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Table 20 Venture Responses Regarding Challenges with CVC Funds 
Challenge Response 
[Venture]: You must demonstrate a strategic benefit for the corporation 
funding you [in order to get funding]. 
[Venture]: [The CVC fund had a] pre-defined view of the kind of company 
they needed. 
Incompatibility 
of venture 
offering with 
CVC fund 
strategic goals 
[Venture]: [The challenge we faced with the CVCs was] finding a close 
match between our technology and their investment "needs." Many just 
follow the pack and look for investments like others have made. 
[Venture]: [Problem with the CVC funds was the] long decision processes 
depending on corporate structure, which could be changed overnight. 
[Venture]: [Our problem with the CVC funds was a] lack of "insider" 
promoting an investment. 
[Venture]: [CVC funds have] too many layers of decision-making. 
Corporate lawyers are too eager to show they are still relevant. 
CVC fund 
decision-
making 
process  
[Venture]: [CVC funds] are slow to make decisions. 
[Venture]:  [In CVC funds] no one in particular seems to be in charge. 
[Venture]: [In CVC funds there is] a lack of commitment to the whole 
process.  
[Venture]: [In CVC funds there is] a lack of business knowledge about 
core business of parent. 
Unprofessional 
management 
practices 
[Venture]: [In CVC funds there is] inexperience at financial due 
diligence. 
 
The CVC fund managers themselves tend to be optimistic of their chances to attract clean 
energy ventures, and see their fund as an ideal partner for many of the ventures:  
[CVC]: When we talk to [entrepreneurial] companies, [our parent 
company] is reasonably attractive because it has a good reputation that it is 
a fairly easy corporation to deal with. So they are not afraid that they’re 
going to get screwed. And then they know it is a fairly big company so there 
is potential help in marketing the products and that there is a potential 
technology help. 
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8.5. Developed Model 
In order to gain a better understanding of the factors that determine the performance of a CVC 
fund, a view concentrating on the organizational culture of the parent firm was chosen. 
Selecting organizational culture as the viewpoint of the analysis is argued to bring fresh new 
perspectives on the CVC fund performance challenges for two main reasons. First, many of 
the obstacles faced by the CVC funds mentioned in previous research, such as venture 
manager incentives (Block 1987 and Chesbrough 2000), internal politics (Sykes 1986), low 
level of fund autonomy (Siegel et al. 1988), and lack of clear mission (Siegel et al.), have 
their source in the interface between the parent firm and the CVC fund. Thus, the findings of 
previous research on CVC indicate that studying the organizational culture of the parent firm, 
defined as being “based upon internally oriented beliefs regarding how to manage, and 
externally oriented beliefs regarding how to compete” (Davis 1984), could be helpful in 
understanding, and possibly even pre-determining, the performance of a CVC activity.  
Second, organizational culture of the firm and the surrounding industry context are closely 
linked. Gordon (1991) presents a model on industry determinants of organizational culture 
that is described as follows: “Organizations are founded on industry-based assumptions about 
customers, competitors, and society, which form the basis of the company culture. From these 
assumptions, certain values develop concerning “the right thing to do,” and consistent with 
these values, management develops strategies, structures, and processes necessary for a 
company to develop its business.” Most of the previous CVC research relies on empirics from 
the ICT or telecom sector. The empirical data of this study comes from the energy sector 
where the industry context differs from the ICT sector in many respects, such as in market 
concentration, regulation, and patenting activity. Analyzing energy sector CVC fund 
investments in clean energy ventures is argued to bring out new perspectives that have gone 
unnoticed in previous research.  
The dependent variable of the research is performance of the CVC fund. Previous research on 
CVC shows that firms engage in CVC activities for both financial and strategic reasons. Since 
most of the interviewed CVC funds had been in operation for less than five years at the time 
of the interview, the financial performance of the funds was not yet available. For many of the 
funds, the strategic goals had been altered along the way and therefore comparison with the 
original goals could have led to misleading results. The volatile nature of the CVC funds is 
mentioned earlier (chapter 3.3.4). Closure or low investment activity of the fund can be 
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regarded as a sign of a decrease in top management commitment to the CVC fund operation. 
Therefore, in this study, the performance of CVC fund is defined as the degree to which the 
strategic and financial goals the firm has set for its external corporate venturing are 
met, measured by the level of activity, and survival of the fund.  
The explanatory model shown in Figure 6 emerges as a result of the data analysis of CVC and 
VC interviews, clean energy venture financing survey, and previous research findings on 
organizational culture, industry context, and decision-making behavior. 
Parent Firm
Organizational
Culture
Industry 
Context
Decision-
Making in 
Organizations
Managing and 
Measuring
Success
CVC Fund
Performance
 
Figure 6 Effect of parent firm’s organizational culture on CVC fund performance 
The model is based on the argument that the parent firm organizational culture affects the 
CVC fund performance. The effect of the organizational culture is moderated by risk-taking 
practices in the parent firm’s decision-making process and the parent firm’s skills in 
managing, measuring, and compensating fund success. The industry context has an 
indirect effect on the fund performance through its impact on the parent firm’s organizational 
culture. Therefore, depending on the strength and nature of the two moderating factors and 
constraints and opportunities set by the industry context, the parent firm’s organizational 
culture may have more or less effect on the CVC fund performance.  
Although organizational decision-making practices and parent firm skills in managing, 
measuring, and compensating fund success are influenced by the parent firm’s organizational 
culture, they are included in the developed model (Figure 6) as separate organizational 
activities. In other words, it is argued that, by developing additional skills in these two 
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organizational activities, the parent firm can moderate the effect the its organizational culture 
has on the performance of the CVC fund. The following chapters discuss the model in more 
detail.  
8.6. Industry Context 
Industry context is, in this study, used as an umbrella term for institutional, regulatory, 
competition, and innovation related factors that form the operating environment for a network 
of firms that operate in the same industrial sector, such as forestry, chemical, energy, or 
pharmaceutical industry. According to Gordon (1991), industries cause organizational 
cultures to develop within defined parameters. Thus, certain cultural characteristics will be 
widespread among organizations in the same industry, and these are most likely different 
from characteristics found in other industries. Because of this relationship, the potential for 
changing a company’s culture is limited to actions that are neutral to, or directionally 
consistent with, industry demands (Gordon). Industry context can also act as a constraint, 
causing organizations to follow mental models (Senge 1990) that are “deeply held internal 
images of how the world works, images that limit us to familiar ways of thinking and acting.” 
The industry context where this study takes place is the energy sector. As discussed in the 
methodology chapter, most of the parent firms of the interviewed CVC funds are electric 
utilities (Table 7). The organizational culture of electric utilities can be regarded as having 
been founded on similar “assumptions about customers, competitors and society” (Gordon 
1991). Interview data from other than electric utility-backed CVC funds, independent VC 
funds, and the clean energy venture financing survey are used in understanding the industry 
context.  
In the energy sector, innovations are traditionally incremental in nature (stakeholder 
interviews, chapter 4.3.2). Therefore, accepting radical innovations from small ventures 
challenges the basic assumptions electric utilities hold on innovation and market potential. 
Discovery and extraordinarily rapid market introduction of nuclear fission (Smil 2003) can be 
regarded as an exception to the energy sector incremental innovation rule. Traditionally, large 
players whose competitive advantage is based on market power and price-based competition, 
not technologically innovative products and services, dominate the energy sector.  
Previous research identifies some links between CVC performance and industry context. 
Gompers (2002) shows that the probability of success is substantially higher for funds 
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operating in industries related to the parent company’s business. Although CVC studies 
analyzing the effect of industry context are not numerous, strategy scholars recognize the 
importance of industry context. According to Pablo (1999), it is widely agreed that research 
findings in strategy differ with industry contexts. Dess et al. (1990) shows that a lack of 
industry controls in what was referred to as the “40 most important strategy research 
contributions of the 1980s” led to inconsistent and misleading results. Miller (1987) shows 
that there are significant links between what he calls environmental characteristics, namely 
dynamism, heterogeneity, and hostility, and changes of strategy. 
8.7. Parent Firm’s Organizational Culture  
The parent firm’s organizational culture, as shown in Figure 6, is defined in this study 
(chapter 2.6) as being “based upon internally oriented beliefs regarding how to manage, and 
externally oriented beliefs regarding how to compete” (Davis 1984). CVC funds operate as 
separate entities within the parent company, some more autonomously than others. CVC 
managers interact with the parent company in investment decision-making, due diligence, and 
other services such as legal help. When the empirical data from the CVC and VC interviews 
are analyzed, large numbers of the CVC fund challenges are shown to link to interaction with 
the parent company. When these challenges are analyzed further, three main factors related to 
parent firm organizational culture are identified: parent firm view on innovation, parent 
firm view of industry development, and parent firm entrepreneurial spirit (List 28). 
These three factors are discussed in detail below. 
List 28 Factors related to Parent Firm’s Organizational Culture 
Parent Firm Organizational
Culture
- View on innovation
- View of industry 
development
- Parent firm entrepreneurial 
spirit  
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8.7.1. Parent Firm’s View of Innovation 
From the CVC and VC interviews, two issues are identified regarding innovation in the 
energy sector. First, many electric utilities did not perceive innovation as a key competitive 
advantage, which in turn makes the life of a CVC fund, concentrating on identifying new 
innovative business approaches promoted by new ventures, difficult. Second, even in cases 
where the parent firm realizes that scouting for new innovative business approaches is 
important, the parent company saw no urgency to act. The lack of urgency is due to the fact 
that parent companies are used to reacting to external regulatory pressures, not to business 
threats imposed by new external ventures. In other words, the CVC activity is not perceived 
as a crucial activity, but rather a convenient approach to keep track of the latest market 
developments.  
The term innovation has become a buzzword in many industrial sectors, with biotech, 
pharmaceuticals, and ICT leading the way. The energy sector seems to have headed to the 
opposite direction in innovation when measured in terms of R&D spending, both in the public 
and private sector. Kammen et al. (2005) studies the U.S. energy industry and finds that both 
the federal government and the private industry cut investments in energy R&D “at a time 
when geopolitics, environmental concerns, and economic competitiveness call instead for a 
major expansion in U.S. capacity to innovate in this sector.” According to Kammen et al., 
investments in energy R&D by U.S. companies fell by 50% between 1991 and 2003. When 
the energy sector spending is compared with other sectors, such as biotech, the picture is even 
bleaker. Total private sector energy R&D is less than the R&D budgets of individual biotech 
companies, such as Amgen or Genentech (Kammen et al.). An interviewed VC comments on 
the electric utilities as follows:  
[VC]: The way that the power industry has changed in the last three years 
has been one of reverting [...] to the kind of the core business of serving 
customers, generating electrons, and managing risks and things like that. 
Not really about innovation and not about innovating service. So, I think 
most of them have done away with innovation culture. 
However, previous research has shown that in order for the CVC activity to be successful, the 
parent firm organizational culture must make venturing a mainstream function of the business 
(Sykes et al. 1989) or create an atmosphere and structure that supports the innovative activity 
(Quinn 1985). In other words, the parent firm’s organizational culture must provide a 
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supportive structure for innovation, which may consist, for example, of R&D or corporate 
venturing activities within the parent firm. Creating a structure or atmosphere that nurtures 
innovation may take a long time to develop. According to March (1988), preferences tend to 
adapt in response to experience. Therefore, firms that have not developed competencies for 
innovation and R&D operations, also tend to lack a taste for these activities, which, in turn, 
shows in the level of organizational support a CVC fund enjoys.  
Currently, the large electric utilities have a strong hold on their customers, but not on energy 
technologies (stakeholder interviews, chapter 4.2.3). They are in the business of generating 
and supplying the heat and power service, but they are not in charge of bringing new 
technological innovations to the energy sector. For many electric utilities, competitive 
advantage through innovation is not a familiar concept. Kammen et al. (1999) argue that 
cutbacks in energy R&D during the past decades reduced the capacity of the energy sector to 
innovate. In the words of one interviewed CVC fund manager: 
[CVC]: The message is that it is really difficult to make a CVC unit exist [in 
a large electric utility] when you are not convinced that innovation will be 
the key in competition. [At] the corporate level, they don’t think that 
innovation will be the key in winning the competition. They think it is the 
price or classical services. 
Regulatory authorities, rather than identify new business innovations and practices, enforce 
the push for innovation in the energy sector.  
[CVC]: I think the extent to which the established corporations like [our 
company] are ready to accept innovation and invest in new business models 
largely depends on the regulatory framework. Because it is relatively stable, 
they do not have any urgency to change their business model. Just do 
nothing and do nothing new, is the best strategy. I’m definitely convinced 
that this is the best strategy. 
The independent VCs that observe the energy company CVC fund activities are more 
optimistic about the chances of success of CVC funds backed by energy technology 
companies than of the funds backed by electric utilities.  
[VC]: [Energy technology companies] are the ones that ultimately are much 
more focused on innovation [than electric utilities] because they know how 
to absorb it and turn it into a value proposition. There’s very little that an 
electricity company can innovate on, because again, ultimately, I think that 
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they are just in the core business of selling, you know, electrons. And there 
are no big changes that have happened [in] over two hundred years, not 
that long, sorry, but since the beginning of last century, that has really 
changed the way that the wholesale power has been delivered to customers. 
 
Proposition 8-1: A parent firm whose organizational culture does not view 
innovation as a key component in gaining competitive advantage negatively affects 
the performance of a CVC fund. 
8.7.2. Parent Firm’s View of Industry Development 
From the CVC fund interviews, a theme is identified regarding the parent firm’s view of 
industry development. The theme is concerned with the parent firm’s not recognizing that 
the surrounding business environment is undergoing a change and acknowledging that 
some of the new entrants could potentially threaten the firm’s market position.  
According to Bettis et al. (1995), the 21st century faces new aspects of competition and 
strategy due to rapid technological change, including the blurring of traditional industry 
boundaries as substitute products are developed in other industries. This phenomenon is 
starting to take hold in the energy sector. For example, several of the independent VCs that 
focus on the clean energy market have large non-energy corporations as investors. One 
example is the Canadian fuel cell VC fund, Chrysalix, whose investors include Ballard, 
BASF, BOC, Boeing, Shell, and Mitsubishi (chapter 5.2.1).  
An interviewed CVC manager comments on the views of his parent company managers on 
the change that is taking place in the energy sector:  
[CVC]: This industry is moving slowly, the driver is not technology but 
market power. So we are not really in the battle, even if [the new market 
entrants] claim that we are in a battle. In the mind of a manager, we are not 
in a battle. So we are anticipating here and it is not easy to anticipate in big 
companies. 
Many of the interviewed CVC fund managers indicate that the parent company’s views on the 
changes in the surrounding industry context and the introduction of new business models are 
in conflict with the views of the CVC fund, especially when it comes to acknowledging the 
speed of change taking place. As one of the interviewed CVC managers comments:  
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[CVC]: I’d say we are not completely mature in Europe today to think that 
the additional services and businesses will be the key to differentiate 
between the competitors. So [at the parent company] the battle was the 
price, and in the minds [of the people] it still is the price. And we [at the 
CVC fund] think that in two to three years, considering the mass market, 
this will be on service, competition on services. 
Although the clean energy market and the large-scale introduction of new technologies is still 
modest, many of the interviewed CVCs and VCs see the momentum for change building as 
the new technologies continue to flow to the energy sector and synergistic benefits among the 
new technologies start to be apparent.  
[CVC]: Right now, the biggest issue in energy is the decentralized 
production. It starts, definitely, in the technology sector with fuel cells and 
steam cells and whatever. And the more these technologies are stable and in 
the market, the more they will generate follow-up business. 
According to Aldrich et al. (1994), established industries may withhold recognition or 
acceptance of the new industry when they feel threatened. Sometimes they are even able to 
change the terms on which resources are available to emerging industries. This kind of 
blocking behavior is not foreign to the CVC managers, who involve the parent firm’s 
managers in the CVC fund investment decision-making:  
[CVC]: Then we have had deals that have been very convincing. And 
[corporate headquarters] say, “People are great, as a technology it seems 
to be very, very interesting.” Then came, “If these guys become a success, 
they will cannibalize our business. We cannot invest in a company that is 
cannibalizing our own business.” 
According to Abernathy et al. (1978) and Utterback (1994), product and process innovation 
follows a general pattern of three stages. In the first stage, during the early years of an 
industry, a high rate of innovation takes place and new players enter the market. However, 
making sense of the new developments may be challenging, since, according to Sanders et al. 
(2004), during the emergence of new industries, investors and analysts lack a codified body of 
knowledge and industry-specific experience. Therefore, identifying the winning business 
models among the various unproven but interesting models explored by competing start-up 
firms is difficult, even for an energy-company backed CVC fund manager. The CVC fund 
managers are, at times, in a position, where they see potential threats to the status quo of the 
parent company, but take no serious counteraction on behalf of the parent company itself:  
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[CVC]: I’d say it is not very easy to compete against [our parent company]. 
So perhaps we don’t see the sign [that we need to act], we see a lot of start-
ups working on these special systems to measure the consumption, to 
evaluate the right services to cut on consumption. But we don’t see a big 
movement of [a] large energy company heading to catch the value of these 
start-ups. 
 
Proposition 8-2: A parent firm whose managers have not internalized that their 
business environment is changing negatively affects the performance of a CVC fund. 
8.7.3. Parent Firm’s Entrepreneurial Spirit 
A theme related to the parent firm’s view on entrepreneurial activities within the organization 
emerges from the CVC and VC interviews. The theme is concerned with a lack of 
entrepreneurial thinking and spirit within the parent firm that is a cause of conflicts in 
the CVC fund and parent firm’s interaction. 
Levinthal et al. (1993) argue that organizations find and construct their private 
comprehensible worlds. The parent firm’s view of the world may differ strongly from the one 
present in the CVC fund. The organizational culture mismatch may lead to a clash of 
management cultures if the parent firm does not provide adequate autonomy for the venturing 
activity to establish its own more entrepreneurial management processes. An interviewed 
CVC fund manager comments about a clash he had experienced with the parent company as 
follows: 
[CVC]: [Our company], of course, tried to duplicate their controlling 
system here at [our CVC fund]. And I said, “Hey, I’m not willing to accept 
this.” Otherwise you are calculating every project to death. You are not 
able to [apply the corporate] mindset [to a CVC fund]. We have a different 
mindset and culture. 
One example of the entrepreneurial mindset mismatch may show in belittling the significance 
of the emerging industry context when compared with the existing business, as the following 
quote demonstrates: 
[CVC]: And [the person] from the corporate HQ was saying to me, “Hmm, 
you are right, obviously it is a great company, but do I really want to have 
this fight with the operations just because of this small company?” 
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According to Bettis et al. (1995), due to the increasing rate of technological change in the 21st 
century, firms in mature industries cannot remain static but are forced to develop an 
entrepreneurial mindset in order to survive. Changing the prevailing mindset means adopting 
a different worldview. Until recently, electric utilities in many countries have been part of a 
government-owned and -regulated entity (stakeholder interviews, chapter 4.2.3). For these 
firms, switching to an entrepreneurial mode of operation and thinking can be difficult. An 
interviewed CVC fund manager’s frustration was evident in his comments on the lack of 
entrepreneurial spirit in his parent company: 
[CVC]: You always have to ask why people are working with a big 
conglomerate or a big energy company and not working as an entrepreneur. 
They have a different spirit. And I asked a board member, very close 
relationship with the board of [our company]. And he said: “Look at these 
people. They are not entrepreneurs.” So you are trying to do something that 
is impossible, to move these people to your side. 
Another interviewed CVC fund manager describes his parent company’s research center 
activities as follows: 
[CVC]: It is always a question of people. And if you have a research center 
with 100 people or 200 people, they can gather all the information available 
in the world about technologies and trends and so on. But they are not 
thinking in terms of business, they are just thinking in terms of a department 
that delivers information. 
Foster (1986) shows that the reason incumbent firms fail in the face of technical change is not 
due to the character of the technology but the cognitive errors the managers make in 
understanding the challenge of the emerging industry context. One interviewed independent 
VC fund manager, who was following the CVC activities of energy companies, comments on 
the willingness of electric utilities to engage in business activities with small firms as follows: 
[VC]: The other characteristic of this industry might be that the utilities 
have a tendency to really only want to work with more mature companies 
and not with companies that they are concerned would disappear. Whereas 
you see in companies, like, you know, Cisco or maybe even in the biotech 
area partnerships between, you know, small lab companies and these big 
pharmaceutical companies. And, you know, lab companies don’t make the 
required discovery or something like that. They disappear or go away but 
this is probably their whole plan to work with this diversified portfolio of 
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small companies. Utilities don’t seem to approach it that way. So you have 
to pass a certain level of maturity before the utilities really want to do 
business with you. 
In a similar fashion, Henderson (1996) finds that radical innovation could displace incumbent 
firms for organizational reasons due to cognitive limits and inertia, in addition to the more 
rational reasons, such as unwillingness to render existing assets obsolete. One example of 
cognitive limits is the inability to adapt to a new way of serving the customers. An 
interviewed VC fund manager comments on the electric utilities and the way they conduct 
their business as follows: 
[VC]: So far, they’ve always looked like, “We are the utility and you are the 
subscribers,” and not like, “You are the customer, how can I serve you and 
make a business?” [...] And that is an attitude that, you know, “It has 
worked, so let’s not change it.” 
 
Proposition 8-3: Lack of entrepreneurial spirit within the parent firm’s personnel 
negatively affects the CVC fund’s performance.  
8.8. Risk and Organizational Decision-Making  
In the CVC fund manager interviews, two themes emerge regarding organizational decision-
making in risky situations, mainly concerned with venture due diligence and investment 
decisions as show in List 29. The first theme, gaining an outside view, both in technical 
and market matters, through the parent company’s involvement in the CVC fund 
investment decision-making, and thus balancing the overconfidence of the CVC fund 
managers, has an upside effect on the CVC fund performance. The second theme, involving 
the parent firm’s managers with no venturing experience in the decision-making, has a 
downside effect on the fund performance. 
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List 29 Factors related to Decision-Making in Organizations 
Decision - Making in 
Organizations
-Involvement of parent firm 
managers with no venturing 
experience
-Gaining an outside view 
through the parent company 
involvement
 
The parent firm’s risk-taking practices in the organizational decision-making process are 
argued to moderate the effects the parent firm’s organizational culture has on the performance 
of the CVC fund, as shown in Figure 6. The decision-making process regarding the fund 
investments often involves managers both from the parent firm and the CVC fund, making the 
decision-making behavior and the biases each party brings to the table critical in making 
decisions on venture investments, divestments, and the direction of the fund.  
The basic assumptions and values that are part of organizational culture also affect decision-
making in organizations. Kahneman et al. (1993) studies cognitive perspectives of decision-
making and argues that decision-makers in organizations are prone to two types of biases. 
First, their forecasts of future performances are often anchored on plans and scenarios of 
success rather than on past results, and are therefore overly optimistic. Second, their 
evaluation of single risky prospects neglects the possibilities of pooling risks and is therefore 
overly timid. Kahneman et al. introduce a concept of an inside view and an outside view. The 
inside view is generated by focusing on the case at hand, by considering the plan and the 
obstacles to its completion, by constructing scenarios of future progress, and by extrapolating 
current trends. The outside view is a conservative approach that relies on statistics of cases 
similar to the present one.  
One example of the outside view’s upside effect is the help provided by the parent firm’s 
technical experts in technical due diligence. The interviewed CVC fund managers tend to 
appreciate the technical knowledge that they receive from the parent company side.  
[CVC]: If you are investing in start-up companies, [the knowledge needed] 
is definitely more on the technical side, definitely. The evaluation of the 
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technology is really the core and very essential for calculating the risk and 
reward scheme.  
The parent firm’s managers can offer the “outside view” to the CVC managers in order to 
help balance the overly optimistic scenarios and thus avoid hype over a certain technological 
solution.  
[CVC]: For our investments, we have invested in very early-stage 
companies. It was really technical due diligence and we were working 
closely together with [our parent company]’s engineering.  And they do 
have four or five hundred specialists. Every specialist really has a specific 
area that he is concentrating in so you really get the best of technical 
experiences. 
Involvement of parent company personnel may also shield the CVC fund managers from 
overconfidence. Managers may view risk as a challenge to be overcome and believe that risk 
can be modified by “managerial wisdom and skill” (Kahneman et al. 1991 and Donaldson et 
al. 1983). Zacharakis et al. (2001) shows that VCs are overconfident in their decision-making 
and the same result can be assumed to apply also to CVC fund managers. 
[CVC]: In the beginning, we were very broad. Everything was energy but 
we were able to invest in batteries, for example, which was really not core 
of the energy business. But we were able to do almost everything. And it was 
really essential to do so. But as soon as we got into discussions with the 
operating units, and we had to get into contact whenever we make a project 
or an investment, of course, we have to involve them and to get some 
technical feedback. 
One example of the outside view downside effect is the involvement in the investment 
decision-making of the parent firm’s managers with no venturing experience. The parent 
firm’s managers’ involvement in the venture investment decision-making process may lead to 
overly timid decisions, demonstrating loss aversion as losses and disadvantages are weighted 
more than gains and advantages, favoring inaction over action, and the status quo over any 
alternatives (Kahneman et al. 1993).  
[CVC]: I had very deep discussion with all the board members, and also the 
ones that have been on my side. And I discovered one phenomenon. They 
feel definitely uncomfortable in making the decision if they were not able to 
understand the business. And you are not doing them a favor by giving them 
a proposal. The better way is to say, “Give me the money and let other 
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people [...] decide for this money.” So they can always say: “It was 
somebody else’s decision.” 
The loss aversion problem becomes especially severe when the CVC fund has to involve the 
parent firm’s managers in the investment decision-making who have insufficient market or 
technical knowledge to judge the investments accordingly. This involvement may lead to 
excessive loss aversion and inhibit the CVC fund from necessary risk-taking. Kahneman et al. 
(1993) proposes that one way to avoid excessive risk aversion is to analyze whether the 
organizational context in which the decisions are made is more likely to enhance or inhibit 
risk aversion. As the quotes below demonstrate, involvement of the parent firm’s 
inexperienced managers clearly enhances the risk aversion in investment decision-making. 
[CVC]: The problem was the corporate headquarters (HQ). The people who 
were deciding about the investments, they were corporate people from 
corporate HQ, they didn’t have any knowledge of the technical things and 
the market things. So they were very insecure. 
Fighting against loss aversion may require CVC managers to spend time on internal lobbying 
work, instead of focusing on the operation of the fund.  
[CVC]: So you have to convince people about the VC idea, who have not 
ever thought about VC. And maybe you get 50% of them, if you are really 
convincing. So it was pretty much fighting against the organization. 
 
Proposition 8-4A: Parent company involvement in technical and market due 
diligence positively affects the performance of the CVC fund.  
Proposition 8-4B: Parent company involvement in investment decision-making 
negatively affects the performance of the CVC fund. 
8.9. Measuring and Managing Success 
An important theme that emerged from the CVC interviews, the parent firm’s skills in 
measuring and managing success (List 30), is argued to moderate the effects the parent 
firm’s organizational culture has on the performance of the CVC fund, as shown in Figure 6. 
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List 30 Factors related to Managing and Measuring Success 
Managing and Measuring
Success
- Parent firm skills
 
The term managing success is, in this study, used to analyze the way firms reward the fund 
managers, the extent to which out-of-the-box thinking is encouraged, and the level of trust 
and patience the parent firm has with the fund managers. The term measuring success is used 
to describe the methods parent firms use to quantify the strategic and financial benefits for the 
firm.  
Managing success requires understanding what Levinthal et al. (1993) refer to as the political 
structure of an organization. Managers who have been successful in the past are launched into 
positions of power in the organization. These individuals tend to carry the recipe for past 
successes in their mind, which discourages out-of-the-box thinking. As Levinthal et al. argue, 
“Organizations code outcomes into successes and failures and develop ideas and causes for 
them.” This easily leads to a situation where unconventional thinking within the CVC fund is 
not supported or rewarded from the parent firm’s side. Levinthal et al. also notes that, since 
return from any particular innovation or technology is partly a function of the organization’s 
experience of the new idea, even successful innovations tend to perform poorly at first until 
the organization has gathered experience. An interviewed CVC fund manager comments 
about his parent firms’ disinclination to support innovative approaches the fund was trying to 
promote as follows: 
[CVC]: The problem [with venturing] is that if you are really innovative, 
you get in trouble with the traditional organization…And if [the ventures] 
are gaining market share, the headquarter or the operating unit is losing 
market share. And losing market share in the traditional sector or an 
operating unit is valued more than chances in the new growth area. 
All of the interviewed CVC funds are small compared to the annual turnover of the parent 
company. This may lead to a situation where failures get punished and success goes 
unnoticed. As an interviewed CVC fund manager comments: 
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[CVC]: So we have only risk and even if you are very, very successful, it’ll 
never be so successful that it will be reported in the quarterly report. So we 
as a supervising team can only lose. So if the money is [gone], the 
shareholders are asking, “What happened to our money? Is it really 
necessary to do these kinds of investments?” And if you’re successful, it is 
“So what.” 
Not having a clear view of how strategic benefits are measured and compensated and what is 
regarded as a successful execution of strategic objectives is also found as a constraining factor 
in the CVC fund managers’ interviews. Especially difficult for many of the interviewed CVC 
managers is finding a balance between strategic and financial objectives. 
[CVC]: [By focusing on strategic objectives], I’m definitely limiting 
potential. Sometimes you cannot do a deal that is financially very attractive 
because of strategic reasons. 
Since finding the balance between the strategic and financial objectives may be difficult, the 
fund managers may try to follow the traditional VC model and concentrate solely on the 
financial return.  
[CVC]: So, basically, it means we go after profits. If you don’t go after the 
profits, how do you know what you’re finding? Is it going to be the market 
leader in the future? So, by definition, if you can’t spot the best deals and 
get the best returns, you cannot spot what the market is doing. 
Measuring the success of the CVC activity is challenging, since the investment committee, 
consisting often of both parent firm managers and fund managers, needs to be able to quantify 
the strategic value of a venture investment in addition to the potential of future financial 
returns. Emerging industry operating procedures, competitive environment, firm size, and 
market dominance strategies may differ from the current industry context, making the 
strategic value quantification difficult for managers tuned to the current industry context. An 
attempt to fulfil the strategic goals may require easing on the financial targets, as the 
following CVC fund manager’s quote demonstrates: 
[CVC]: I’m now concentrating on delivering strategic benefits and maybe 
I’m suffering on the return side, because I cannot invest so many resources 
to making financially really attractive deals. 
In addition, the self-interest of the parent firm managers may cause bias in quantifying the 
strategic gains of the CVC activity. The financial returns from small ventures may also appear 
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modest when benchmarked against the existing business units. A more fair quantification can 
be reached by benchmarking the CVC fund against a similar fund outside of the firm. Parent 
company managers may also see an investment in a venture as threatening and attempt to 
contain a negative strategic value for the parent firm, especially if competing firms are 
investing in the same venture. As an interviewed CVC fund manager comments:  
[CVC]: It was odd to have so many other corporate [funds] in there. It is 
very hard to argue for this investment from a strategic point of view. If you 
go to your investment committee they say, “Ok, it is an interesting case and 
you have these risks and benefits.” But then they also notice that [competing 
firm] is inside and then they say, “Hey, what is [this]...competitive 
advantage? Maybe it is a disadvantage if they invest and we don’t.” But it is 
not so convincing. It is always more convincing when you say, “We have 
this exclusive deal and, if it is a big hit, we have the advantage to acquire 
[the] rest of the shares and make a huge business out of it.” That is really 
convincing. 
 
Proposition 8-5: Parent firms who fail to reward out-of-the-box thinking and 
accomplishments of the CVC fund, and have not been able to develop appropriate 
mechanisms to measure both strategic and financial success of the fund, negatively 
affect the performance of the CVC fund. 
8.10. CVC Fund Performance 
The majority of the CVC fund interviews were carried out between Fall 2003 and Spring 
2004, as is demonstrated in Table 21. When the current status of the interviewed funds is 
analyzed in October 2005, the electric utility-backed funds seem to have fared the worst, 
supporting the results of the study. Some of the funds are closed down, some still exist but are 
not actively investing, and some have been spun off to operate as independent VC funds. The 
first signs of the struggle are already evident during the time of the interviews in many of the 
electric utility-backed funds. In many cases, the parent firms of interviewed CVC funds 
seemed to have forgotten why the fund had been set up in the first place. 
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Table 21 Status of Interviewed CVC Funds, October 2005 
Fund Fund Status on 10/2005 Interview Date 
Electric utility CVC fund 
(RWE dynamics) 
Spun off from the electric utility via a 
management buy-out in 2005. 17.2 2004 
Electric utility CVC fund 
(MVV/Accera) 
Spun off from the electric utility via a 
management buy-out in 2005. 18.2 2004 
Electric utility CVC fund 
(Eon Venture Partners) 
Fund essentially closed down. 
19.2 2004 
Electric utility CVC fund 
(Vattenfall Europe venture) 
Not actively investing. 
5.2 2004 
Electric utility CVC fund 
(Suez NovInvest) 
Closed 
24.3 2004 
Electric utility CVC fund 
(EdF Business Innovation) 
Closed 
25.3 2004 
Electric utility CVC fund 
(EdF capital Investissement) 
Active, although no recent investments. 
24.3 2004 
Electric utility CVC fund 
(EasEnergy) 
Active 
17.2 2005 
Non-electric utility CVC 
fund (Norsk Hydro 
Technology ventures) 
Active, although not many recent 
investments. 
6.11 2003 
Non-electric utility CVC 
fund (Schneider Electric 
Ventures) 
Active 
23.3 2004 
Non-electric utility CVC 
fund (BASF Venture Capital 
GmbH) 
Active 
18.2 2004 
 
In many of the interviewed CVC funds, changes in the corporation leadership, re-organization 
of competitor CVC funds, and changes in the competitive environment affect the commitment 
corporations have in their CVC funds. As one electric utility-backed CVC fund manager 
frustratingly comments: 
[CVC]: What I see now is that all the CVCs [in the energy sector] are in a 
more defensive position. All of them, I cannot tell you one exception, are 
struggling with their own company. And everybody is looking at his 
competitor. And they say: “If they are closing their business, why should I 
  144 
be in this business? There are only risks and if I do nothing, I will be 
punished. If I don’t make the decision other people have already taken, 
maybe I’m proven wrong and I’m fired in two years”. So, it is very, very 
difficult. 
Some of the electric utility-backed CVC funds are already ramping down their business at the 
time of the interview, as times had turned difficult and the support of the upper management 
for the CVC activity had decreased. 
[CVC]: We are now [at] the low point of the curve for investment in the 
company, but we still produce a very high cash flow in the company, and so 
the priorities are now to consolidate and reduce debt, but in two years, the 
situation will change and we will come back to the investment period. And 
we want to keep the contacts so that when the investment will start again, 
we want to be ready. 
CVC funds were the first movers in the energy venture capital market prior to independent 
VC funds entering the market. The fact that several of them are planning to exit their 
investments due to changes in strategy, provides independent VCs with opportunities to get 
involved in clean energy investing at a bargain price:  
[CVC]: Some independent VCs are entering the market for energy, they are 
interested in it but they are a little bit hesitant, of course, because they don’t 
know too much about the business. So they really try to link with these 
[CVC] guys over their funds… That is definitely a trend. Others are, of 
course, going in a secondary market [.…] They can make great deals right 
now with the [energy companies]. 
The interviewed CVCs generally feel that one of the reasons independent VCs are not 
entering the sector in larger numbers is the lower level of knowledge, both in terms of energy 
markets and technologies. The interviewed CVC fund managers generally feel that they and 
their parent company, are accrueing some strategic benefits by learning through venturing.  
[CVC]: We have gone through a learning curve ourselves. We’ll now avoid 
capital intensive deals. The other lesson is the market adoption time: [you] 
just need to look at microturbines. Market adoption takes a lot of time. And 
people tend to be incredibly over-optimistic about that. And even when you 
have discussions with large suppliers on how long it takes to take products 
to the market, they can also be far [more] optimistic than they should be. 
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For many of the parent firms and their CVC funds, it also becomes clear that the unique 
selling points they thought had existed at the time of founding the fund, in most cases during 
the boom years of the late 1990s, are not supporting them in the investment activity. In other 
words, the struggle with the parent organization and the inability of the CVC fund to harness 
the capabilities, such as technical knowledge, of the parent organization to achieve a 
competitive advantage over other VC funds has not worked out as planned. As an interviewed 
CVC fund manager comments: 
[CVC]: Our previous model was that the pearl that we thought we [had] 
detect[ed], could not be detected by other funds, because they look[ed] at it 
with the financial eyes and we look[ed] at it with the strategic eyes. So now 
we just look at the [financial] opportunities, the pearls, and think of them 
also as strategic. 
8.11. Discussion 
The study presented in this chapter develops the notion of the role of the parent firm’s 
organizational culture as a determinant of CVC fund performance. The developed model on 
the effect of parent firm organizational culture on CVC fund performance consists of the 
following components: industry context, parent firm’s organizational culture, organizational 
decision-making practices, managing, measuring and compensating success, and CVC fund 
performance. Propositions are developed that can be tested in future research.  
The main argument that derives from the results is that understanding the parent firm’s 
organizational culture limitations may offer the firm tools to avoid the CVC fund activity 
pitfalls and diminish the chance for fund failure. The status of the interviewed CVC funds 
(Table 21) also indicates the difficulty of operating a CVC fund in general, and specifically in 
the area of clean energy. Corporations that are planning on launching external venturing 
activities should carefully consider the obstacles involved in operating a CVC fund. 
Significant savings in capital and labor costs could be achieved if a corporation planning a 
CVC fund would analyze the limitations of its organizational culture and the challenges posed 
by the surrounding industry context. Instead of a CVC model, maybe another internal or 
external venturing model would be found more suitable in the pre-launch phase.  
Chapter 9 contains a more detailed discussion on the findings, limitations, and contributions 
of the findings of this chapter. 
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9. Discussion and Conclusions 
The last chapter of this dissertation summarizes the findings and puts them in perspective. In 
addition, theoretical contributions of the dissertation and implications for practitioners are 
identified. Finally, limitations of the study and avenues for future research are presented. 
9.1. Discussion of Results 
The aim of this dissertation was to expand the knowledge base of clean energy venture 
entrepreneurial challenges, especially in the area of venture financing. Figure 7 shows the 
integration of the results from theory chapters 6 through 8.  
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Figure 7 Summary of the study results 
The results from chapters 6 through 8 come together in what is referred to as the clean energy 
venture financing triangle (Figure 7). Within the financing triangle, three stakeholders, 
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namely the venture capitalists, clean energy entrepreneurial ventures, and large firms in the 
form of strategic investors, operate and interact in the emerging clean energy market. Chapter 
6 identifies three main clean energy venture entrepreneurial challenges: financing, market 
education, and growth management. One of these challenges, financing, is identified as a 
common challenge for all clean energy ventures, independent of the clean energy industry 
category development stage. The financing challenge is studied further, in chapters 7 and 8, 
from the perspectives of VCs and CVC funds of large firms. The two other identified main 
entrepreneurial challenges, growth management and market education, were not studied in 
more detail in the consecutive chapters. Instead of studying the relationships between the VCs 
and clean energy ventures, or operational partnerships between large firms and clean energy 
ventures, the focus is on operational challenges within VCs and CVC funds. Chapter 7 aims 
to bring in new knowledge on cognitive risk factors of VCs. Chapter 8 brings new knowledge 
on operating a CVC fund from an organizational culture perspective. 
Since the goal of this study was theory-building, the dissertation employed a grounded theory 
approach. Three data collection approaches were utilized during the cource of the study. First, 
interviews with European and North American VC and CVC firms that have invested in clean 
energy ventures were carried out. Second, a clean energy venture financing survey that 
consisted both of qualitative, essay-format questions and some quantitative questions was 
conducted. In addition, interviews with clean energy stakeholders, media search, and 
attendance of conferences in the clean energy and cleantech area were carried out in order to a 
gain better understanding of the emerging sector. 
9.1.1. Clean Energy Venture Entrepreneurial Challenges 
Chapter 5.3 provides an overview of clean energy market drivers and shows that most OECD 
countries have national policies in place that provide support both for clean energy 
technological R&D programs and clean energy production. However, the current set of 
national and international energy policies are not enough (IEA 2004b). It is estimated that 
both the world’s energy needs and the CO2 emissions will be almost 60% higher in 2030 than 
they are now (IEA). An addition to introducing more effective policy instruments that support 
clean energy market creation, it is important to gain a better understanding of the challenges 
clean energy ventures are facing in developing new solutions to the energy problem. The goal 
of chapter 6 is to bring more light to the entrepreneurial challenges of clean energy ventures.  
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Previous literature related to cleantech industry emergence emphasizes system-level and 
policy perspective (Kemp et al. 1998, Tsoutsos et al. 2005, Jacobsson et al. 2000, and Russo 
2003). These studies widen the understanding of both system-level policy drivers and 
technological regime-induced barriers to clean technologies. However, cleantech or clean 
energy industry firm-level studies remain absent, even though entrepreneurial firms form the 
core elements of emerging industries. The need for further research among sustainable, or 
cleantech, technology entrepreneurial firms is identified in the previous studies (Jacobsson et 
al. 2000, Russo 2003). This dissertation employed a micro-level approach and studied the 
firm-level entrepreneurial challenges in clean energy market creation. 
The goal was to study the clean energy venture entrepreneurial challenges building on 
empirical data. The source of empirical data used in the theory-building was the clean energy 
venture financing survey that was specifically designed for the study. The survey data include 
firms less than 10 years of age that operate in the clean energy technology area. The survey 
received 164 eligible responses. In the course of this study, three main challenges of clean 
energy entrepreneurial ventures were identified. These three entrepreneurial challenges are 
financing, market education, and growth management. The financing challenge consists of 
one main factor, raising capital for the venture. For the survey respondent firms, venture 
capital funding had been the second most important source of funding (after the founder’s 
personal funds). The second main entrepreneurial challenge, market education, consists of 
three factors that surface from the survey: public perception, market education and awareness, 
and market acceptance of technology.  The last of the three main entrepreneurial challenges of 
clean energy ventures, growth management, consists of four factors: partnering, recruitment 
and retaining of human resources, growth management, and market dynamics.    
A study of three clean energy industry categories reveals additional challenges that vary 
according to the industry development stage. The three industry development stages are early-
stage, rapid-growth, and slow-growth stage. Fuel cells and other hydrogen related technology 
ventures are selected as an example of early-stage clean energy ventures. Early-stage clean 
energy ventures are found to face their biggest entrepreneurial challenges in the area of 
financing, growth management, and technology development and cost reduction. Solar 
photovoltaic technology ventures are selected as an example of rapid-growth clean energy 
ventures- and energy efficiency ventures as an example of slow-growth clean energy ventures. 
The major entrepreneurial challenges rapid-growth clean energy ventures face are found to be 
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financing, growth management, market education, and ramping up production while reducing 
unit costs. Slow-growth clean energy ventures are found to face their biggest challenges in the 
area of financing and marketing of their solutions. 
The main argument deriving from the study results is that clean energy venture 
entrepreneurial challenges concentrate on other areas than what the previous clean energy 
industry related studies have emphasized. In other words, in order to facilitate clean energy 
industry growth, further research needs to be conducted to understand the venture level 
obstacles in greater detail.  
9.1.2. Clean Energy Venture Risk Characteristics 
Previous research has shown VCs to favor innovation and emergence of a new sector for two 
reasons. First, new emerging sectors, such as biotechnology and ITC, have been financed, in 
large part, by venture capital investment in the early stage of the sector development. Second, 
venture capital has been shown to have a strong positive impact on innovation (Gompers et al. 
2001). The study was motivated by the fact that cognitive factors in VC decision-making 
remain understudied. During the past decade, some steps have been taken to understand the 
cognitive side of venture capital decision-making process (Shepherd 1999 and Zacharakis et 
al. 2001 and 1998), but cognitive biases, especially related to clean energy ventures, have not 
been researched.  
The goal was to develop a model of clean energy venture risk characteristics from the VC 
perspective. The source of empirical data used in the theory building was VC and CVC 
interviews and the clean energy venture financing survey. All together, 29 interviews were 
carried out among independent, corporate, and government-backed VCs, both in Europe and 
in North America. The clean energy venture financing survey was specifically designed for 
the study. The main argument of the study was that, in addition to risk characteristics that are 
generally recognized by both the VCs and the clean energy ventures, venture capitalists’ 
cognitive biases in decision-making create additional risk characteristics that make it more 
difficult for clean energy ventures to raise venture capital funding. Results of this study 
demonstrate that clean energy venture risk characteristics can be divided into two groups. The 
first group, consisting of five risk characteristics, is generally recognized risk characteristics. 
These five generally recognized risk characteristics are market demand and adaptation, 
incompatibility with the VC model, technology, regulatory control, and exits. Each of these 
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risk characteristics consists of several themes that are discussed in more detail in chapter 7.4. 
The second group, consisting of four risk characteristics, is cognitive risk characteristics. 
These four cognitive risk factors are investment outcome history, VC risk preferences, 
investment domain familiarity, and venture framing. The four cognitive risk characteristics 
consist of several themes discussed in more detail in chapter 7.5. For example, one of the 
identified cognitive risk characteristics, investment domain familiarity, is found to contain 
two themes: difficulties of VCs in identifying business opportunities and hesitancy of VCs to 
invest in an unfamiliar area. 
Based on the study, nine propositions that can be tested in future research were developed. 
The main argument deriving from the results is that cognitive risk characteristics of venture 
capitalists are key to understanding why clean energy ventures have received only a small 
amount of venture capital investment. 
9.1.3. Parent Firm’s Organizational Culture and CVC Fund 
Performance 
Previous literature finds that the strategic and financial outcomes of CVC funds of large 
corporations vary substantially (Sykes 1986, Siegel et al. 1988, Gompers et al. 1998, and 
Chesbrough 2000). The CVC funds are also found to be short-lived and more volatile than 
independent VC funds (Gompers et al.). The study was motivated by the following research 
question: Why is the outcome of CVC funds often disappointing, leading to poor performance 
or even a failure of a fund? 
The goal of the study was to complement and expand the clean energy venture financing 
challenge argument by empirically developing an organizational culture–based model that 
aims to explain how the organizational culture of the CVC fund’s parent firm affects the 
performance of the fund. The performance of CVC fund was defined as the degree to which 
the strategic and financial goals the firm has set for its external corporate venturing are met, 
measured by the level of activity and survival of the fund. In addition to developing the 
model, the motivation of CVC funds to invest in clean energy ventures was reviewed briefly. 
The source of empirical data used in the theory building was VC and CVC interviews and the 
clean energy venture financing survey. 
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The developed model on the effect of parent firm organizational culture on CVC fund 
performance consists of the following components: industry context, parent firm’s 
organizational culture, organizational decision-making practices, managing, measuring, and 
compensating success, and CVC fund performance. The model is based on the argument that 
the parent firm’s organizational culture affects the CVC fund performance. The effect of the 
organizational culture is moderated by risk-taking practices in the parent firm’s decision-
making process and the parent firm’s skills in managing, measuring, and compensating fund 
success. The industry context has an indirect effect on the fund’s performance through its 
impact on the parent firm’s organizational culture. The model components consist of several 
factors and themes. For example, three main factors that are related to the parent firm’s 
organizational culture were identified: the parent firm’s view on innovation, the parent firm’s 
view on industry development, and the parent firm’s entrepreneurial spirit. When the factors 
were studied further, more specific issues surfaced. For example, two themes were identified 
regarding the factor of the parent firm’s view on innovation. First, many electric utilities did 
not perceive innovation as a key competitive advantage. Second, the parent company saw no 
urgency to act, despite the fact that it had realized that scouting for new innovative business 
approaches was important for its future survival.  
Six propositions were developed that can be tested in future research. The main argument 
deriving from the results is that understanding the parent firm’s organizational culture 
limitations may offer the firm tools to avoid the CVC fund activity pitfalls and diminish the 
chance for fund failure. The status of the interviewed CVC funds was reviewed in October 
2005 (Table 21) and several funds were found to have been closed down, spun-off to operate 
as independent VC funds, or were in a non-active investment mode. The status review 
strengthened the study results and also indicated the difficulty of operating a CVC fund in 
general, specifically in the area of clean energy.  
9.2. Theoretical Contributions of the Dissertation 
The main contribution of this dissertation is in identifying theoretical models that explain the 
clean energy venture entrepreneurial challenges, how VCs view clean energy ventures from 
risk perspective, and how the organizational culture of a firm affects its CVC activity. The 
dissertation contributes to several bodies of literature in the area of entrepreneurship, new 
industry creation, corporate venturing, and venture capital research.  
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The previous literature has ignored firm-level studies related to cleantech and environmental 
technology industry and has focused on system-level studies only (Kemp et al. 1998, Tsoutsos 
et al. 2005, Jacobsson et al. 2000, and Russo 2003). The system-level studies have often failed 
to analyze whether the system-level environmental industry creation challenges correspond to 
what new firms in the cleantech, or environmental, area are experiencing. In this dissertation, 
three main clean energy venture entrepreneurial challenges were identified. In addition, this 
study analyzed how the entrepreneurial challenges varied according to the industry 
development stage.  
Venture capital research related to investment decision-making (Tyebjee et al. 1984, Fried et 
al. 1994, and Roberts 1991) has been mainly process-oriented. Some recent studies analyze 
the cognitive aspect of the VC decision-making process (Shepherd 1999 and Zacharakis et al. 
2001 and 1998). However, gaps in understanding still exist. This dissertation provides a 
model of clean energy venture risk characteristics by taking into account the venture capitalist 
cognitive biases. The study contributes to the venture capital literature by linking behavioral 
economics literature with the venture capitalist decision-making process. In particular, this 
dissertation has contributed to our understanding of why clean energy ventures have received 
only a small part of the invested venture capital to date. In this dissertation, four cognitive risk 
characteristics were identified, in addition to five generally recognized risk characteristics.  
This dissertation has also demonstrated that incumbent firms, especially the electric utilities 
that were the empirical focus of the CVC study of this dissertation, face big challenges in 
renewing their business through CVC activities because of the constraints related to their 
organizational culture. In this dissertation, three factors related to the parent firm’s 
organizational culture were identified that negatively affect the CVC fund performance. In 
addition, two moderating mechanisms in the area of decision-making practices, and 
measuring and managing success were identified.  
Finally, the dissertation has contributed to the emerging literature on clean energy market 
creation. The findings of this dissertation emphasize that a complex web of social, 
environmental, and economical factors are behind the clean energy market drivers.  
9.3. Managerial Implications 
The dissertation has concentrated on theory-building rather than testing previous theory. 
Despite this limitation, important implications for clean energy sector stakeholders arise from 
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the study. The findings of the study suggest several pointers to policy-makers, corporations 
planning to launch CVC fund activities, venture capitalists, and clean energy ventures.  
From a public policy perspective, understanding and internalizing the identified 
entrepreneurial challenges, growth management, financing, and market education is of 
paramount importance. First, educating the market is essential for the small clean energy 
firms. Although the survey sample cannot be used as a generic sample of the clean energy 
market due to biases in database building, it may still be concluded that the majority of the 
clean energy firms remain very small. Of the survey respondent companies, 73% employed 
25 people or fewer. Therefore, reaching out to the market and providing education to the 
consumers on clean energy solutions is very difficult for most clean energy companies due to 
their limited resources. Help from governmental programs that provide consumers 
information on clean technologies would speed the clean energy market development. For 
governmental and private sector programs that promote the clean energy market, providing 
enough help and resources to clean energy ventures on financing and growth management 
would enable the ventures to cross the “valley of death” safely and grow to a sustainable 
business. For policy-makers, understanding the clean energy venture risk characteristics helps 
to explain why clean energy ventures have received only a small amount of venture capital 
investment. The study findings also emphasize the importance of providing public policy 
instruments that aim to lower some of these risk characteristics, such as providing better seed 
funding opportunities, investing “patient government capital” into clean energy VC funds, or 
providing better R&D funding support for early-stage clean energy ventures. 
For venture capital firms, the implications of this study are to analyze the risk perceptions and 
risk propensities of their partners and investment analysts. The study of clean energy venture 
risk characteristics shows, for example, that overly homogenous venture capital firms having 
backgrounds in IT, telecom, and biotech might lead to missed opportunities in clean energy 
venture area.  
For clean energy ventures, an important implication of this study is to understand the clean 
energy venture risk characteristics from the VC perspective and identify areas for 
improvement. For example, clean energy firms should analyze how they present their venture 
proposals to the venture capitalists. Both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence show 
that the way venture proposals are framed has direct implications on how the venture 
capitalists view the risks and opportunities of the venture. In addition, the dissertation study 
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shows that CVC funds, especially the ones backed by electric utilities, may experience 
problems due to the parent firm’s organizational culture. Thus, the clean energy ventures that 
aim to raise funding from CVC funds should take the higher volatility and even possible 
failure of the CVC fund into account when choosing between the different investors.  
The study results bear implications also for corporations that are planning to launch corporate 
venturing activities. The status of the interviewed CVC funds in October 2005 (Table 21) also 
indicates the difficulty of operating a CVC fund in general, and specifically in the area of 
clean energy. The findings suggest that firms should closely analyze the parent firm’s 
organizational culture and the industry context in which the firm operates. In this way, the 
firm could identify the potential shortcomings in its organizational culture, such as view of 
innovation, industry development scenarios, and the entrepreneurial spirit within the 
organization prior to setting up the fund. A further study on decision-making processes and 
skills in managing and measuring success could be carried out in the firm to alleviate the 
negative effects, potentially leading to a better outcome of the corporate venturing activity. 
Significant savings in capital and labor costs could be achieved with this kind of pre-study. 
Instead of a CVC model, maybe another internal or external venturing model would be found 
more suitable in the pre-launch phase. 
9.4. Limitations and Directions for Further Research 
As this dissertation was concerned with theory-building rather than testing existing theory, a 
number of limitations to the results exist. The models and propositions were developed 
grounded in empirical data. In other words, the findings are based on empirical qualitative 
data and the theory developed in this study has not been tested in a quantitative manner. In 
addition, the theoretical scope is limited to clean energy market development. The empirical 
data of this dissertation are from the venture capital firm side limited to Europe and North 
America. On the clean energy venture side, the data are dominated by European and North 
American ventures, although some Asian and South American ventures are included in the 
data set. The applicability to other cleantech environments may be limited due to peculiarity 
of the energy sector.  
The findings and limitations suggest several avenues for future research. First, the developed 
models and propositions should be quantitatively tested and further refined. It would also be 
interesting to use empirical data from a cleantech category other than an energy-related 
technology in the quantitative testing of the results of this study. Furthermore, the effect of the 
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parent firm’s organizational culture on the CVC fund performance warrants further 
investigation, preferably in some context other than clean energy. 
Several additional topics for further research surfaced during the study. In chapter 6, three 
main entrepreneurial challenges were identified, but only one of the challenges, venture 
financing, was explored further in the consecutive two chapters. Future research could explore 
the two other clean energy venture entrepreneurial challenges, growth management and 
market education, in more detail. When the identified clean energy entrepreneurial challenges 
were mapped on the Van de Ven et al model (Figure 4), institutional arrangements did not 
appear significant. However, as discussed in chapter 5.3, energy policy and governmental 
commitments have made a significant contribution to the clean energy market development. 
The role of institutions and energy policy in the formation of clean energy markets, especially 
from the perspective of clean energy ventures and investors, would be worth exploring in 
future research. 
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